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ABSTRACT 
 
 Family forest owners control a majority of the South’s forest land and nearly half 
of its growing stock. These owners are a diverse group with widely varied objectives for 
ownership and management. Many family forest owners manage their holdings for timber 
production objectives and thus, are concerned with issues such as reforestation incentives 
and tax treatment of timber revenues. Their actual knowledge of the tax aspects of timber 
management varies, with some owners unaware of the federal income tax provisions that 
apply to timber. This study uses econometric techniques to establish socioeconomic 
predictors of family forest owner use of seven federal income tax provisions under the 
2001 public laws. The long-term capital gain treatment of qualifying income, annual 
deduction of management costs, depreciation and section 179 deduction, and deduction 
for casualty losses or other involuntary conversions are available to taxpayers in general. 
The reforestation tax provisions and the ability to exclude qualifying reforestation cost-
share payments are specific to family forest owners. Data collected from a mail survey 
conducted in 2001 with family forest owners in South Carolina is analyzed to show 
which socioeconomic factors (e.g., size of forest holding, ownership objective, education, 
age, income) impact whether or not a family forest owner is aware of specific income tax 
provisions, and more importantly, if the owner is aware of the provisions, which factors 
impact use of the provisions.  Since the initial study was conducted in 2001, prudence 
would suggest that the findings presented herein may vary from the findings of a like 
study conducted under the current Internal Revenue Code. Several of the provisions have 
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been altered since the initial study, one of the provisions, the reforestation tax credit, has 
been eliminated. A two-step sample selection methodology revealed that membership in a 
landowner organization and size of forest holding positively influence landowner 
awareness of the seven tax provisions, while ownership objective and level of education 
exhibit varying degrees of influences. Overall, the findings suggest that size of forest 
holding is the key determinant that influences landowner use of the provisions. With 
urban development and other social pressures decreasing average parcel size, additional 
efforts must be made to educate small family forest landowners on the benefits of the tax 
provisions offered through the Internal Revenue Code. Tax policy has profound impacts 
on the profitability of forest management; it also has the potential to be a huge player in 
the conservation of many forested tracts across the United States. Since size of forest 
holding was the most significant variable that predicted use of the tax provisions in this 
study, further research efforts examining the awareness and use of federal tax provisions 
by family forest owners must be exerted to understand the exact acreage classes in which 
landowners are more likely to utilize the provisions than not. This one piece of data 
would enable forestry researchers to develop tools to reach out to those who are not 
currently using them. If we as society value the many benefits that forests produce, it will 
be imperative to not only disseminate information on tax provisions, but also educate 
family forest owners on the benefits of them.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Family forest owners control approximately 62 percent of our nation’s private 
forest land (Butler 2008). This group of families, individuals, trusts, estates, family 
partnerships, and other unincorporated groups of individuals has been and still are crucial 
to maintaining sustainable forests in the United States and crucial to the nation’s timber 
supply (Best 2002).  Early in the twentieth century researchers, in the forestry arena, felt 
the management practices of these ownership groups were suboptimal relative to 
industrial owners, and this lack of intense management would eventually lead to a severe 
“timber famine” (Baker 1933).  Two major USDA Forest Service reports, the Capper 
Report in 1920 and the 1933 Copeland Report urged legislative action to provide state-
federal cooperation and public aid to family forest owners to encourage “rational” forest 
management (Dana and Fairfax 1980).  Through the years, several other cost-share and 
technical assistance programs have been developed at the state and federal levels to 
promote sustainable forest management.  
 Research on the small forest ownership “problem” has also been conducted since 
the 1940s.  Initial efforts used pine stocking index to define and compare management 
intensity levels. These studies eventually expanded to include landowner characteristics 
such as size of forest holding, farm ownership, occupation, education, and the like in 
efforts to identify relationships of these characteristics to forest management practices 
and landowner behavior. Many of these studies were conducted by state and federal 
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extension offices, and by the 1960’s and 1970’s the marginal value of additional studies 
was being questioned (Keniston 1962). By this time, some in the forestry arena were even 
calling the small forest ownership problem a myth.  
 In the early 1980s, the vast body of landowner surveys was found to be somewhat 
misleading to policymakers in the sense that they focused on “publicly desirable” instead 
of “individually rational” levels of forest management (Royer 1980). This prompted a 
redefinition of the “problem” and caused the scientific community to focus on the actual 
management behavior of family forest owners. The influence size of forest holding has 
on the economic efficiency of management practice germane to the establishment, 
management, and harvesting of timber also became more obvious (Cubbage 1983). 
Researchers noticed that other variables such as an owner’s asset position were related to 
the size of forest holding and influenced a landowner’s forest management decisions. 
Surveys at both the state and federal levels began to incorporate these important 
variables, among others in order to better understand what motivates family forest 
landowners.  
 Today, the National Woodland Owners Survey (NWOS) is the primary vehicle 
used to obtain information about family forest owners in the United States such as forest 
characteristics; ownership objectives; ownership history; forest use; forest management; 
information sources; concerns; intentions; and demographics (Butler 2008). The most 
recent summary (Butler 2008) of the NWOS data reveals that family forest owners across 
the United States is comprised of a diverse group of individuals who hold and manage 
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forestland for a variety of reasons. Many of these reasons for owning (e.g. Aesthetics, 
privacy or home, family legacy) do not provide an annual revenue stream to the 
landowner. When landowners manage their holdings for income producing objectives 
such as timber production, hunting lease and the like they must pay federal income tax on 
any revenue derived from their holdings.  
 The federal income tax has a profound effect on the profitability of managing 
forestland. Land expectation value, the value of forestland in permanent timber 
production is significantly affected by the tax rate applied to timber income (Guertin and 
Rideout 1987, Haney et al. 2001). Especially for low productivity sites, the economic 
feasibility of forest management practices quickly dissipates if the tax rate is increased. 
On the contrary, a landowner’s use of tax provisions that apply to timber (e.g. the 
amortization of reforestation expenses) can dramatically improve their returns (Royer and 
Moulton 1987). Unfortunately, landowner knowledge of the tax provisions that apply to 
timber, as well as other tax aspects germane to forest management varies greatly (Thrift 
et al. 1997). Moreover, despite the vast body of literature presented herein, few 
researchers have examined whether family forest owners are aware of or use the 
incentives and other beneficial income tax provisions found in the Internal Revenue Code 
(IRC). As beneficial as tax provisions can be to ensure sustainable forest management in 
the future, efforts must be made to bridge the chasm that exists in the literature- one of 
the aims of this study is to do just that. 
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 The objective of this research is to establish socioeconomic predictors of family 
forest owner use of seven different tax incentives: long-term capital gains treatment of 
timber income, annual deduction of management expenses, depreciation and the section 
179 provision, deduction for casualty losses and other involuntary conversions, the 
reforestation tax credit, amortization of reforestation expenses, and the ability to exclude 
qualifying reforestation cost-share payments from gross income. Logistic regression 
techniques coupled with a two-stage selection process will be used to develop models 
that examine which socioeconomic factors are associated with landowner awareness and 
landowner use of the seven tax incentives. In the first stage, the landowner awareness 
model will be developed. Then conditional on landowner awareness, a model will be 
developed in the second stage to determine which factors affected the use of each of the 
provisions.  
 Chapter two begins by discussing the historical basis of the small forest 
ownership problem in the United States. The chapter continues by giving the reader a 
thorough review of both the classical and current size of forest holding literature. The 
importance of the size of holding variable is also discussed here. Chapter 3 contains a 
literature review of the seven tax incentives examined in this study. The legislative 
history of each provision is given along with a summary of the germane literature. The 
chapter ends by reviewing the body of literature that focuses on the effects of tax 
provisions on family forest owners. Chapter four presents the methods used in this study. 
This chapter begins with a discussion on why logistic regression techniques were chosen 
for the analyses. The dependent and independent variables are identified as well. The 
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chapter concludes by presenting the diagnostic procedures and statistical tests used to 
determine the significance of the models. Chapter five presents results for the awareness 
and use models for each of the tax provisions examined in this study. The final chapter 
summarizes the findings of this study. The Appendix presents the data and models for 
each of the seven tax provisions examined. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SMALL FOREST OWNERSHIP PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 
 There are about 11.3 million private forest owners in the United States; of those, 
10.4 million are family forest owners (Butler 2008). They control approximately 62 
percent of our nation’s private forest land. In the recent past, these ownerships were 
categorized as nonindustrial private forests (NIPFs). Over the last few decades, large 
amounts of forest industry timberland shifted in NIPF ownership, requiring a shift in 
definition to family forest to better define these smaller ownerships. 
 Private forestland is now classified as industrial, other non-industrial, and family 
forest (Butler 2008). Since most data comes from U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) Forest Service surveys, the definitions of these terms are relevant: NIPF owners 
are defined as “family and individuals who own forestland and corporations and other 
private groups that own forestland, but do not own and operate a primary wood-
processing facility”. This group is a subset of private forest owners while family forest 
owners are defined as “families, individuals, trusts, estates, family partnerships, and other 
unincorporated group of individuals that own forestland.” NIPF owners are a subset of 
private forest owners and family forest owners are a subset of NIPF owners (Butler 
2008). Family forests have long been recognized as crucial to maintaining sustainable 
forests in the United States and crucial to the nation’s timber supply (Best 2002). Early 
forestry literature calls them small forests (as many of them are small in size;  over 60% 
of family forests are less than 10 acres in size), farm forests (many of the early family 
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forests were parts of farm operation), and eventually NIPFs. The forestry literature now 
primarily uses NIPF and family forest to identify these forests. 
 There are regional differences in family forests across the country. This is due to 
factors like federal forestland ownership patterns, varying silvicultural practices, and mill 
patterns. Family forest owners control over a third of the nation’s forest land and these 
forests are important in all regions. These regional ownership patterns impact many of the 
parameters that encourage or discourage sustainable forest management. For example, in 
regions with many small family forests, it is more difficult to practice sustainable forestry 
with tracts containing just a few acres. Plus, the large number of family forest owners 
means there is a diversity of ownership and management objectives. Moreover, these 
objectives are subject to change over time. Market forces, government regulation and 
ownership transfers may produce inconsistent trends through time. This makes 
encouraging sustainable forest management on these family forests a challenge. It is 
important to understand the motivations, limitations, and management objectives of these 
family forest owners because they own a large portion of the nation’s forestland and 
account for much of the nation’s forest outputs (Butler 2008). 
Historical Basis of the Forestry Problem 
 The ownership of small forests has been a fundamental issue in American forest 
policy since the early twentieth century. The owners of NIPFs, as they were called at the 
time, were thought to be managing their forests less intensively than other ownership 
groups and, since they controlled much of the nation’s most productive timberland, 
timber supply problems were likely to result. The NIPF has always been recognized as a 
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critical component of national timber supply; the result of the NIPF not producing its 
potential contribution of timber would be a severe “timber famine” (Baker 1933).   
 For the first few decades of the twentieth century, the forestry problem was the 
concentration of timberland ownership by a few timber barons. Often the practice of 
these timber barons was to “cut and run”, or abandonment of cut-over timberland. 
Eventually, this forestland moved into smaller private ownerships. Some of the earliest 
NIPF research studies concentrated on the growing stock on these smaller private 
ownerships and used a stocking index to compare management with other ownership 
classes (Folweiler 1944; Folweiler and Vaux 1944; James et al. 1951). While these 
indexes were arbitrary and did not take NIPF owner motivations and objectives into 
account, they led to an issue that still continues today: how to encourage better 
management of these small forests (Straka 2011).  This is a classic example of a market 
failure in which the needs of society are not adequately met by the suppliers.  Figure 2.1 
depicts a market where the needs of consumers are adequately met by the suppliers ( e1).  
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 In the case of the forestry problem, society demanded a supply of timber at e3 
(Figure 2). Thus creating a problem: how to induce nonindustrial landowners (as they 
were called at the time) to produce a supply of timber at D2 while preventing substantial 
price increases.  
 
 
Price
S1
P1
Quantity
D1
Q1
Figure 2.1. Supply and Demand in Equilibrium. 
e1 
Price S1
D2 S2
D1
P2
P1
Q1  Q2   Q3 Quantity
Figure 2.2 Supply and Demand With and Without 
Market Failure.
e1 
e2
e3
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 The solution to the forestry problem came down to a choice between federal 
regulation of private forestlands or some sort of federal-state cooperative effort to 
encourage improved forest management practices, especially in terms of reforestation and 
fire protection (Dana and Fairfax 1980).  The Capper Report in 1920 found “the kernel of 
the problem lies in the enormous areas of forestland which are not producing the timber 
crops that they should” and urged legislation “which will permit effective cooperation 
between the Federal Government and the several states in preventing forest fires and 
growing timber on cut-over lands” (USDA 1920). In 1924, Congress settled the argument 
with the passage of the Clarke-McNary Act that authorized federal-state cooperation in 
forest fire protection, tree planting, and forest Extension (Cubbage et al. 1993). 
 A second major USDA Forest Service report in 1933, the Copeland Report, 
continued to stress timber depletion and exploitation by the private forest owners, but 
suggested state-federal cooperation and public aid to private forest owners to encourage 
rational forest management (Dana and Fairfax 1980). Further resources became available 
to family forest owners with the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 
1936’s authorization of the Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP). This provided 
federal cost-share assistance to farmers and ranchers for approved conservation practices 
such as tree planting, timber stand improvement, shelterbelts, firebreaks, and fencing for 
protection against grazing.  
 Another assistance program, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) of the 
1950s, commonly known as the Soil Bank, had a similar goal of encouraging farmers to 
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convert marginal cropland to forest or grasslands (Dana 1956). Through the years, many 
cost-share and technical assistance programs have been developed that deserve 
mentioning. The Forestry Incentive Program of 1973 (FIP) was a timber production 
oriented cost-share program that mainly encouraged reforestation and timber stand 
improvement (Cubbage et al. 1993).  
 Many states were also developing state-level forestry cost-share programs during 
this same time. Virginia enacted a state reforestation program in 1971 that was funded by 
the landowner, a severance tax, and the general fund. Mississippi, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina passed similar programs that provided cost-share payments to family 
forest owners. Alabama implemented a program funded by the state’s general assembly 
while Texas initiated a program funded wholly by forest industry (Barber 1989).  
 The 1990s brought a major shift to federal forestry and natural resource financial 
incentives programs. The initiation of the Forest Stewardship Program (FSP) and 
Stewardship Incentive Program under the Forest Stewardship Act of 1990 replaced the 
timber-oriented FIP by a multiple resource program that included timber, wildlife, soils, 
water, aesthetics, and recreation (Wicker 2002). Other programs such as the Forest Land 
Enhancement Program (FLEP); the Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program; the Forest 
Legacy Program; and the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) were all 
introduced in the 1990s as environmental cost-sharing incentives varying in terms of the 
specific natural resource being sustained, objectives, and requirements for being funded.  
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 While many cost-share programs have been implemented over the years to 
encourage family forest landowners to engage in “better” forest management, the 
research community has also expended much energy to understand the “complexity” of 
this problem. While the early research efforts were focused on impending timber supply 
problems, through time, these efforts shifted to understand family forest owner 
motivations, expected behavior, and economic expectations (LeMaster 1978; Clawson 
1978; Clawson 1979). Some researchers even questioned if researchers were properly 
identifying NIPF owner objectives (Royer 1980). Considerable research since then has 
confirmed NIPF owners do have patterns to their behavior. Plus, other factors like 
individual motivations control behavior. All forest landowners are not alike and they 
have different objectives and views of their land (Schaaf and Broussard 2006; Davis and 
Fly 2010) 
Family Forest Literature 
 Research on the small landholding or nonindustrial private forest (NIPF) began 
about 1940 with one of the earliest NIPF landowner studies that mention size of forest 
holding as a factor that influenced a forest owner’s forest management behavior 
(Stoddard 1942). Other studies specifically listed size of forest holding as a variable 
impacting forest management (Barraclough 1950), but most of the classical NIPF 
landowner studies measured the quality of forest management using relatively subjective 
standards (Folweiler and Vaux 1944; Webster and Stoltenberg 1959). Great weight was 
placed on certain forest owner variables in these early studies, like farm ownership, 
occupation, and education. The studies were simple surveys and little effort was extended 
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to determine which variables exerted the most influence or might be correlated 
(Chamberlin et al. 1945; Poli and Griffith 1948; Southern and Miller 1956; Somberg 
1971).  
 Today parcelization is a major forestry problem that results from urban 
development and other pressures that decrease forest tract sizes. The basis of this problem 
relates to earlier size of forest holding concerns and influences of average tract size. Size 
of forest holding was recognized as a factor controlling forest management options; 
depending on forest owner objectives, forest practices may be limited by these small tract 
sizes. Stoddard proposed that perhaps a “centralized operating organization” might be 
necessary to address “the difficulties of technical direction, marketing, and logging” 
inherent with small tract sizes. Parcelization as a concept is certainly what he described in 
1942: “It should be pointed out that the larger concerns have followed the policy of 
selling off small parcels after an area has been logged. This practice has resulted in 
breaking up large forest units into tracts too small for efficient forest management. Many 
of the small-sized tracts are held for recreational purposes or used as farm woodlands. 
Nevertheless, the breaking up of larger tracts into many ownerships has tended to render 
numerous areas into units too small for economic forest operations, even though these 
units have not been and probably will be put into any other use” (Stoddard 1942).  
 
Traditional Emphasis on Size of Forest Holding 
 These early timber production studies noted that size of forest holding was a 
critical variable in terms of reforestation of cutover lands and quality of forest 
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management (often measured with a pine stocking index) (Folweiler 1944). Most owners 
of nonindustrial private forestland found their acreages were too small to adopt forest 
management practices (Chamberlin and Sample 1945). Their pine stocking index-based 
studies found this not to be the case. Similar studies in the same region found size of 
forest holding to be a key characteristic controlling timber production and that “larger 
nonindustrial holdings” were in an “appreciably more productive condition than the 
smaller ones” (Folweiler 1944). While not all early family forest owner studies identified 
size of forest holding as a crucial variable influencing timber production, most did 
recognize it as a significant determinant of forest management intensity by this ownership 
group.  
 Gradually the focus of NIPF research moved from surveys of NIPF landowner 
characteristics to determining the relationship of these ownership characteristics to forest 
management practices and landowner behavior. Asset and financial position surfaced as a 
critical variable. Other variables that were obviously correlated with a forest owner’s 
financial position gained importance: forest owner age, length of land tenure, inheritance 
of land, and education level. Better asset and financial position equated to better capital 
availability and, thus, more opportunity to manage the forestland (Perry and Guttenberg 
1959; Cole and Smith 1960; Worley 1960; Hutchison and McCauley 1961; McMahon 
1964; Fontenot and Marlin 1974; Kingsley 1976; Birch and Butler 2001; Leatherberry 
1997).  
 Tract size or size of forest holding was also a focus of European forestry research 
in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Restricted capital for investment was a limitation for forest 
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management on many properties; returns from forest management did not justify the 
investment in the eyes of many NIPF owners or limited markets for forest products 
discouraged tree intensive forest management (Zivnuska 1959). By this time some NIPF 
researchers were questioning the marginal value of additional research on the subject 
(Kenistion 1962). The NIPF problem remained part of the literature, but it moved beyond 
the landowner characteristics studies, and many authors questioned the definition of the 
problem (Preston 1956; Quinney1961; Plair 1962; Yoho 1962; Stoltenberg and 
Gottsacker 1967). By the late 1970’s and 1980’s the NIPF problem was even being called 
a myth (Clawson 1979; Glasscock 1978; Gould 1978; Sedjo and Ostermeier 1978; Kaiser 
et al. 1982). 
 Royer reviewed NIPF research studies and identified the dependent variables used 
to assess the landowner’s performance and noted that the earlier surveys appeared to have 
been somewhat misleading to policymakers (Royer 1980). The dependent variables that 
were being measured were typically derived as those that were “publicly desirable rather 
than individually rational levels of performance” (Royer 1980). Many of the studies in 
this category focused on psychogenic determinants of landowner behavior, like age, 
education, race, and occupation, and ignored sociogenic determinants. Not surprisingly, 
asset or financial position (or a proxy for asset position, like size of forest holding) often 
was found to be an important determinant of landowner behavior (Duerr 1948; Clawson 
1957; Row 1978; Cubbage 1983; Straka and Wisdom 1984). 
 As the NIPF problem was being redefined, NIPF research was refocusing on 
actual management behavior of NIPF landowners. The importance of size of forest 
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holding as a limiting factor in terms of economies of scale available to a forest owner in 
the establishment, management, and harvesting of timber became more apparent 
(Cubbage 1983; Cubbage 1982; Karppinen 2005). In addition, size of forest holding is 
known to be closely correlated with the forest owner’s asset position, impacting their 
availability of capital to invest in and manage forest land (Duerr 1948; Straka and 
Wisdom 1983). A classic study in Sweden (Streyffert 1957), and other studies in the 
United States, focused on the effects of tract size (Knight 1978; Gunter 1979; Thompson 
and Jones 1981; Fecso et al. 1982; Wiersum et al. 2005; Bliss and Kelly 2008; Zhang et 
al. 2009). The most recent NIPF studies and reports continue to examine this variable 
(Butler 2008; Straka 2011). 
Current Family Forest Literature  
 The classic NIPF problems still exist today but they are sometimes defined 
differently. One thing that is certain is that there is a better understanding of their 
foundations. The family forest continues to be important and modern versions of the 
same problems constantly surface. Parcelization is a very good example of this. It is the 
decrease in average family forest tract size as owners’ gift or sells forest holdings. 
Multiple heirs might be a reason for parcelization. Urbanization is one of the main causes 
of parcelization and it is most pronounced at the urban-rural interface. Of course, the 
fundamental problem is that average tract size decreases and the economies of scale 
inherent in a larger tract are lost. Also, as forest owners change, oftentimes new owners 
have different management objectives (Best 2002; DeCoster 1998; Sampson and 
DeCoster 1997; Mundell et al. 2007; Germain et al. 2007; Moldenhauer 2009; Haines et 
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al. 2011). Surprisingly, parcelization showed up in the classical literature as early as the 
early 1960’s (Schallau 1962; Schallau 1965). The use of the word “fragmentation” should 
not be confused with the more current issue of forest fragmentation which refers to the 
loss of forest cover and wildlife habitat as NIPF land is divided among more owners or 
converted to more developed uses (Vince et al. 2005). It is possible for parcelization to 
occur without forest fragmentation as long as the adjoined parcels retain their continuity 
without major disruption.  
 Forestry incentives developed as federal and state forest policies shifted to 
encourage forest management practices on family forests (especially reforestation and 
fire control). These incentives ranged from cost-share payments, technical assistance, 
technical advice, and favorable property and income tax policies. Most recipients of cost-
share funding were timber-oriented family forest owners (Kluender and Walkingstick 
2000; Megalos 1999; Stein 2001; Greene et al. 2004; Daniels et al. 2010). Cost-share 
recipients tend to be better educated and have higher incomes than the average family 
forest owner. Size of forest holding is one of the best predictors of cost-share use (Royer 
1987; Bliss and Martin 1989; Hyberg and Holthausen 1989; Lorenzo and Beard 1996; 
Amacher et al. 1998; Arano and Munn 2006). NIPF and family forest owners have been 
provided additional forest management assistance through education and technical 
assistance programs. Like other assistance programs, certain landowners tended to 
receive most of the aid. Forest owners with higher levels of education and income were 
most likely to receive this type of assistance, and size of forest holding, again, was highly 
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correlated with use of technical assistance (Bliss et al. 1997; Gunter et al. 2001; Kilgore 
and Blinn 2004). 
 Size of forest holding and characteristics related to size of forest holding like 
occupation, education, and land tenure are positively related to landowner adoption of 
incentive-based forestry practices (Muench 1965). One researcher suggested technical 
assistance would be more effective if it was leveraged through coordinated management 
of forest ownerships (Cloud 1966). One problem was that family forest owners were not 
generally aware of forestry incentive programs and participation rates were not high. A 
second serious problem was that many family forests were very small and lacked the 
basic economies of size necessary to implement some forestry practices (Guttenberg 
1950; Redman 1956; Bethune and Legrande 1960; Coutu 1960; Herrick 1960).  
 From early on, forestry cooperatives were seen as a means to achieve economies 
of scale of small forest properties (Aaltonan et al. 1938; Cope 1943). Various efforts were 
attempted at locations across the country and the concept is still popular today. Usually 
its advantages lead to increased technical assistance, better information, and increased 
(combined) economies of scale (Josephson 1963; Stoddard 1964; Dempsey 1967; Simon 
and Scoville 1982; Rosen et al. 1989; Sturgess et al. 2004; Hull and Ashton 2008). 
Successful applications of forestry cooperative association techniques from other 
countries have been applied in the United States (Kittredge 2005).  
 Current family forest research continues to stress size of forest holding as a key 
forest owner characteristic that influences forest management on family forests. Even the 
current family forest literature continues to show size of forest holding to be strongly 
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correlated with many variables related to forest management, especially forest owners’ 
technical knowledge, educational levels, and attitudes towards timber harvesting. These 
values and attitudes may be linked to the better asset position of these forest owners 
(Butler 2008; Cubbage 1982; Duerr 1974; Kuuluvainen et al. 1996).  
 Over time NIPF and family forest research has focused on timber production 
foregone due to lack of owner knowledge, insufficient capital, inefficient tract size, or a 
simple lack of interest (McMahon 1964; Duerr 1948; James 1950; Lord 1963; Birch 
1996). Consistently, income, education, and ownership objectives were correlated with 
forest management intensity, harvest and reforestation activities, and the use of cost-share 
assistance (Duerr 1948; Straka and Wisdom 1984; Hodgdon and Tyrrell 2003; Wicker 
2002; Belin et al. 2005; Butler and Zhao 2011). While key variables influencing forest 
management activities by family forest owners are well-known, the relationship between 
these variables and the controlling variables is less well-defined (Bliss and Kelly 2008; 
Streyffert 1961; Turner et al. 1977; Kingsley 1979). Owner income, asset position, 
occupation, and education are all positively correlated with size of forest holding. On an 
operational basis, size of forest holding is an easy statistic to obtain. Does size of forest 
holding exert strong influence on private forest management practices, or is it merely 
correlated with other variables that exert that influence? Size of forest holding has been 
shown to be an excellent proxy variable for these other variables (Straka et al. 1984). For 
example, a professionally-prepared forest resource management plan is highly correlated 
with timber harvesting and reforestation activities, but also is positively correlated with 
size of forest holding (Butler 2008; Williams et al. 1996). 
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 There are over 75 years of NIPF or family forest research literature and there has 
been a consistent family forest problem. That problem is that family forests are a huge 
proportion of private forestland in the United States and, due to many factors, there are 
doubts they will produce the forest products that may be required by society. In terms of 
timber there could be timber supply problems and higher timber prices. Over time the 
complexity of the family forest and even the “problem” was realized. Perhaps, 
economically-rational family forest owners should not be producing forest products.  
One fundamental relationship became apparent over time; family forests tended to be 
small and the trend over time was for them to become even smaller (parcelization). Size 
of forest holding quickly became one of the controlling variables. It apparently had much 
influence over a family forest owner’s ability and motivation to practice forestry. If size 
of forest holding was not a controlling variable, it clearly was correlated with variables 
that impacted forest management. The forest parcelization problem is based on the same 
foundation as size of forest holding as a family forest problem: small forest tracts, lack of 
economies of scale, and disincentives to practice forestry. 
 The National Woodland Owners Survey (NWOS) is the official census of forest 
owners in the United States. It is created and maintained by the USDA Forest Service. 
The NWOS provides useful information in understanding who owns forestland, the size 
they own, insight into why they own forestland, and how they manage it, future 
intentions, owner demographics, and other questions concerning the current state and 
future state of their forestland (Butler and Leatherberry 2004). Butler summarized the 
characteristics of landowners and size of forest holdings in a publication based on the 
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most recent NWOS (Butler 2008). His summary of size of forest holding relationships 
includes the following key variables from the NIPF/family forest literature:  
Land tenure: as the size of forest holding increases, the length of land tenure increases 
Land transfers: as the size of forest holding increases, transferred forestland increases 
Ownership objectives: vary by the size of forest holding 
Timber management objectives: as the size of forest holding increases, the probability 
that the owner has timber management objectives increases 
Leasing: as the size of forest holding increases, leasing by owners increases 
Cost-share programs: as the size of forest holding increases, participation in cost-share 
programs increases 
Management plan: as the size of forest holding increases, the percentage of owners with 
a management plan increases 
Management advice: as the size of forest holding increases, the likelihood of an owner 
seeking management advice increases 
Absentee ownership: as the size of forest holding increases, the percentage of absentee 
ownership increases 
 
 
 It is important to stress that the NIPF problem or family forest problem, both of 
which are based on the technical problems resulting from decreasing average size of 
family forest holdings (Clawson 1957; Row 1978; Cubbage 1983; Straka et al. 1984; 
Karppinen 2005), are not the same problem as parcelization. There is an interrelationship 
as the same socioeconomic factors are driving both processes; both have foundations of 
owner attitudes towards forest management that are impacted by tract size and affect 
much more than timber supply, including the whole array of ecosystem services, like 
wildlife habitat and clean water (Belin et al. 2005) . It is the combined impact of forest 
conversion and parcelization that are decreasing the number of forested acres, increasing 
the number of family forest owners, and impeding the ability to manage smaller and smaller 
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forest holdings (Stein et al. 2005; D’Amato et al. 2010). Size of forest holding represents a 
distribution of family forest owners by forest holding size (Butler and Leatherberry 2004) 
and that distribution has a tremendous impact on forest management due to the family 
forest owner attitudes and motivations towards important variables that control intensity 
of management, like ownership objectives, cost-share programs, management plans, and 
management advice (Butler 2008). 
Parcelization 
 Parcelization is the tendency for large forest holdings (parcels) with a single 
owner to divide into smaller forest holdings with multiple owners. This leads to problems 
of economic efficiency in forest management, disincentives for investment in forest 
practices, and greater management problems related to wildlife, water, recreational 
opportunities, soils, and ecosystem services. Parcelization has the potential to lead to 
fragmentation, where forest land is fragmented to widely dispersed blocks that limit 
ecological processes (Mundell et al. 2010). 
 Parcelization is the trend for number of family forest owners to increase, while 
average size of forest holding decreases, due to death, urbanization, income, regulatory 
uncertainty, and financial assistance for family forest owners (Mundell et al. 2007). This 
is a general trend from a few landowners with large forest holdings to many landowners 
with small forest holdings. Size of forest holding relationships provide the results of 
parcelization: increases in harvesting and transactions costs, more diverse forest owner 
objectives, and more diverse owner motivations and attitudes. The impact is on potential 
timber supply (the traditional concern), but also all ecosystem services, including wildlife 
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habitat, water quality, aesthetics, and recreation (Mundell et al. 2007; Germain et al. 
2007; Moldenhauer and Bolding 2009). Parcelization is a temporal process and size of 
forest holding a resulting relationship. That is our basis for suggesting that researchers 
make this connection. 
 It has two distinct dimensions: (1) an activity (the subdivision of a larger forest 
land parcel into two or more smaller parcels) and (2) an outcome (a landscape that has, 
with repeated subdivision of larger forested parcels, become parcelized). Parcelization is 
difficult to measure. Of course, most measures are temporal and center on how size of 
forest holding (parcel size) shifts over time. There are other types of metrics that have 
been used to measure this change and none have been shown to be perfect (Kilgore et al. 
2013). 
 The NWOS does a good job of summarizing key family forest/size of forest 
holding relationships. The NIPF/family forest literature supports the survey results and 
from the prior discussion more relationships could be identified. Our point is that this 
valuable prior research can be applied to the related problem of parcelization today. 
Forest parcelization is an on-going process and will continue into the future; the process 
ensures that size of forest holding will remain a central concept in family forest 
management. It is the current term for the small tract problem and urbanization is keeping 
the problem visible. There is a rich body of NIPF and family forest research literature and 
tract size relationships are destined to continue to be a focus of this research. 
 Parcelization has been incorporated into the general forestry literature. Often 
authors mention a size of forest holding article when discussing the background of 
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parcelization, but often they seem unaware of this connection. Sampson and DeCoster 
suggested the need for management strategies for small parcels and questioned what 
parcelization might do to conservation easement agreements (Sampson and DeCoster 
1997). This is an early example of an excellent discussion of parcelization that touches on 
many aspects of the size of forest holding problem without ever mentioning the earlier 
version of the problem. 
 There are many parcelization articles from the turn of the century that introduce 
the current version of the parcelization problem (Best 2002; Zhang et al. 2009; Haines et 
al. 2011; Harris and DeForest 1984; Shands 1991; Wear et al. 1999; Harrison et al. 2002; 
Rickenbach et al. 2003; Robinson 2012). The relationship of parcelization to population 
increases at the urban fringe or urban/rural interface are many, along with future 
implications (Vaux 1982; Bradley 1984; Macie et al. 2002; Kline et al. 2004; Nowak and 
Walton 2005; Germain et al. 2007) and how parcelized forest landscapes are 
characterized. 
 One study looked at landowner characteristics of urban immigrants in Washington 
state (or new small parcel owners) and analyzed the implication of variables like 
occupation, income (household and investment), management objective, and social 
responsibility (Creighton et al. 2004). They also clearly define the differences between 
forest fragmentation and forest parcelization. Cleaves and Bennett discussed unit, parcel, 
and ownership elements of holding size (Cleaves and Bennett 1995). They defined 
parcels as separate units in the ownership unit and noted that smaller ownerships have a 
greater variety of harvesting and silvicultural problems. Their article was technically not 
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on parcelization, but shows that size of forest holding was still considered a problem as 
the parcelization problem was developing. 
 Mehmood and Zhang’s 2001 study is one of the best examples of the interaction 
of parcelization and size of forest holding (Mehmood and Zhang 2001). They looked at 
“causes of parcelization in the existing literature,” then, with minor exceptions, ignored 
the huge body of literature on the subject of size of forest holding. Parcelization causes 
the distribution of size of forest holding and the literature on size of forest holding would 
provide huge insights into the results of parcelization. Granted, size of forest holding is 
not a cause of parcelization, but a result of it. However, as size gets smaller, it probably 
reaches a point where small becomes smaller, as there are limits on what can be done 
with a small tract. Their definition of parcelization was large landholdings shifting to 
smaller landholdings and they expected the process to lead to timber supply problems. 
They almost restated the traditional NIPF problem in defining parcelization. They 
anticipated an increase in harvesting and transaction costs and a greater diversity of 
landowner objectives (making forest owners less likely to include timber harvesting and 
forest management in their objectives). Factors impacting parcelization were the same 
ones impacting size of forest holding: land tenure (as death rate increases, so does 
parcelization), taxes (increased taxes lead to increased parcelization), urbanization 
(increased urbanization leads to parcelization), income (as income increases so does 
parcelization), uncertainty (as environmental friendliness increases, so does uncertainty 
over ability to harvest timber and to perform other forest operations), and cost-share 
programs (forestry incentives make timber growing more profitable and parcelization less 
  
26 
 
likely). All of these relationships could have been determined from a review of the family 
forest literature. 
 Other authors cover parcelization in the general context of the size of forest 
holding problem. Bliss described the two fundamental shifts leading to parcelization: 
changes in the structure and pattern of private forest ownerships and changes in the social 
values of the United States as it changes from rural to urban to suburban (Bliss 2003). He 
does define the traditional NIPF problem of poor forest management on family forests, 
leading to poor forest productivity, and the unpredictable behavior of family forest 
owners. Other researchers see the implications of parcelization as increased harvesting 
costs, increased prescribed burning costs, increased regulation, cost-share funding 
shifting to urban areas, and general forest operations limitations (Bliss 2003; Zhang et al. 
2004; Moldenhauer and Bolding 2009;Moss and Hedderick 2012) . The general idea is that 
small parcel size increases production cost per unit in harvesting operations, plantations, 
and general forest management. This means timber supply is generally positively 
correlated with parcel or holding size. 
 Despite concerns about the adverse impacts of parcelization, there has been no 
standardized convention developed to tell when or if a landscape has become parcelized 
in the first place, or whether it has passed a threshold such that adverse impacts begin to 
occur. For example, one study was based on digitized historical parcel maps from plat 
books for three Michigan counties and calculated parcelization as the change in average 
parcel size between three time periods (Dryzyga and Brown 1999), while another study 
was based on quantified parcelization for one New York county using digital tax maps 
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and six different area classes to track the total number and area of parcels between 1975 
and 2000 (Germain et al. 2006). 
 Researchers have also constructed life histories of parcels using “parent and child 
relationships,” the former referring to pre-parcelization and the latter referring to post-
parcelization parcels. Other researchers developed a parcelization typology to 
characterize different types of parcel split or aggregation events using digitized historic 
plat maps to track ownership changes in two townships in Indiana between 1928 and 
1997 (Donnelly and Evans 2008; Kittredge et al. 2008). Although these studies provide 
detail on the sequence change in specific landscapes over time, and in some cases, 
important drivers of these changes, they fail to provide insight into when or where 
thresholds of parcelization concern may exist, or how to effectively measure the degree 
or severity of parcelization in a landscape at any given point in time. 
 Few authors have focused specifically on measuring the degree to which a private 
forest landscape is parcelized. One study estimated the distribution of private forests and 
ownership in Massachusetts in different size class categories for one year to develop a 
proxy measure for parcelization, noting that average parcel size, as a measure of 
parcelized landscape, has deficiencies because it can be greatly skewed when a landscape 
has a large number of small parcels (Mundell et al. 2010). Other researchers used 
multiple metrics to examine the distribution of timberland holding size at the county level 
for 55 counties in Alabama. They found that several metrics must be used because the 
sole use of average parcel size cannot adequately capture information about the 
distribution of parcel ownership (Kilgore et al. 2013). 
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 Other researchers stressed the importance of selecting metric, scale, and threshold 
when characterizing a parcelized forest landscape. They evaluated four metrics (average 
parcel size, Gini coefficient, Shannon Entropy index, and adjusted mean parcel size) for 
their usefulness in characterizing the extent to which a forested landscape has become 
parcelized. Applying these measures to 410 forested townships in a contiguous, six-
county area of northern Minnesota, their analyses show that each metric typically 
describes a different pattern of parcelization due to each capturing different aspects of 
ownership patterns within a landscape. They demonstrate that choice of metric, landscape 
scale, spatial and physical ownership features, and threshold for determining when a 
landscape is parcelized can greatly influence conclusions regarding parcelization (Pan et 
al. 2009). Thus, researchers must give careful consideration to these factors when 
attempting to analyze a parcelized landscape and use caution when interpreting and 
comparing parcelization studies where one or more of these factors vary. Some studies 
focus on parcelization as a process and others as an outcome (Mundell et al. 2010; 
Kilgore et al. 2010). 
 About 75 years of research literature has developed around the NIPF or family 
forest problem (Yoho 1959). It has centered on the quantity and intensity of management 
practiced on family forest lands, the behavior and motivations of family forest owners, 
and the implications for timber supply and forest sustainability. Gradually the 
motivations of these forest owners were shown to be economically rational. It is the 
nature of forest property to become parceled over time. Larger forest holdings are divided 
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into smaller ones as estates are apportioned or development takes place. Clearly, 
population increases are leading to parcelization at the urban/rural interface.  
 The issue of parcelization has been in the literature for about twenty years and has 
become a major issue in the last ten years. It has attracted research. Often, the 
background size of forest holding problem that is well-researched is not part of the 
foundation for current parcelization studies. Moreover, the one area that has received 
little attention over the years is the role that tax incentives play in alleviating the “forestry 
problem”. The purpose of this study is to establish socioeconomic predictors of family 
forest owner use of seven different tax incentives. These results should provide insight 
into the socioeconomic factors (e.g., size of forest holding, ownership objective, 
education, occupation, age, income) that impact whether or not a family forest owner is 
aware of the provisions, and more importantly, if the owner is aware of the provisions, 
which factors impact use of the provisions. 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Ratification of the 16th amendment to the United States Constitution in 1913 
granted the US Congress “the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever 
source derived without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to 
any census or enumeration.” Passage of the 1913 Revenue Act quickly followed suit, 
applying a federal income tax to wages, salaries, interest, dividends, rents, entrepreneurial 
incomes and capital gains (Pechman 1987). Since 1911, the collection of income taxes 
from individuals has also occurred at the state level (Cushing 2006). Moreover, many 
states levy taxes on property held by individuals. 
 The collection of taxes provides a means to transfer resources from the private 
sector to the public sector. This influx of revenues into state and federal coffers allows 
governments to provide services without a direct assessment to the taxpayer in the 
absence of a market to determine the value of the services. Taxes also distribute the cost 
of government services among taxpayers (Cushing 2006). The aim of distribution is to 
equitably spread the costs of government services among those of the same income level 
and fairly between taxpayers of different income levels. Finally, a tax system has the goal 
to promote economic growth, stability and efficiency (Pechman 1987).  
 Taxes are also one of the many costs that affect landowner decisions (Siegel et al. 
1996). Family forest landowners can be subject to the assessment of a variety of property 
taxes: ad valorem, yield, flat, and exemption, in addition to the income taxes that they 
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pay at the federal/state level. The ad valorem tax is a tax assessed on the fair market value 
of the property. Fair market value is defined as the price a willing buyer and seller agree 
upon in an arm’s-length transaction (National Education Association 1998). A flat tax 
levies the same tax per acre, regardless of productivity level. Yield taxes are often 
assessed when timber is exempt from taxation (Hickman 1992). The severance tax bases 
the assessment on the value of timber at the time of harvest (Hibbard et al. 2001). 
Klemperer (1988) cites that one advantage to the yield tax is the matching of income to 
taxes. Finally, the last category of property taxation is exemption. This system exempts 
forestland from the property tax and may also apply to the timber growing on it.    
 Since the enactment of federal and state taxes, the federal government has also 
provided a number of provisions in the tax code to reduce family forest landowners tax 
liabilities owed from the sale of timber and encourage sustainable forest management. 
The following section will discuss seven different tax incentives that are examined in this 
study: the capital gains treatment of timber, the ability to deduct certain management 
costs from gross income, the ten-percent reforestation credit, the amortization of 
reforestation expenses, the Section 179 deduction and depreciation, the exclusion of 
qualified cost-share payments, and the involuntary conversion provision which covers 
losses caused by beetle attacks, ice storms, theft, and condemnation.   
The Capital Gains Treatment of Timber  
 The capital gain treatment of timber income is the longest-standing of the 
provisions examined herein; and has received the most attention from the legislative 
community of the tax incentives available to family forest landowners. Capital gains 
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result from holding an investment and then disposing that asset for more than the 
acquisition price or the basis of any asset that is considered be a capital asset. When the 
capital asset is timber, the basis is supposed to be established at the time the timberland is 
acquired. If the basis is not established, when the timber is disposed of a legitimate 
deduction will be lost and taxes on the proceeds from the sale will be higher than they 
need be (Stier 1997).  
 With the passage of the 1913 Revenue Act (RA 1913) timber was recognized as a 
capital asset when it was sold outright in a lump-sum transaction- as long as it had not 
been held by the owner for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his business 
(Siegel 1977 ). However, in the years following passage of the RA 1913 through 1944, if 
a landowner harvested timber themselves and then sold it, or used in their personal 
business, they were assessed at the ordinary income rates on whatever gain resulted. One 
case in point, an owner that harvested their own trees and then sold the logs to a sawmill 
was assessed at a higher rate than if they had sold the trees outright on the stump and let 
the buyer come on their lands to do the cutting. Moreover, the sawmill owner who owned 
standing timber and cut it for use in their mill were subject to the higher ordinary income 
tax rates on the timber’s increase in value.  
 Subsequent to the end of World War II, corporate tax rates increased from 15 
percent to 24 percent in 1940. This rate was increased to 32 percent in 1941, and again to 
40 percent in 1942 (Siegel 1977). Timber owners were finding it to be in their best 
interest to use outright sales as the method to market their timber. This encouraged a 
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liquidation of timber assets as opposed to long-term management of them.  The disparity 
in tax treatment of timber stemmed from a position taken by the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue which held that the disposal of timber at an agreed per unit price involved 
“retention of an economic interest” by the owner (Siegel 1977).  That is, such a disposal 
did not constitute a sale for capital gains purposes. The Internal Revenue Service later 
applied this same logic in a 1943 ruling which stated that proceeds received under a 
timber harvesting contract, as opposed to a lump-sum sale, were to be treated as ordinary 
income (Bureau of Internal Revenue 1943).  
 Congress responded to the growing complaints of this inequity by adding IRC § 
117 (K) to the Revenue Act of 1943 (RA 1943), which Congress passed despite President 
Roosevelt’s veto. This placed an owner who cut timber themselves, or disposed of it 
under a harvesting contract on the same tax basis as an owner who sold their timber in an 
outright sale. The house version of the RA 1943 provided no such differential treatment 
of timber income, while the Senate version proposed to amend Section 117 to include a 
differential treatment provision (Siegel 1977). The act passed both chambers with the 
Senate’s amendment intact on February 7, 1944. President Roosevelt, however, vetoed 
the bill and returned it with the statement: 
“The lumber industry is permitted to treat income from the cutting of timber, including 
selective logging, as a capital gain rather than annual income. As a grower and seller of 
timber, I think that timber should be treated as a crop and therefore an income when it is 
sold. This would encourage reforestation.” 
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The Senate majority leader at the time, Senator Barkley resigned and commented on the 
floor: 
“I do not know to what extent the President is engaged in the timber business. I do know 
that he sells Christmas trees at Christmas time. They are no doubt of easy growth and 
short life, and I have no doubt that the income from the sale of them constitutes annual 
income not only to him but that such income would constitute annual income to any other 
persons engaged in like enterprise. But Mr. President, to compare those little pine bushes 
with a sturdy oak, gum-poplar, or spruce which requires a generation of care and 
nurturing to produce in the forest, and from which no annual income is derived until 
finally it is sold, is like comparing a cricket to a stallion.” 
 Clearly, the 1944 Congress intended for capital gains to result under two 
scenarios mentioned herein- when the taxpayer was not primarily in the timber business. 
These are mentioned in the Senate’s Committee Report (Siegel 1977). However, the fact 
that Congress intended to extend the capital gains treatment to the timber industry as a 
whole – that is, those corporations and partnerships that held timber primarily to sale to 
customers or as a part of their inventory is a little  more turbid.  The majority of IRC § 
117(K) was reenacted as Section 631 of Internal Revenue Code of 1954. However, 
several significant changes were made: 1) the “timber” was expanded to include 
evergreen trees sold for ornamental purposes that are more than six years old when 
harvested. This provision allowed for the inclusion of Christmas trees as capital gains, 2) 
the date of disposal was defined as the date in which trees were severed from the stump, 
  
35 
 
except where payment is made to the owner under the contract before the timber is cut, 3) 
for the purposes of “disposal with a retained economic interest,” the term “owner” was 
defined as any person who owns an interest in timber, including a sublessor and a holder 
of a contract to cut timber.  
 The first of several challenges to eliminate a corporations ability to treat timber 
income as a capital gain came in President Kennedy’s 1963 proposal for the Revenue Act 
of 1964 (Kennedy 1963). In that same tax message, President Kennedy proposed to limit 
the capital gains an individual could claim from timber income to $5,000 annually. To 
partially offset the increased tax liabilities brought on by these new tax laws, the 
president also proposed that individuals and corporations be able to deduct reforestation 
costs from ordinary income of instead of having to be capitalized.  
 These proposals were met with widespread opposition, culminating in a House 
Bill with no mention of the administration’s suggestions with respect to timber. Instead, 
the House classified timber as a so-called “Class B” capital, affording it the same tax 
treatment that was already receiving. The Senate’s version struck this proposal when it 
rejected the complex capital gains package offered by the lower chamber. The final 
version of the RA 1964 did not alter the essential features of the timber provisions under 
Sections 631 and 1231 (Siegel 1977).  
 The capital gains rates were increased with the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 
1969 from 25 to 30 percent for corporations and 36.5 percent for individuals, including 
the preference tax. The Revenue Act of 1976 did increase the holding period for capital 
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gains.  A corporation’s treatment of timber income as a capital gain was first challenged 
by President Kennedy’s proposal of the Revenue Act of 1964. The President also sought 
to limit such treatment for individuals to $5,000 annually.  
 Passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 brought drastic changes to the tax laws 
that currently effect timberland owners. For industrial timberland owners, the TRA of 
1986 removed the capital gains tax advantage, subjecting them to ordinary income rates 
(Yin et al., 1998).  For family forest owners, the TRA of 1986 repealed the provision that 
allowed for up to 60 percent of long-term capital gains income to be excluded from gross 
income. The TRA of 1986 also eliminated the disparity between the capital gains tax rate 
and ordinary income tax rates, thus eliminating the capital gains tax incentive from a 
family forest owner’s repertoire of tax minimizing tools. The capital gains tax rate was 
later changed back to a maximum of 28 percent as a result of the Revenue Reconciliation 
Act of 1990 (Siegel 1996). The Revenue Act of 1993 expanded the ordinary income tax 
brackets to five, with a cap of 39.6 percent, presenting a major tax benefit to those whose 
income qualified as a long-term capital gain.  The last changes in treatment of timber sale 
income came with the passage of the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004. 
Passage of this law allowed lump sum sales to qualify under Code Section 631(b), 
disposal with an economic interest retained. This means that timber gains and losses are 
netted against other gains and losses from the disposal of business assets (Hoover 2005). 
Annual Deduction of Management Expenses  
 Most timberland owners incur some sort of management costs (Siegel 1987). The 
annual deduction of management expenses provision allows family forest owners to 
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deduct certain management expenses from gross income. The costs eligible for deduction 
include the day-to-day activities that are required to manage timber property such as 
hiring salaried labor, consulting forester’s fees, and travel expenses that can be directly 
related to income potential for the property. These types of expenses are considered 
“operating costs” (Haney et al. 2001). Other costs incurred, termed “carrying charges”, 
include property taxes, insurance premiums, and interest payments, all of which may also 
be deducted from gross income. The property does not have to generate income in order 
to qualify for this deduction; it is based upon intent to produce future income. Prior to 
1987 most management costs could be deducted from a taxpayer’s gross income. 
However, after passage of TRA 1986 management costs are treated in one of three ways, 
depending on how the land is managed. The first category pertains to timberland held as a 
business with the owner being an active manager. Under this scenario all management 
costs can be deducted. The second situation considers timberland held as an investment 
with the owner being an active manager.  In this scenario owners may deduct property 
taxes from their gross income with other expenses having limits based on investment 
income. The third scenario is termed “passive participation” and deals with timberland 
held as either an investment or as a business, depending on when the “ passive 
participation” began (Dee 2001, Greene et al. 2004). Landowners who began managing 
their land after October 21, 1986 were allowed to expense all of their management costs 
up to the point where expenses equal income (Siegel 1987). 
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Casualty Losses and Involuntary Conversions 
 Under Section 165 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC 1954) family 
forest landowners were afforded a tax deduction for casualty losses of timber. At the 
time, a casualty was defined as “Complete or partial destruction of property resulting 
from an identifiable event of a sudden, unexpected, or unusual nature” (Siegel 1970).  
From a forester and family forest owner’s perspective, timber casualties were seen as 
damage or destruction of trees from fire, storm, ice, flood, disease, insects, or any other 
unavoidable cause. However, in order to qualify for the deduction the destruction had to 
be sudden, unexpected, or unusual as contrasted with progressive deterioration through a 
steadily operating cause (Siegel 1970).   
 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969 the statuses of casualty loss deductions were 
at best confusing. The problem was to determine whether a casualty loss was deductible 
from ordinary income or was required to be treated with other gains and losses under IRC 
1231, where net gains are taxable as capital gains and net losses are not taxable. 
Taxpayers generally found the application of section 1231 as unfavorable as it often 
caused casualty losses to merely offset gains otherwise taxable as capital gains. The 
classification of the loss under prior law depended generally on whether the property was 
or was not insured. Under TRA 1969, casualty gains and losses, whether they relate to 
insured or uninsured property is first viewed together as a special category of gain or loss. 
If there is a net gain in this category it is to be handled through section 1231 and will thus 
be treated as a capital gain. If there is a net loss, it is to be deducted from ordinary 
income. 
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Depreciation and the Section 179 Deduction 
 The Section 179 expensing allowance originated as a special first-year deduction 
allowance that Congress included in the Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958 (P.L. 
85-866). It aims to reduce the tax burden on small business owners, stimulate small 
business investment, and simplify tax accounting for smaller firms. The original 
deduction was capped at $2,000 annually ($4,000 for a married couple filing jointly) for 
new and used business machines and equipment with a tax life of six or more years. 
Passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) increased the expensing 
allowance to $5,000 and established a timetable for gradually increasing the allowance to 
$10,000 by 1986 (ERTA; P.L. 97-34). Despite the substantial increase in the allowance, 
few firms took advantage of it. Passage of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 postponed 
this schedule from 1986 to 1990 in efforts to curb the growth of the federal budget 
deficit.  However, following the repeal of the investment tax credit by the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, use of the Section 179 deduction rose markedly.  
 Congress increased the allowance to $10,000, as scheduled, in 1990 and the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 further increased the allowance to $17,500 
(OBRA 93; P.L. 103-66).  Further scheduled annual increases of the allowance were 
authorized by the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-188), raising the 
allowance to $18,000 in 1997, $18,500 in 1998, $19,000 in 1999, $20,000 in 2000, 
$24,000 in 2001 and 2002, and $25,000 in 2003 and thereafter.  
 Depreciation allows family forest landowners to deduct up to $24,000 per year in 
qualified expenditures from their gross income.  Qualifying expenditures include 
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equipment purchases, roads, fences, and other such items used in the production of timber 
(Haney et al. 2001). The landowner must use the property as a trade or business to 
qualify, and the deduction must be taken the year the equipment is placed into service. 
For every dollar exceeding $200,000 of qualifying property, the deduction is reduced by 
a dollar. Of course, this provision does allow equipment, buildings, and other non-
permanent assets to be depreciated over their determinable useful life as they are “used 
up”. Timberland owners may depreciate equipment as long as the land is held as either an 
investment or as an active trade or business (Haney et al. 2001). The Section 179 
provision allows the qualifying costs, in effect, to be expensed in the current year, rather 
than be depreciated over a useful life. 
The Reforestation Tax Credit and Amortization of Reforestation Expenses  
 The enactment of Public Law 96-451 on October 14, 1980 made the reforestation 
tax credit available to small and medium-size landowners (not exceeding 2,000 acres) , 
depending on the cost of reforestation (Timber Tax 1981). The reforestation tax credit 
afforded landowners that spent up to $10,000 for tree planting costs such as site 
preparation, seeds, seedlings, and labor a 10 percent tax credit ($1,000) that could be 
subtracted from the amount of taxes otherwise owed to the federal government.  This 
allowed owners to capitalize direct costs incurred from reforestation such as site 
preparation, seeds or seedlings, and the costs of labor and tools required for planting or 
seeding. Equipment such as tractors or trucks used in planting or seeding was also 
allowed to be depreciated through capitalization.  
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 Under prior law, such capitalized costs were not eligible for the investment tax 
credit and could not be depreciated. Instead, the costs were offset against the amount 
realized from the sale or other disposition of the timber in determining taxable gain. The 
tax provision enabling taxpayers to amortize up to $10,000 of reforestation expenses was 
also authorized under P.L. 96-451.  This allowed landowners to deduct from yearly 
earnings the full $10,000 over a 7-year period.  The importance of the reforestation tax 
credit and the amortization deduction, the year they were authorized, can best be 
illustrated by considering the case of a taxpayer who earns $30,000/annually, files a joint 
return and does not itemize deductions.  Where the taxpayer spends $10,000 for 
reforestation, his liability pre- and post- 1980 would be as indicated in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 Tax Liability pre- and post- passage of P.L. 46-951. 
Pre- 
1980 
1980-
2004  
Gross Income $30,000  $30,000  
Reforestation Amortization Deduction (this is the first year 
amount) $-0- $714  
Adjusted Gross Income $30,000  $29,286  
Tax  $5,601  $5,361  
Reforestation Tax Credit $-0- $1,000  
Total Tax Liability $5,601  $4,361  
Total Tax Savings in the First Year $-0- $1,240  
* This is the first year amount. The deduction in years two 
through seven is $1,428. In year eight, it is $714.  
 
 Note that in the year of reforestation, the taxpayer receives the full benefit of the 
credit and only a part of the full amortization deduction. The Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 reduced the amortizable basis of qualified reforestation 
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expenditures under Section 194 with respect to which an investment credit is claimed.  
Thus, for example, was a landowner to incur $3,000 of qualified reforestation 
expenditures, under prior law he could claim a $300 investment tax credit and amortize 
his $3,000 of qualified reforestation expenditures. Under TEFRA, the landowner may 
either (1) claim an investment tax credit of $300, and reduce his amortizable basis by one 
half that amount (i.e., $150) , so that they may amortize $2,850 of qualified reforestation 
expenditures; or (2) claim an investment tax credit of $240 , and amortize the full amount 
of the $3,000 of qualified reforestation expenditures . 
 Both the seven-year amortization and the ten-percent tax credit were unaffected 
by TRA 1986. However, the changes that were made to the tax code created more 
complexity and forced timberland owners to maintain more accurate records and decide 
whether or not their holdings were held for investment or business purposes (Bettinger 
1991).  Dewitt and Raper (2007) cite that both the reforestation tax credit and 
amortization were federal tax expenditures that were profitable to the U.S. Treasury. 
Federal “tax expenditures” are tax revenues foregone by the IRS due to preferential 
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code , such as tax credits, deductions, exemptions, 
special exclusions or tax rates (OMB 1998). Federal tax expenditures are numerous and 
involve substantial sums of money that would otherwise flow into the U.S. Treasury 
annually. However, as noted by Dewitt and Raper, the reforestation tax credit and 
amortization expenditure differs from most tax expenditures in that its use can ultimately 
result in significant profits to the U.S. Treasury. Passage of the American Jobs Creation 
Act (AJCA) of 2004 brought changes to both the seven-year amortization and 
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reforestation tax credit provisions. AJCA 2004 amended the reforestation amortization 
section of the laws to allow family forest owners to deduct up to $10,000 per qualified 
timber property per year of qualified reforestation expenses, while eliminating the 
reforestation tax credit (Hoover 2005). AJCA 2004 also allowed landowners to amortize 
any amount in excess of $10,000 over 84 months. Since the data for this study were 
collected prior to the passage of AJCA 2004, we will examine the awareness and use of 
both the ARE and RTC provisions. 
Exclusion of Qualified Cost-Share Payments 
 With the passage of Public Law 95-600 in 1978, Congress authorized the 
exclusion of   qualifying cost-share payments from gross income, under IRC Section 126. 
Nine federal cost-share programs were available to timberland owners at the time (2001) 
the data was collected for this study, as well as a multitude of state cost-share programs 
that qualify for this incentive.  Government cost-share payments represent financial 
incentives to landowners to encourage reforestation on cutover lands (Royer 1987). 
Examples are the Forestry Incentives Program and the Agricultural Conservation 
Program. Family forest landowners must meet two conditions in order for the cost-share 
payments to qualify for exclusion from gross income: (1) the money must be used to 
conserve the soil and water, to protect the environment, to improve the forest, or to 
provide habitat for wildlife and (2) the amount of money cannot substantially increase the 
value of the property (Haney et al. 2000).  
 As one can see, tax provisions have been around for over a century, however, the 
complexities of the tax laws of today have made incentives more cumbersome and 
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difficult to comprehend. Yet, the research community has given very little attention to the 
awareness and use of provisions, as well as their effectiveness.  
Effects of Tax Provisions on Family Forest Owners- Literature  
 Family forests owners’ knowledge of federal and state provisions has not always 
been high. An early survey of small woodland owners in Southwest Arkansas found that 
none of the respondents mentioned the capital-gains treatment of timber income when 
asked about taxation (Perry and Guttenberg 1959). Other early family forest surveys 
never even addressed landowner awareness and use of forestry cost-sharing programs 
such as the Agricultural Conservation Program (Hutchison and McCauley 1961). The 
authors even inquired about the influence taxes have on a landowner’s plans for using 
their woodlands. However, they failed to ask whether or not landowners were aware of 
the tax provisions available to them. In another study, Quinney (1962) inquires about the 
impact of property taxes on landowner’s decisions, but fails to inquire about the 
awareness of tax provisions available to forest landowners. His study of small private 
forest landowners in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula found that property taxes did not 
appear to be a major factor affecting the decisions of the majority of those surveyed.  
 One of the earliest studies that inquired about a landowner’s awareness and use of 
forestry tax provisions was conducted by Schallau (1962). Schallau examined the private 
forest landownership in the urban fringe area of Michigan.  In addition to noting that 
property taxes had little bearing on the way those surveyed manage their woodlots, In his 
study, he cites that only 3 percent of those surveyed had taken advantage of the capital 
gains provision of the Internal Revenue Code. He notes an additional 9 percent were 
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aware of the provision, but never used it because they had not harvested timber products. 
Those that were aware and had not taken advantage of the provision either believed they 
would not have derived any benefit from it or felt the red tape involved was not worth the 
savings they would have incurred. When the provisions were explained to those 
surveyed, one-third expressed some interest, while 55 percent remained indifferent. Of 
those who had utilized the provision did not feel that it influenced the way they managed 
their woodlands. Contrary to his 1962 study, Schallau does little to inquire about the 
awareness and use of forestry tax provision in a 1964 study of forest owners and timber 
management in Michigan. Schallau (1964) does inquire about provisions specific to 
forest landowners in Michigan at the time of the study, The Woodlot Yield Tax Law and 
the Commercial Forest Reserve Act, both of which were designed to shift the incidence 
of tax on forest property from periods when no income was being derived to those 
periods when harvest cuts were made. But no attempt was made to ask about forestry tax 
provisions found in the Internal Revenue Code.  
 Farrell’s (1964) study of small woodland owners in the Missouri Ozarks is 
another example where only state specific tax provisions are mentioned. His examination 
of small woodland owners includes a question on whether or not taxes affect their forest 
management decisions, but fails to ask about any of the forestry tax provisions. The only 
tax provisions mentioned are those afforded to landowners by the Missouri Conservation 
Commission Forest Crop Law. Stoltenberg and Gottsacker (1967) surveyed a random 
sample of forest owners in six Iowa counties were asked whether or not they were aware 
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of a property tax advantage under the Iowa Forest Preserve Law, but no mentioning of 
the federal tax provisions is found in their study.  
 Koss and Scott (1978) profiled nonindustrial forest landowners of western 
Washington State. Their sample included a majority of landowners enrolled in 
Washington State’s Forest Tax Law- a tax provision specific to the state that made 
forestry more financially attractive. Nearly half desired more tax incentives to make it 
more profitable for landowners to manage their lands. Fecso et al. (1982) examined the 
management practices and reforestation decisions of southern pineland owners who had 
harvested timber. Their study is one of the first surveys to ask respondents about tax 
provisions offered under the Internal Revenue Code. Their findings indicate that tax 
credits and additional deductions for reforestation were likely to have an effect on 
approximately seven-tenths of the harvested acres in the South. At the time of their study 
tax credits and deductions for forestry investments had only been in effect less than a 
year.  Respondents rated improving capital gains treatment for timber income as having a 
high or moderate possible effect.  
 In 1987, Royer conducted a study in North Carolina between 1981-1984 
evaluating the use of cost-share payments, the ten-percent tax credit, seven-year 
amortization or the combination of all three by family forest landowners that had sold 
timber (Royer 1987). His study found that of the landowners that actively reforested, 80 
percent used cost-share money, 60 percent utilized the reforestation tax credit, and 55 
percent used both incentives.  In another study, Royer and Moulton (1987) found that of 
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farmers who had made a final harvest of their timber and then reforested, 71 percent had 
used the cost-sharing and/ or the reforestation tax incentives. Overall, their study reported 
that 48 percent of those conducting reforestation had received cost-share payments and 
58 percent had used the reforestation incentives. Bliss and Martin (1990) determined that 
cost-sharing by family forest landowners was beneficial, because they required a 
Registered Forester to manage their timberland. The authors also cited the fact that 
although many of the landowners would have done the work without the cost-share 
payments, the payments allowed them to do more.  
 Dee (2001; also see Greene et al. 2004) conducted a study of South Carolina 
NIPF landowners to determine the reasons for use and nonuse of forestry tax incentives 
and identify the characteristics of those landowners that do utilize tax incentives in their 
forestry operations. Their study showed that 78% of the landowners surveyed were aware 
that timber sale income could qualify as long-term capital gain, of those aware 85% had 
made use of it. A like percentage of respondents were also aware of the annual deduction 
of management expenses, with an 85% use rate among those aware. Only 50% of those 
surveyed in their study were aware of the depreciation and section 179 deduction for 
income-producing property. Of those aware, only 67% had actually used it.  Just 54% of 
their samples were aware of the reforestation tax credit. However, 78% of those aware 
utilized it. Like the reforestation tax credit, a little over half (56%) of those surveyed 
were aware of the amortization of reforestation expenses provision, with 80% of those 
aware using it. Greene et al. (2004) reported that survey respondents were least aware 
(42%) of the provision allowing NIPF landowners to exclude qualifying reforestation 
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cost-sharing payments from gross income. Of those aware of the provision 70% had used 
it.  Many of the responses from landowners not utilizing the provisions indicated that 
approximately one-quarter to one-third felt that the benefit was not worth the time and 
effort needed.  
 There is a vast body of literature dedicated to the small ownership problem. Most 
land grant universities and Forest Service experiment stations have conducted surveys in 
efforts to understand the complexities of the “problem” and develop and implement 
technical assistance and cost-share programs to encourage more forest management from 
this critical mass of landowners. Moreover, there is a subset of the literature dedicated to 
the effectiveness and awareness of these cost-share and technical assistance programs as 
they are developed and being used. However, there has been little attempt to determine 
which drivers influence the use of tax provisions available to family forest landowners 
under the Internal Revenue Code. This study seeks to fill this chasm in the literature 
regarding the awareness and use of tax incentives that are available to family forest 
landowners in the United States.  
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODS 
 The objective of this study was to establish socioeconomic predictors of family 
forest owner use of federal income tax provisions.  Income derived from timber harvests 
is subject to state and federal taxation. One would expect rational family forest owners to 
avail themselves of tax incentive provisions that minimize tax liabilities and increase 
their after-tax cash flow (Dee 2001, Greene et al. 2004). However, contrary to what one 
would think, not all landowners utilize these provisions. What socioeconomic factors 
contribute to a landowner who is aware of these provisions, and further, one who utilizes 
these tax minimizing strategies. This knowledge will provide valuable insights into the 
efficiency of the various tax provisions in modifying family forest owner behavior 
towards improved forest management practices. 
 The data utilized in this study were derived from a mail survey of South Carolina 
family forest owners initially used to determine the reasons for use and nonuse of seven 
forestry tax provisions. The authors of that study (Dee 2001, Greene et al. 2004) deemed 
a mail survey to be the most beneficial way to conduct the survey, and in turn, led to 
more results to analyze. Initial efforts were made to follow the total design method 
(Dillman 1978). However, budgetary and time constraints prohibited the survey from 
completely following the survey methodology outlined by Dillman (1978). Greene et al. 
(2004) obtained a list of family forest owners in South Carolina from a large national 
forestry organization. This entire list of landowners was utilized, less those addresses that 
were incomplete. The list of addresses covered every county in South Carolina so as not 
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to bias one area of the state. An unbiased picture of the entire state was one of the 
benefits of using the total design method for conducting the survey (Dee 2001, Greene et 
al. 2004).  A total of 1,350 questionnaires were mailed to South Carolina family forest 
landowners in late January 2001. About 100 of these South Carolina landowners lived 
out-of-state, with the majority of these in close-by East Coast states. The authors mailed a 
second, follow-up survey in early March 2001 to those that did not respond to the first 
questionnaire 
 The complete survey form is included as Appendix A. The survey instrument 
contained 58 questions, seven questions per incentive and nine questions on 
demographics. A cover letter was also attached to the survey explaining who was 
conducting the survey and why. Also included was a page with a brief explanation of 
each of the seven incentives that were covered in the questionnaire. The questionnaire 
was designed to ask the same seven questions for each of the incentives. The nine 
demographic questions were the last asked. These were mostly multiple choice questions, 
with several open-ended queries. The questions focused on whether an incentive was 
used and when it was last used. If an incentive was not used the questions then centered 
on the reason for nonuse. 
 A reply envelope addressed to Clemson University’s School of Natural Resources 
was included with each survey, giving it a more professional appearance. In order to 
maintain a record of the number of surveys returned, a running tally of returned 
envelopes was kept. In an effort to track respondents, the last page of each questionnaire 
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had a place for the respondent to sign their name. When the survey was returned the 
respondents name would then be deleted from the computer database so no second survey 
would be mailed. Several respondents did not provide a signature and therefore remained 
in the database. The discrepancies between the number mailed for the second survey and 
the number not returned from the first survey is a result of those landowners who did not 
provide a signature.  Also, several first-round surveys were returned after the second 
mailing was sent. Four hundred and ninety eight surveys were returned, of which 472 
contained usable forms, yielding a response rate of 35 percent. Those that were deemed 
unusable were either left entirely blank or were considered incomplete. The responses to 
the surveys were entered into spreadsheet form in a computer database. The data for a 
landowner’s awareness and use of the seven tax provisions (dependent variables) were 
entered in the database as a 0 or 1. Zero signified that the particular landowner was 
unaware, or if aware of the provision did not use it. A 1 in the awareness category 
signified that a landowner was knowledgeable about the provision, and likewise, a 1 in 
the use column signified that a landowner had used it. The demographic data (i.e., level 
of education, membership to a landowner organization, and the like) were entered as a 0 
or 1 as well, with 0 equating to a failure (did not belong to the category) and a 1 
signifying a success (membership to a category). The data for the total acreage (TA), 
forested acreage (FA), and percent of land forested (PF) were entered into the database in 
two forms: 1) the actual number of acres (for TA and FA) and the percentage in decimal 
form for the PF category (e.g., 0.8 equals eighty-percent of total land forested); and 2) in 
a 0 or 1 for multiple categories. A full discussion of the variables, both dependent and 
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independent will follow the next section. In the research community entering data in a 0 
or 1 format is often referred to as a categorical or dichotomous data set. This format 
requires the utilization of a specific type of model that yields the best fitting and 
parsimonious model, able to describe the relationship between an outcome (dependent or 
response) variable and a set of independent (predictor or explanatory) variables. While 
there are several models that will meet these expectations, for this analysis we chose to 
use logistic regression to analyze the data. 
Logistic Regression  
 
 Hosmer et al. (2013) give two primary reasons for using logistic regression in this 
setting. First, from a mathematical perspective, it is extremely flexible and easily used. 
Second, its model parameters provide the basis for meaningful estimates of effect.  The 
specific form of the relationship function used for the logistic regression model used in 
this study is: 
| 
	
 
	
1  	
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Where 
| = Probability of the dependent variable= 1. 
= the base of the natural logarithms  
= the constant of the equation and, 
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= the coefficient associated with the independent variable . 
The logit transformation is often used for the relationship function (Hosmer et al. 
2013).The transformation is defined as: 
g=ln   
Which results in = g      …     
The result of this transformation is that the logit g, is linear in its parameters; 
similar to traditional linear regression. An important difference between traditional linear 
regression and logistic regression models concerns the conditional distribution of the 
outcome variable. In the linear regression model the relationship function is  
!" |    …     and 
y= !" | + # 
Where 
# is the error term and expresses an observation’s deviation from the conditional mean. 
The most common assumption is that # follows a normal distribution with mean zero and 
a variance that is constant across levels of the independent variables (Hosmer et al. 2013). 
However, this is not the case with dichotomous outcome variables. The error term in this 
case can only assume two values:  0 or 1. In this scenario, the value of the outcome 
variable given x is expressed as: 
$  |  # 
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# in this case may only assume one of two possible values. When y=1 then  
#  1 % | with probability |, and if y=0 then # = %| with probability 1%| 
Thus # has a distribution with mean zero and variance equal to |&1 % | '. That is, 
the conditional distribution of the outcome variable follows a binomial distribution with 
probability given by the conditional mean, |. 
 In this study, the statistical software package JMP was used to perform the 
logistic regression analyses (SAS 2012). The analysis followed a two-step sample 
selection model to examine which socioeconomic factors were associated with landowner 
awareness of the tax provision. Then conditional on landowner awareness, a model was 
developed to determine which what factors affected their use of the provisions.  Two-
stage analyses have been widely used in the literature to analyze cost-share programs, 
hunting lease markets, and other forestry-related issues ( Starbuck et al. 2004; 
Ovaskainen et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2006; Hussain et al. 2007; Sun et al. 2009). In this 
study, a two-step sample selection model is employed to examine the determinants of 
landowner awareness and use of tax provisions. It is assumed that use of tax provisions 
are contingent upon whether these landowners are aware of the provisions.  In the 
selection stage, landowner awareness of a specific tax provision is modeled as a function 
of variables, comprised of landowner characteristics. In the outcome stage, landowner use 
of the provisions is specified as a function of similar explanatory variables. Conceptually 
the model is expressed as follows: 
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Selection equation: Zi = g (xi) 
Outcome equation: Yi = f (Zi) 
 Where Z is a binary variable that indicates whether landowner i is aware of an 
individual tax provision (i.e., LTCG, ADME, DS179, CLIC, RTC, ARE, ECSP); Zi 
equals one if the landowner is aware of the program, and zero otherwise.  Y is a binary 
variable that indicates whether landowner i has used the tax provision, and 0 otherwise. 
The variables of awareness (Zi) and use (Yi) are related but may be influenced by 
different explanatory variables, or by the same set of socioeconomic factors to a different 
degree. Therefore, Zi may be different from Yi. Both the selection and outcome logistic 
regressions were reported for each tax provisions. Upon completion of each analysis the 
receiver operator characteristic curve (ROC) and the odds ratios were examined to 
determine the soundness of each model. 
Dependent Variables  
 The dependent variables used for this analysis were awareness and use of the 
following tax provisions: long-term capital gains treatment of timber income, annual 
deduction of management expenses, depreciation and the section 179 provision, 
deduction for casualty losses and other involuntary conversions, the reforestation tax 
credit, amortization of reforestation expenses, and the ability to exclude qualifying 
reforestation cost-share payments from gross income. A summary of these variables can 
be found in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1. Summary of Dependent Variables. 
Variable Description 
LTCG2 Dummy= 1 if the landowner was aware of the program; 0 otherwise 
LTCG3 Dummy=1 if the landowner used the program;                  0 otherwise 
ADME1 Dummy= 1 if the landowner was aware of the program; 0 otherwise 
ADME3 Dummy=1 if the landowner used the program;                  0 otherwise 
DS1791 Dummy= 1 if the landowner was aware of the program; 0 otherwise 
DS1793 Dummy=1 if the landowner used the program; 0 otherwise 
CLIC1 Dummy= 1 if the landowner was aware of the program; 0 otherwise 
CLIC3 Dummy=1 if the landowner used the program; 0 otherwise 
RTC1 Dummy= 1 if the landowner was aware of the program; 0 otherwise 
RTC3 Dummy=1 if the landowner used the program; 0 otherwise 
ARE1 Dummy= 1 if the landowner was aware of the program; 0 otherwise 
ARE3 Dummy=1 if the landowner used the program; 0 otherwise 
ECSP1 Dummy= 1 if the landowner was aware of the 
program; 0 otherwise 
ECSP3 Dummy=1 if the landowner used the program;                   0 otherwise 
 
 First examined is the long-standing federal tax provision of capital gains 
treatment for the sale of timber. Found in Section 631 of the Internal Revenue Code, this 
provision allows for timber that is considered to be a “capital asset” to be taxed at rates 
lower than ordinary income, depending upon income level. The United States tax law 
defines a capital asset as any property (e.g. house, car, stocks, bonds) except that held for 
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sale in the ordinary course of business (i.e., assets defined under I.R.C.§ 1221) (Black 
1991  ).  In 2001, when the data was collected for this study, the four upper level ordinary 
income tax rates ranged from 28 percent to 39.6 percent, the corresponding capital gains 
tax rate was 20 percent. The bottom ordinary income tax rate of 15 percent had a 
corresponding capital gains tax of only 10 percent. Obviously, the result of income 
qualifying as capital gains rather than as ordinary income equates to substantial tax 
savings. The IRC also requires that timber be held for at least one year and disposed of in 
one three ways: the landowner must sell the timber in a lump-sum sale, under a pay-as-
cut contract in which the owner retains an economic interest in the timber, or cut and sell 
the timber himself. Finally, capital losses can be used to directly offset any capital 
income whereas with ordinary income there is a $3,000 limit to offset losses (Haney et al. 
2000). 
 The second provision available is the ability to deduct certain management costs 
from gross income. These costs include the day-to-day activities that are required to 
manage timber property such as hiring salaried labor, consulting forester fees, and travel 
expenses that can be directly related to income potential for the property. These types of 
expenses are considered “operating costs” (Haney et al. 2000). Other expenses, termed 
“carrying charges,” include property taxes, insurance premiums, and interest payments, 
all of which may also be deducted from gross income. The property does not have to be 
producing income in order to qualify for this deduction; the deduction is based upon 
intent to produce future income.  
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 A third provision is the ten-percent reforestation tax credit available to anyone 
who reforests his or her property. It allows for a ten-percent tax credit on up to $10,000 
of reforestation expenditures annually. This equates to a potential $1,000 tax credit each 
year reforestation expenditures are incurred. Recapture rules apply to the tax credit if the 
trees are not held for at least 5 years. The fourth provision, seven-year amortization, is 
tied in with the reforestation tax credit. The qualifying landowner is allowed to amortize 
(deduct) up to $10,000 of reforestation expenditures per year. Any amount amortized 
must be reduced by 50 percent of the reforestation tax credit taken. This means that if a 
$1,000 tax credit were taken, only $9,500 would qualify for amortization. The schedule 
for amortization is one-fourteenth the first year, followed by one-seventh the next six 
years, followed by one-fourteenth in the eighth and final year. The trees must be held at 
least ten years before they may be cut. If this ten-year period is not met, the tax savings 
from amortization are subject to recapture.  
 A fifth provision available is the Section 179 deduction  which allows for up to 
$24,000 per year in qualified expenditures to be deducted from gross income. Qualifying 
expenditures include equipment purchases, roads, fences and other such items used in the 
production of timber. The taxpayer must use the property as a trade or business to qualify 
and the deduction must be taken the year the equipment is placed into service. For every 
dollar over $200,000 of qualifying property, the deduction is reduced by a dollar. Of 
course, equipment, buildings, and other non-permanent assets may be depreciated over 
their determinable useful life as they are “used up.”  Timberland owners may depreciate 
equipment as long as the land is held as either an investment or as an active trade or 
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business. Section 179 allows the qualifying costs, in effect, to be expensed in the current 
year, rather than be depreciated over a useful life.  
 The sixth provision concerns government cost-share payments. Qualifying 
government cost-share payments may be excluded from gross income. Nine federal cost-
share programs are available to timberland owners, as well as a multitude of state cost-
share programs that qualify for this incentive. Examples are the Forestry Incentive 
Program and the Agricultural Conservation Program. Two conditions must be met in 
order for the cost-share payments to qualify for exclusion form gross income: (1) the 
money must be used to conserve the soil and water, to protect the environment, to 
improve the forest, or to provide habitat for wildlife and (2) the amount of money cannot 
substantially increase the value of the property (Haney et al. 2000).  
 The seventh provision available to NIPF landowners concerns timber losses 
caused by beetle attacks, ice storms, theft, and condemnation. These are termed 
involuntary conversions and to qualify the timberland must be held as an investment or as 
an active trade or business. Normal losses from diseases or natural mortality do not 
typically qualify for this deduction. Southern pine beetle attacks do qualify for this 
deduction. However, since they are deemed a sudden and unexpected loss, the amount of 
the loss that may be deducted is limited to the basis invested in the land. 
Independent Variables 
 The independent variables for this analysis were derived from nine demographic 
questions initially used to analyze the differences between the respondents in Greene et 
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al. (2004). The nine demographic questions focused on the landowner’s reasons for 
owning timberland, education level, household income level, and occupation. Also 
included in the demographic questions were queries about how many acres of forestland 
and total acres of land the landowner owned as well as the landowner’s membership in a 
forest organization and use of a written management plan. A summary of the independent 
variables used in the analysis can be found in table 4.2.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
61 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2. Summary of Independent variables. 
Variable Definition  
TA Total Acre owned by the landowner 
FA Total forested acreage owned by the landowner 
PF Percent of forested acreage owned by the landowner 
PRO Value=1 if landowner holds for investment purposes; 0 otherwise 
BTO Value=1 if landowner belongs to a landowner organization; 0 otherwise 
MP Value=1 if landowner has written forest management plan; 0 otherwise 
LOE Value= 1 if landowner has a college education; 0 otherwise 
OCC 
Value=1 if landowner is blue collar worker;0 otherwise 
Value=1 if landowner is white collar worker;0 otherwise 
Value=1 if landowner is farmer; 0 otherwise 
Value=1 if landowner is homemaker; 0 otherwise 
Value=1 if landowner is retired; 0 otherwise 
Value=1 if landowner works in a field that is not mentioned; 0 otherwise 
Value=1 if landowner is blue collar worker;0 otherwise 
AGE 
Value= 1 if landowner is <30 years old;0 otherwise 
Value= 1 if landowner is 30-49 years old;0 otherwise 
Value= 1 if landowner is 50-65 years old;0 otherwise 
Value= 1 if landowner is >65 years old;0 otherwise 
HIL Value= 1 if landowner's household income level is <$30,000; 0 otherwise 
Value= 1 if landowner's household income level is $30,000-$85,000; 0 
otherwise 
  Value= 1 if landowner's household income level is >$85,000; 0 otherwise 
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 All of the independent variables analyzed in this study have historical significance 
in the family forest research arena. And while an in-depth discussion of these can be 
found in Chapter 2, pages 8-15 of this manuscript, a brief summary of the independent 
variables follows. One could not consider conducting family forest research without 
examining the size of forest holding. The size of forest holding is revered by all in the 
forestry arena as the crux of the family forestry problem. Empirically, time and time 
again, it has proven that forest owner’s management decisions are driven by the amount 
of land under their control. Classical studies noted that size of forest holding was a key 
variable in terms of reforestation behavior on cutover lands. Others have identified the 
importance of size of forest holding as a limiting factor in terms of economies of scale 
available to a forest owner in the establishment, management, and harvesting of timber. 
The size of forest holding has been and is still known to be closely correlated with the 
forest owner’s asset position, which affects their ability to invest in and manage 
timberland. The size of forest holding variable has also been found to be a significant 
predictor of cost-share use and a landowner’s adoption of incentive-based forestry 
practices. 
 Researchers have identified a forest owner’s objectives as an important 
determinant of landowner behavior. In this study, the PRO variable captures whether or 
not a family forest owner holds his or her land for investment purposes. Forest owners 
who control forest land for this reason have been found to be more likely to engage in 
harvesting and reforestation activities, manage their holdings more intensely, and utilize 
cost-share assistance. Family forest owners who belong to a landowner organization 
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(BTO) or use a professionally prepared management plan (MP) have also been found 
more likely to engage in harvesting and reforestation activities. Level of education has 
also been tied with a landowner’s asset and financial position (HIL), as well as 
occupation (OCC), and age. All of these factors have been found to influence a family 
forest owner’s decision to invest in and manage forest land. Empirical evidence has 
shown that landowners with a college degree are more likely to seek professional advice, 
engage in harvesting and reforestation activities, and utilize cost-share programs.  
Analysis 
 Since much of the research over the last few decades has found many of these 
independent variables to be highly correlated, initial screening using contingency tables 
was conducted to detect any potential multicollinearity that may distort the analysis. 
Multicollinearity occurs when linear or near linear dependencies exists between the 
explanatory variables. This can adversely affect the results of the regression analysis. 
Traditionally, with least squares estimation in standard multiple regressions, 
decomposition of the correlation matrix of explanatory variables has been used as a 
diagnostic tool to determine the distortion multicollinearity has on parameter estimation 
and prediction. Although researchers have been unjustifiably utilizing these least square 
multicollinearity diagnostics for models comprised of dichotomous data, the normality 
assumptions of least squares linear regression does not hold with these data (Marx and 
Smith 1990).  One tool in the econometrician’s box that does allow for the accurate 
detection of multicollinearity when dichotomous data are analyzed is the contingency 
table.  
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 Contingency tables allow the researcher to detect multicollinearity by comparing 
the frequencies with percentages across rows (Allison 1999). When large percentages 
occur in the upper right- or lower left-hand cells, or vice versa, multicollinearity exists 
amongst the pair of explanatory variables being examined. It is up to the researcher to 
decide the magnitude of the collinearity and what steps need to be taken to mitigate the 
potential effects. In this study, it was determined a priori, that should issues of 
multicollinearity arise, a proxy variable would be used to estimate the variable that would 
be omitted from the analysis.   
 Contingency tables also allow the researcher to check for zero cell frequencies 
that may lead to issues with the analysis. Two types of zeroes may be observed: structural 
or random. Structural zeroes occur when a nonzero count is impossible because of the 
nature of the phenomenon or the design of the study (Allison 1999). Issues arising from 
the presence of structural zeroes may be alleviated by simply deleting the structural 
zeroes from the data set before estimating the model. On the contrary, in cells that 
contain random zeroes, nonzero counts are possible but a zero occurs because of random 
variation (Allison 1999). When random zeroes are present, at least one maximum 
likelihood parameter estimate is infinite and the fitting algorithm will not converge 
(Allison 1999).  This is often referred to as quasi-complete separation. Besides the case of 
random zeroes, quasi-complete separation can occur if the model perfectly predicts the 
response or if there are more parameters in the model than can be estimated because the 
data are sparse. The maximum likelihood estimates exist only if the normal equations 
produce a finite solution (Webb et al. 2004).  Allison (1999) cites that issues of quasi-
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complete separation may be resolved by recoding the problem variables, exclude cases 
from the model, or retain the model with quasi-complete separation but use likelihood-
ratio tests.  
 Examination of the contingency tables for the explanatory variables resulted in 
the use of the forested acres (FA) variable as a proxy for total acreage (TA) owned; and 
landowner organization (BTO) as a proxy for use of a management plan (MP). The FA 
variable was also used as a proxy for household income level and age. Since the initial 
study from which the data were derived was not designed around an econometric 
analysis, the occupation category of variables was omitted from the analysis because no 
logical grouping of this category could be made upon inspection of the contingency 
tables for possible multicollinearity and balanced data issues. 
 Upon completion of each analysis the receiver operator characteristic curve 
(ROC) and the odds ratios were examined to determine the soundness of each model. The 
ROC analysis is commonly used in clinical radiology research to express the diagnostic 
accuracy of imaging examinations (Eng 2002). ROC curves plot a test’s false-positive 
rate (FPR), or 1-specificity (plotted on the horizontal axis), versus its sensitivity (plotted 
on the vertical axis) (Obuchowski 2005). An ROC curve begins at the (0, 0) coordinate, 
corresponding to the strictest decision threshold whereby all test results are negative. The 
ROC ends at the (1, 1) coordinate, corresponding to the most lenient decision threshold 
whereby all results are positive  
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 The most popular summary measure of accuracy is the area under the ROC curve, 
denoted as “AUC” for area under curve. It ranges in value from 0.5(chance) to 1.0 
(perfect discrimination or accuracy) (Hosmer et al. 2013). There are three interpretations 
for the AUC: the average sensitivity over all false-positive rates; the average specificity 
over all sensitivities (Metz 1989); and the probability that, when presented with a 
randomly chosen landowner is aware of or uses a provision and a randomly chosen 
landowner who is unaware, the results of the diagnostic test will rank the landowner who 
is aware of or uses as having a higher likelihood for use than the landowner who is 
unaware. (Hanley and McNeil 1982)  
Odds Ratio 
 An odds ratio is a measure of association between an exposure and an outcome 
(Szumilas 2010). The OR represents the odds that an outcome will occur given a 
particular exposure, compared to the odds of the outcome occurring in the absence of that 
exposure. For example, an odds of 5 means we expect 5times as many occurrences as 
non-occurrences. An odds ratio less than 1 corresponds to probabilities below 0.5 while 
odds greater than 1 correspond to probabilities greater than 0.5 (Allison 1999). Like 
probabilities, odds have a lower bound of 0, but unlike probabilities, there is no upper 
bound on the odds (Allison 1999). When a logistic regression is calculated, the regression 
coefficient is the estimated increase in the log odds of the outcome per unit increase in 
awareness and use. In other words, the exponential function of the regression coefficient 
is the odds ratio associated with a one-unit increase in awareness. Another type of odds 
ratio reported in this study is the range odds ratios. In the case of continuous variables 
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(e.g. size of forest holding and percent of forested acreage), the range odds ratio gives the 
odds of landowner being aware or using one the seven tax provisions over the range of 
the continuous variable.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Descriptive Statistics -Dependent Variables 
 The descriptive statistics for the dependent variables used in this study are 
presented in Table 5.1. Landowner awareness and use of each provision was measured by 
a binary variable so its mean also revealed the percentage.  Awareness of the provisions 
varied widely, with respondents being most aware of the capital gains treatment of timber 
sale revenue (LTCG) and the annual deduction of forest management costs (ADME) 
incentives (Table 5.1). While a substantial percentage ( >75%) of the respondents were 
aware of these two provisions, just over half were aware of the reforestation tax credit 
(RTC), seven year amortization of reforestation expenses (ARE) ,  section 179 
depreciation (DS179), and casualty losses and involuntary conversions  (CLIC) 
provisions (Table 5.1)  . Only 41 percent of respondents indicated they were aware of the 
exclusion of qualifying cost-share (ECSP) incentive (Table 5.1). For those not aware of 
the tax provisions, many reported that their accountants most likely had at least some 
knowledge of the existence of the provisions (Dee 2001). 
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Table 5.1. Awareness and Use of the Forestry Tax Incentives (Dee 2001). 
Forestry Tax Incentive 
Knowledge of 
Incentive Use of Incentive 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
        
Capital Gains Treatment 360/465 77 304/360 84 
Management Cost 359/465 77 304/359 85 
Timber Losses 273/465 59 61/273 22 
Depreciation/Deductions 233/465 50 153/233 66 
Tax Credit 251/465 54 195/251 78 
Seven-year Amortization 256/465 55 203/256 79 
Cost-Share Payments 191/465 41 135/191 71 
 
 Utilization of the first six provisions ranged from two-thirds to 85 percent (Table 
5.1). Only 22 percent indicated they had taken advantage of CLIC, but given this 
incentive is subject to opportunity, the low percentage is understandable. Overall, 
respondents’ awareness of the tax incentives is relatively high, as well as use (Table 5.1). 
The savings derived from classifying timber income as a capital gain can lead to 
significant tax savings. Moreover, for landowners that actively manage their forestland, 
being able to deduct these management costs on an annual basis leads to substantial tax 
savings each year.  
 The RTC and ARE incentives are closely tied in terms of landowner awareness as 
well as in their actual use. Over 50 percent of the respondents were aware of these two 
incentives, with nearly 80 percent of those aware indicating that they had used the 
provisions (Table 5.1).  
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 The respondents knew least about ECSP, which allows owners to exclude 
qualifying cost-share payments from gross income. Despite low awareness ( 41percent), 
71 percent of those who knew about it had in fact used the tax provision in the past 
(Table 5.1). The second least known tax incentive available to NIPF landowners dealt 
with deductions and depreciation, DS179 (Table 5.1). Only 50 percent of the respondents 
claimed having knowledge about these provisions. Of those aware, only 66 percent had 
used them, making them the second least used tax incentive available (Table 5.1).  
 Although awareness of CLIC, which deals with timber losses resulting from theft, 
condemnation or disease was the third most widely known about ( 59 percent), only 22 
percent reported using this provision in the past. Since this provision is subject to actual 
timber losses the low usage percentage is in part due to landowner’s lack of timber losses 
to claim (Table 5.1).  
 Overall landowner’s awareness of the forestry income tax incentives appears to be 
relatively high with the exception of the cost-share and depreciation/deduction incentives. 
Landowners knowledgeable about the incentives tend to use the tax provisions, except for 
the timber loss provision (CLIC). Despite this, a substantial number of NIPF landowners 
lack awareness of key incentives and others choose not to utilize them.  
Descriptive Statistics- Independent Variables 
 Since the independent variables for landowners holding membership in a 
landowner organization (BTO), having a college education (LOE), and holding land for 
investment purposes (PRO-I) are dichotomous, like the dependent variables, their means 
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also revealed the percentages. Awareness and use of the tax incentives exhibited similar 
trends for the independent variables as the dependent variables (Table 5.2).   
 
Table 5.2. Awareness and Use (Conditional on Awareness) of Each Tax Incentive by Independent 
Variable. 
Incentive 
Independent Variable 
BTO LOE PRO-I 
Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage 
LTCG Aware 260/465 56 264/465 57 270/465 58 Use 221/360 61 224/360 62 228/360 63 
ADME Aware 264/465 57 265/465 57 275/465 59 Use 226/359 63 225/359 63 237/359 66 
CLIC Aware 209/465 45 212/465 46 214/465 46 Use 43/273 16 51/273 19 48/273 18 
DS179 Aware 175/465 38 178/465 38 179/465 38 Use 119/233 51 115/233 49 120/233 52 
RTC 
Aware 190/465 41 189/465 41 198/465 43 
Use 150/251 60 150/251 60 161/251 64 
ARE 
Aware 192/465 41 200/465 43 210/465 45 
Use 149/256 58 158/256 62 171/256 67 
ECSP 
Aware 149/465 32 139/465 30 148/465 32 
Use 107/191 56 99/191 52 109/191 57 
 
 Landowner awareness of the seven tax incentives was similar among the three 
independent variables, with awareness being slightly higher for the holding forestland for 
investment purposes variable (Table 5.2). This is consistent with Dee (2001) and Greene 
et al. (2004), as more landowners were in the holding land for investment purposes 
category than having a college education, or belonging to a landowner organization.  
Awareness for the holding for investment purposes (PRO) variable ranged from 32 
percent to 59 percent (Table 5.2). Respondents with this attribute seemed to be more 
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aware of the provision dealing with the annual deduction of management expenses 
(ADME) and the capital gains treatment of timber income (LTCG). While awareness for 
these two incentives was slightly more than 50 percent of the respondents for all three 
independent variables, only 30 to 46 percent of the respondents who possessed one of 
these attributes, or a combination thereof, were aware of the other five incentives (Table 
5.2).  
 Utilization of the tax incentives for each independent variable ranged from 16 
percent to 67 percent (Table 5.2). Similar to the dependent variables, CLIC was the least 
utilized among the variables analyzed. The RTC and ARE incentives shared similar 
awareness and usage rates among the attributes examined, with the highest usage rate 
observed among respondents that held a college education (Table 5.2).  
 Respondents in all three categories were least aware of ECSP; however, use of the 
incentive remained high among those who were aware of it. Approximately half of the 
respondents in all three categories that were aware of ECSP claimed to have used it at 
some point in time (Table 5.2). 
 The fact that trends for awareness and use are highly consistent among the three 
dichotomous independent variables examined in this analysis suggests that a high 
proportion of the respondents belong to one or more of these categories. This is highly 
consistent with the findings of Kaiser et al. 1982; Thrift et al. 1997; Dee 2001; Wicker 
2002; Greene et al. 2004’Kilgore et al. 2007; Greene et al. 2010;  Butler and Zhoa 2011) 
that suggest landowners who are better educated; more involved; and have a profit 
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motive are more likely to actively engage in forest management activities and seek 
avenues to minimize their tax liabilities and out-of-pocket expenses. 
 The two continuous independent variables analyzed in this study are the size of 
forest holding (FA) and the percent of forested land (PF) (Tables 5.3 & 5.5, respectively). 
Since the dependent variables were binary ( 0 = unaware, 1= aware; likewise for use ), 
the information presented in tables 5.3-5.6 use the same coding for succinctness. For 
example, the 234 in the 0 column for the LTCG2 variable represents the mean number of 
forested acres held by an individual who was unaware of the provision that allows timber 
income to be treated as a long-term capital gain. The mean holding size for respondents 
who were not aware of the seven tax incentives, or who were aware but did not use them 
ranged from 196 to 542 acres (Table 5.3). The average size of forest holding for 
landowners who were aware of the tax incentives and those who used them ranged from 
454 to 761 acres (Table 5.3).  
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Table 5.3. Size of Forest Holding (in acres) for Awareness and Use of 
Each Tax Incentive 
Dependent Variable 
Mean 
Holding Size 
(Acres) 
Median Holding 
Size (Acres) 
0 1 0 1 
LTCG2 (Aware) 234 454 150 253 
LTCG3 (Use) 234 495 140 300 
ADME1 (Aware) 196 466 140 285 
ADME3 (Use) 353 487 250 300 
DS1791 (Aware) 285 523 160 300 
DS1793 (Use) 405 585 245 300 
CLIC1 (Aware) 259 507 160 300 
CLIC3 (Use) 435 761 255 400 
RTC1 (Aware) 293 500 160 320 
RTC3 (Use) 288 561 195 350 
ARE1 (Aware) 303 488 160 300 
ARE3 (Use) 323 531 200 340 
ECSP1 (Aware) 341 496 200 275 
ECSP3 (Use) 542 477 210 300 
 
 This simple statistic reveals that respondents who were aware and who used the 
first six tax incentives held larger holdings than the unaware and nonuse groups. 
Interestingly, the mean forest holding size was larger for those respondents aware of the 
ECSP provision versus those unaware, but for the respondents who were aware and used 
the incentive the size of holding was smaller versus the groups that were not aware and 
did not use the incentive. Examination of the minimum and maximum acreages for the 
dependent variables is consistent with the size of forest holding means (Table 5.4).  
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Table 5.4. Minimum and Maximum Forested Acreage for 
Awareness and Use of each Tax Incentive. 
Forested Acreage 
Dependent Variable 
Minimum  Maximum 
0 1 0 1 
LTCG2 (Aware) 0 0 1200 4750 
LTCG3 (Use) 7 0 1560 4750 
ADME1 (Aware) 0 0 1200 4750 
ADME3 (Use) 24 0 2900 4750 
CLIC1 (Aware) 0 0 2000 4750 
CLIC3 (Use) 0 0 3000 4750 
DS1791 (Aware) 0 0 4200 4750 
DS1793 (Use) 28 0 2900 4750 
RTC1 (Aware) 0 0 1925 4750 
RTC3 (Use) 0 0 4500 4750 
ARE1 (Aware) 0 0 4500 4750 
ARE3 (Use) 15 0 2250 4750 
ECSP1 (Aware) 0 0 4200 4750 
ECSP3 (Use) 0 0 4500 4750 
 
 Since the size of forest holding (FA) variable was used as a proxy for the total 
acres held, the percent of forested area (PF) variable provides some insight into how 
much land is allocated towards forestry versus the total acreage held (Table 5.5). 
Surprisingly, there was more variation as to which group (aware versus unaware, use 
versus nonuse) had the highest percentage of forested land than the mean acreage groups 
(Table 5.5).  
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Table 5.5. Percentage of Forested Acreage for Awareness and Use of 
Each Tax Incentive. 
Dependent Variable 
Mean Percent 
Forested 
Median 
Percent 
Forested 
(Acres) 
0 1 0 1 
LTCG2 (Aware) 75 78 83 88 
LTCG3 (Use) 78 78 88 88 
ADME1 (Aware) 70 79 80 88 
ADME3 (Use) 81 79 88 88 
CLIC1 (Aware) 70 79 80 88 
CLIC3 (Use) 81 79 88 88 
DS1791 (Aware) 72 82 81 90 
DS1793 (Use) 84 80 92 88 
RTC1 (Aware) 73 80 90 80 
RTC3 (Use) 73 82 81 92 
ARE1 (Aware) 72 81 80 90 
ARE3 (Use) 75 82 81 91 
ECSP1 (Aware) 74 82 81 91 
ECSP3 (Use) 78 83 85 91 
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 Interestingly, the mean percent of forested acreage coefficients for the ADME, 
DS179, and CLIC (Table 5.8) tax incentives exhibit different trends than those reported 
by in the size of forest holding statistics (Table 5.4).  
Table 5.6. Minimum and Maximum forested acreage for 
awareness and use of each tax incentive. 
Forested Acreage 
Dependent Variable 
Minimum  Maximum 
0 1 0 1 
LTCG2 (Aware) 0 0 1200 4750 
LTCG3 (Use) 7 0 1560 4750 
ADME1 (Aware) 0 0 1200 4750 
ADME3 (Use) 24 0 2900 4750 
CLIC1 (Aware) 0 0 2000 4750 
CLIC3 (Use) 0 0 3000 4750 
DS1791 (Aware) 0 0 4200 4750 
DS1793 (Use) 28 0 2900 4750 
RTC1 (Aware) 0 0 1925 4750 
RTC3 (Use) 0 0 4500 4750 
ARE1 (Aware) 0 0 4500 4750 
ARE3 (Use) 15 0 2250 4750 
ECSP1 (Aware) 0 0 4200 4750 
ECSP3 (Use) 0 0 4500 4750 
 
 One would surmise that a landowner who uses one these incentives and 
has more forested acreage would also have a higher percentage of their holdings in timber 
production relative to the nonuser group. However, we can only speculate that those 
owners in this scenario have maximized the return on their holdings by incorporating 
nontimber uses as well. 
 Overall the trends exhibited in tables six through nine suggests that landowners 
who are aware and who use the incentives own more forested acreage and dedicate a 
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larger percentage of their holdings to timber production. This is highly consistent with the 
findings of Duerr (1948); Knight (1978); Straka and Wisdom (1983); Royer 1987; 
Lorenzo and Beard 1996; Wiersum et al. (2005); and Zhang et al. (2009) that suggests the 
size of forest holding is highly correlated with a landowner’s propensity to invest and 
engage in forest management activities, as well as utilize cost-share programs and the 
like.  
Model Results 
The results for the econometric models are presented in tables 5.7 through 5.33  
For the dichotomous variables (BTO, LOE, PRO) the log-odds and odds ratio coefficients 
are reported for each model, as well as the confidence intervals (α=0.05). In addition to 
these coefficients, the range log-odds and range odds ratios are shown for the continuous 
variables (FA, PF). Since the BTO, LOE, and PRO variables are dichotomous and 
bounded by the range zero to one, the odds ratio coefficients for those variables are also 
the range log-odds and range odds ratios.  
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Long-Term Capital Gains Treatment of Timber 
 The awareness model for the tax incentive dealing with the capital gains treatment 
of timber revenue (LTCG) revealed that the independent variables for BTO, FA, LOE, 
and PRO were significant at the α=0.05 level (Table 5.7). 
 
Table 5.7. Logistic Regression for Awareness of the Long-Term Capital 
Gains (LTCG) Treatment of Timber. 
Independent 
Variable 
      
 Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq 
Odds 
Ratio Lower Upper 
Constant 0.7747 0.0286 
BTO 0.6328 <.0001* 3.5455 2.2197 5.7153 
FA 0.0015 0.001* 1.0015 1.0007 1.0025 
PRO -0.4134 0.0092* 0.43739 0.2289 0.7987 
LOE 0.2487 0.0439* 1.6444 1.0103 2.664 
PF 0.05849 0.8998 1.0602 0.4207 2.6177 
* Significant at the 5% level 
AUC= 0.7416 
 
 Respondents holding membership in a landowner organization were two to six 
times more likely to be aware of the tax incentive than those that did not belong to one 
(Table 5.7).  Landowners with a college education were one to three times as likely to be 
aware of the LTCG provision as the other respondents (Table 5.7). Contrary to our 
hypothesis, the coefficient for landowners holding forestland for investment purposes 
(PRO) was negative, with respondents belonging to this category only being 0.23 to 0.80 
more times as likely of being aware of the tax incentive than those holding forest land for 
other reasons.  
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 The size of forest holding (FA) variable revealed that respondents were one times 
as likely (Table 5.8) to be aware of the provision for every additional forested acre held 
over the average forest holding (454 acres, Table 5.3). 
Table 5.8.Range Odds Ratios for the size of forest holding variable (FA) for the 
awareness the LTCG provision. 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Range 
Odds Ratio 
 Range Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
FA (Awareness) 0.00151499 0.001 1334.367 26.70245 140688.6 
 
 The awareness model range odds ratio for the FA variable indicates that the odds 
of being knowledgeable about the LTCG incentive improve by a factor of 1334.37 (Table 
5.8) as forest acreage is varied between 0 and 4,750 acres (the minimum and maximum 
acreages, respectively, Table 5.4). Examination of the AUC indicates that the model did 
an acceptable job at fitting the observations (Hosmer et al 2013). 
 The model for use of the LTCG provision given awareness revealed that the size 
of forest holding coefficient was the only significant variable at the α=0.05 level. For 
every one acre increase from the mean size of forest holding (495 acres, Table 5.3)  
landowners were one times as likely to use the incentive than landowners with holdings 
smaller than the average (Table 5.9).  
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Table 5.9. Logistic Regression for Use of the LTCG Provision, Given 
the Awareness of. 
Independent 
Variable 
      
 Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq 
Odds 
Ratio Lower Upper 
Constant 1.5921 0.001 
BTO 0.0666 0.6856 1.1425 0.588 2.1503 
FA 0.002 0.0019* 1.002 1.0009 1.0035 
PRO -0.0253 0.8895 0.9506 0.4529 1.9073 
LOE -0.0178 0.9146 0.965 0.4919 1.8221 
PF -0.7174 0.25585 0.4879 0.1333 1.6281 
* Significant at the 5% level 
AUC= 0.69423 
 
Table 5.10.Range Odds Ratios for the size of forest holding variable (FA) for  
use of the LTCG provision. 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Range Odds 
Ratio 
 Range Odds 
Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
FA (Use) 0.00203391 0.0019 15694.5 71.29 13922571 
 
 The range odds ratio revealed that the odds of using the incentive improve by a 
factor of 15694 as forested acreage is varied between the minimum and maximum (0 and 
4,750 acres, respectively, Table ) for the respondents aware of the provision (Table 5.10). 
The AUC coefficient for the use model also indicates that the model did an acceptable 
job at fitting the observations. 
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Annual Deduction of Management Expenses 
 The awareness model for the tax incentive that enables owners to deduct 
management costs on an annual basis  (ADME) revealed that all but one of the 
independent variables for the annual deduction of management expenses were significant 
at the α=0.05 level (Table 5.11).  
 
Table 5.11. Logistic Regression for Awareness of the Annual Deduction of 
Management Expenses (ADME) Provision. 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Odds Ratio 
 Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient Prob> Chisq Lower Upper 
Constant -0.03669 0.9156 
BTO 0.747989 <.0001* 4.4637 2.7588 7.3178 
FA 0.0022 <.0001* 1.00221 1.0012 1.0034 
PRO -0.3245 0.0376* 0.52256 0.2778 0.948 
LOE 0.27255 0.0314* 1.7247966 1.0468 2.8323 
PF 0.82352 0.0781 2.278505 0.9112 5.7242 
* Significant at the 5% level 
AUC= 0.7805 
 
 Respondents who held membership in a landowner organization were 2.76 to 7.32 
times as likely to be aware of the ADME provision those that did not belong to one. 
Surprisingly, the coefficient for landowners holding timberland for investment purposes 
(PRO) was negative, suggesting that awareness of this incentive decreases as the odds of  
owning forestland for investment purposes increases (Table 5.11). For respondents 
holding forestland over the mean (466 acres, Table 5.3) size of holding, their odds for 
being aware of the provision increase by a factor of 1.022 for every additional acre over 
the average owned (Table 5.11). The range odds ratio for the awareness model indicates 
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that the odd of a landowner being aware of the provision increase by a factor of 35,793 
(Table 5.12) as forested acreage is varied between 0 and 4,750 acres (minimum and 
maximum acreages of the sample, respectively, Table 5.6). The AUC coefficient for the 
awareness model (Table 5.11) suggests that the model did an excellent job at fitting the 
observations. 
Table 5.12.Range Odds Ratios for the size of forest holding variable (FA) for the 
awareness of the ADME provision. 
Independent 
Variable 
    Range Odds 
Ratio 
 Range Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient Prob> Chisq Lower Upper 
FA (Use) 0.00055585 0.1288 14.01753 0.734916 673.9736 
 
 Although FA is a significant variable for predicting the awareness of the ADME 
provision, it nor any of the other independent variables proved to be significant at the α= 
0.05 level for the model estimating use of the incentive (Table 5.13). 
Table 5.13. Logistic Regression for Use of the ADME Provision, Given 
Awareness . 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Odds Ratio 
 Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
Constant 2.0039 0.0004* 
BTO 0.1033 0.5255 1.2295 0.6367 2.2957 
FA 0.0005 0.1288 1.0005 0.9999 1.0013 
PRO 0.30213 0.0722 1.8299 0.9333 3.5083 
LOE 0.02858 0.8648 1.0588351 0.5348 2.0101 
PF -0.900528 0.1958 0.4063 0.0964 1.4971 
* Significant at the 5% level 
AUC=0.60978 
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 Casualty Losses, Involuntary Conversions 
The analysis for the tax incentive dealing with timber losses resulting from theft, 
condemnation or disease revealed that coefficients for BTO, FA, and LOE were positive 
and significant at the α=0.05 level (Table 5.14). Examination of the AUC coefficient 
suggests that the model did an acceptable job of fitting the observations. 
Table 5.14. Logistic Regression for Awareness of the Casualty Losses 
and Involuntary Conversions Provision. 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Odds Ratio 
 Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
Constant -0.91049 0.0057* 
BTO 0.56955 <.0001* 3.12399 2.0597 4.7748 
FA 0.00117466 0.0002* 1.0012 1.0006 1.0018 
PRO -0.02699 0.8308 0.947448 0.5748 1.5504 
LOE 0.3733 0.0007* 2.1098 1.369 3.2655 
PF 0.7327 0.0815 2.0808 0.9177 4.7953 
* Significant at the 5% level 
AUC= 0.72788 
 The coefficient for BTO continues to be a significant predictor of tax incentive 
awareness, with landowners belonging to a landowner organization being 2.05 to 4.77 
times more likely to be aware of the casualty loss provision than respondents that did not 
hold membership in such groups (Table 5.14). Respondents with a college education 
tended to be 1.37 to 3.26 times more likely to be aware versus those with less formal 
education (Table 5.14).  The odds ratio for the FA variable indicates that for every acre 
over the mean size of forest holding (507 acres, Table 5.3), the odds of a landowner using 
the provision increases by factor of 1.0012 per additional forested acre held (Table 5.15). 
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Table 5.15.Range Odds Ratios for the size of forest holding variable (FA) for the 
awareness of the CLIC provision. 
Independent 
Variable 
    Range Odds 
Ratio 
 Range Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient Prob> Chisq Lower Upper 
FA  (Awareness) 0.00117466 0.0002 264.9756 17.04578 6168.487 
 
 
 The model estimating the use of the casualty loss and involuntary conversions 
provision revealed that the size of forest holding (FA) variable was significant at the 
α=0.05 level (Table 5.16). This coefficient indicates that a landowner’s odds for using the 
CLIC provision increased by a factor of one (Table 5.16) for every additional acre held 
over the mean (761 acres, Table 5.3). 
 
Table 5.16. Logistic Regression for Use of the Casualty Loss and Involuntary 
Conversions Provision, Given Awareness . 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Odds Ratio 
 Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient Prob> Chisq Lower Upper 
Constant -1.04339 0.0503 
BTO -0.24343 0.1521 0.6145 0.3181 1.2138 
FA 0.00069 0.0017* 1.00069 1.0003 1.0012 
PRO 0.0521308 0.7811 1.1098 0.5428 2.3855 
LOE 0.251349 0.202 1.65317 0.7901 3.7539 
PF -0.8162901 0.2198 0.442069 0.1221 1.6909 
* Significant at the 5% level 
AUC= 0.64398 
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 The range odds ratio for the use model, FA variable indicates that a landowner’s 
odds for using the provision improve by a factor of 26 (Table 5.17) as forested acreage is 
varied between 0 and 4,750 acres (minimum and maximum acreages, respectively; Table 
5.4). 
Section 179 Deductions 
 The logistic regression results for the awareness of the section 179 deductions 
model revealed that all but one of the independent variables were both positive and 
significant at the α=0.05 level (Table 5.18).  Examination of the AUC coefficient reveals 
that the model did an acceptable job at fitting the observations (Table 5.18). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.17.Range Odds Ratios for the size of forest holding variable (FA) for the use of 
the CLIC provision, Given Awareness. 
Independent 
Variable 
    Range Odds 
Ratio 
 Range Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient Prob> Chisq Lower Upper 
FA (Use) 0.00069119 0.0017 26.66007 3.731225 234.4177 
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Table 5.18. Logistic Regression for the Awareness of the Section 179 
Deductions (DS179) Provision. 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Odds Ratio 
 Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
Constant -1.4238 <.0001* 
BTO 0.4072 0.0001* 2.2579 1.4993 3.4252 
FA 0.0008 0.0006* 1.0008 1.0004 1.0014 
PRO -0.1577 0.1981 0.7294 0.4492 1.1767 
LOE 0.2265 0.037* 1.5732048 1.0293 2.4151 
PF 1.23292 0.004* 3.4312 1.5075 8.1028 
* Significant at the 5% level 
AUC= 0.69851 
 
 The coefficient for landowner organization membership (BTO) revealed that 
respondents who participated were 1.5 to 3.4 times more likely to be aware of the Section 
179 deductions than nonparticipants (Table 5.18). Much like the BTO variable, level of 
education has been a strong predictor of awareness, with respondents with a college 
education being 1 to 2.4 times more likely to be aware of the provision than those without 
a college education (Table 5.18).  
Table 5.19.Range Odds Ratios for the size of forest holding variable (FA) for 
the awareness the DS179 provision. 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Range 
Odds Ratio 
 Range Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
FA (Awareness) 0.0008873 0.0006 67.67757 7.24586 891.2084 
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  The odds ratio for the FA variable indicates that for every acre over the mean size 
of forest holding (523 acres, Table 5.3), the odds of a landowner being aware of the 
provision increases by factor of one per additional forested acre held (Table 5.18). The 
range odds ratio for the awareness model, FA variable indicates that the odds of a 
landowner being aware of the section 179 provision increase by a factor of 68 (Table 
5.19) as forested acreage is varied between 0 and 4,750 acres (Table 5.4). For 
respondents with more than 82 percent (Table 5.5) of their holdings forested, their odds 
being aware of the section 179 deductions increases by a factor of 3.4 (Table 5.18) for 
every additional percent of forested land held. Expanded over the entire range of the 
sample ( 0 to 100 percent, Table 5.6) the odds of a landowner being aware of the 
provision improves by a factor of 1.5 to 8.1 (Table 5.18). 
Table 5.20. Logistic Regression for Use of the DS179 Provision, Given  
Awareness . 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Odds Ratio 
 Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
Constant 1.5242 0.014* 
BTO 0.2426 0.1341 1.62472 0.8572 3.0669 
FA 0.0006 0.0285* 1.0006 1.0001 1.0013 
PRO 0.1688 0.3364 1.40167 0.7003 2.7924 
LOE -0.1391 0.4147 0.75711 0.3807 1.4594 
PF -1.6131 0.0322* 0.199265 0.0431 0.837 
* Significant at the 5% level 
AUC=0.65 
 
 The use model estimates for the section 179 deductions revealed that the size of 
forest holding (FA) and percent of forested land (PF) were both positive and significant at 
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the α=0.05 level, with the AUC coefficient indicating an acceptable fit of the model 
(Table 5.20). The FA coefficient indicates that a landowner’s odds of being aware of the 
provision increases by a factor of one (Table 5.20) for every additional acre held over the 
average (585 acres, Table 5.3). As forested acreage is varied from 0 to 4,750 acres a 
landowner’s odds of using the incentive improve by a factor of 24 (Table 5.21).  
Table 5.21.Range Odds Ratios for the size of forest holding variable (FA) for 
the Use of the DS179 provision, Given Awareness. 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Range Odds 
Ratio 
 Range Odds 
Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
FA (Use) 0.00066883 0.0285 23.97332 1.85012 554.728 
 
 Examination of the PF estimate for the use model indicates that a respondent’s 
odds for being aware of the provision improve by a factor of 0.20 (Table 5.20)for every 
percent of forested land held over 80 percent (Table 5.5). 
Reforestation Tax Credit 
 Analysis of the model for awareness of the reforestation tax revealed that only 
those respondents belonging to a landowner organization (BTO) and the independent 
variable for size of forest holding (FA) were  significant at the α=0.05 level (Table 5.22). 
Examination of the AUC coefficient reveals that the model did an acceptable job at fitting 
the observations (Table 5.22). 
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Table 5.22. Logistic Regression for Awareness of the Reforestation Tax 
Credit. 
Independent 
Variable 
      
 Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq 
Odds 
Ratio Lower Upper 
Constant -0.9 0.0056* 
BTO 0.46 <.0001* 2.5085 1.6761 3.7783 
FA 0.0008 0.0026* 1.0007 1.0003 1.0013 
PRO 0.019 0.8811 1.0367 0.645 1.6615 
LOE 0.2031 0.0586 1.5011 0.9858 2.2907 
PF 0.7 0.0918 1.9858 0.9 4.4584 
* Significant at the 5% level 
AUC= 0.69289 
 Respondents that held membership in a landowner organization were 1.67 to 3.77 
times more likely to be aware of the reforestation tax credit versus those respondents who 
were not involved in an organization (Table 5.22). The odds ratio for the FA variable 
indicates that for every acre over the mean size of forest holding (500 acres, Table 5.3), 
the odds of a landowner using the provision increases by factor of one per additional 
forested acre held (Table 5.22). The range odds ratio for the awareness model, FA 
variable indicates that the odds of a landowner being aware of the RTC provision 
increase by a factor of 36.63 (Table 5.23) as forested acreage is varied between 0 and 
4,750 acres (Table 5.4). 
Table 5.23.Range Odds Ratios for the size of forest holding variable (FA) for 
the awareness of the RTC provision. 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Range 
Odds Ratio 
 Range Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
FA (Awareness) 0.00075809 0.0026 36.63247 4.217653 451.2735 
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 The model estimating a landowner’s use of the reforestation tax credit revealed 
that the FA variable was the only independent variable significant at the α=0.05 level, 
with an AUC coefficient suggesting an acceptable fit of the model (Table 5.24). A 
landowner’s odds for using the RTC provision increased by a factor of 1.001 (Table 5.24) 
for every additional acre held over the mean (561 acres, Table 5.3).  
 
Table 5.24. Logistic Regression for Use of the Reforestation Tax Credit, 
Given the Awareness of. 
Independent 
Variable Odds Ratio 
Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
Constant -0.0646 0.8952 
BTO 0.11894 0.5111 1.2685 0.6117 2.5477 
FA 0.0012 0.0136* 1.001 1 1.0023 
PRO 0.3263 0.0754 1.92038 0.9231 3.9166 
LOE 0.1492 0.396 1.3476 0.6659 2.6597 
PF 0.6871 0.2791 1.9878 0.5614 6.8677 
* Significant at the 5% level 
AUC= 0.68979 
  
Table 5.25.Range Odds Ratios for the size of forest holding variable (FA) for 
the use of the RTC provision. 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Range Odds 
Ratio 
 Range Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
FA (Use) 0.00122496 0.0136 336.4915 5.634545 60047.85 
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 The range odds ratio for the use model, FA variable indicates that the odds 
improve by a factor of 336 (Table 5.25) as forested acreage is varied between 0 and 4,750 
acres (minimum and maximum acreages, respectively, Table 5.4).  
Amortization of Reforestation Expenses 
 Although closely tied to the RTC provision, the analysis of the model for 
awareness of the amortization of reforestation expenses incentive revealed that all of the 
independent variables were significant at the α=0.05 level, with an AUC coefficient 
indicating an acceptable fit of the model. Respondents belonging to a landowner 
organization were 1.5 to 3.5 times more likely to be aware of the provision than those not 
holding membership, while those holding forestland for investment were only 1 to 2.67 
times more likely to be aware of the provision compared to those holding timberland for 
other objectives (Table 5.26). The odds for landowners with a college education were 
similar for those belonging to a landowner organization, with respondents being 1.5 to 
3.5 times as likely to be aware of the tax incentive versus those without a college 
education (Table 5.26).  
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Table 5.26. Logistic Regression for Awareness of the Amortization of 
Reforestation Expenses Provision. 
Independent 
Variable 
      
 Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq 
Odds 
Ratio Lower Upper 
Constant -1.1025 0.0008* 
BTO 0.4212 <.0001* 2.3222 1.5445 3.5095 
FA 0.0005 0.017* 1.0005 1.0001 1.001 
PRO 0.2495 0.0402* 1.6472 1.0233 2.6607 
LOE 0.3953 0.0003* 2.2045 1.44 3.3956 
PF 0.8762 0.0342* 2.4017 1.0755 5.4709 
* Significant at the 5% level 
AUC=0.70355 
 
The size of forest holding variable (FA) revealed that respondents’ awareness 
increased by a factor of 1.0005 (Table 5.26) for every one acre increase in the number of 
forested acres held over the average (488 acres, Table 5.3). The range odds ratio for the 
FA variable indicates that a landowner’s odds of being aware of the provision improve by 
a factor of 14 (Table 5.27) as forested acreage is varied between 0 and 4,750 acres 
(minimum and maximum, respectively, Table 5.4). For landowners with forested 
holdings comprising 81 percent (Table 5.5) or more of total acreage held their odds of 
being aware of the incentive improved by a factor of 2.4 for every additional percent in 
forested acreage owned (Table 5.26).  
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Table 5.27.Range Odds Ratios for the size of forest holding variable (FA) for the 
awareness of the ARE provision. 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Range Odds 
Ratio 
 Range Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
FA(Awareness) 0.00055817 0.017 14.17268 1.894463 148.0655 
 
 
 None of the coefficients for the amortization of reforestation expenses use model 
suggested that none of the independent variables used in the analysis were significant at 
the α=0.05 level, however, the AUC coefficient revealed that the model did an acceptable 
job at fitting the observations. (Table 5.28). Examination of the effects likelihood ratio 
test for size of forest holding, did however, suggest that the FA variable is significant at 
predicting a landowner’s use of the provision.  
 
Table 5.28. Logistic Regression for Use of the Amortization of 
Reforestation Expenses Provision, Given Awareness . 
        
 Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Independent 
Variable Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq 
Odds 
Ratio Lower Upper 
Constant 0.3983 0.4648 
BTO -0.2593 0.1921 0.5953 0.265 1.2548 
FA 0.0008 0.0603 1.0008 1 1.002 
PRO 0.263 0.1765 1.6924 0.7716 3.5827 
LOE -0.032 0.8688 0.94 0.4225 1.96 
PF 0.775 0.2592 2.1703 0.5488 8.2701 
Overall model fit 
AUC=0.6997 
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Table 5.29.Range Odds Ratios for the Size of forest Holding Variable (FA) for 
the Use of the ARE provision, Given Awareness. 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Range Odds 
Ratio 
 Range Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
FA(Use) 0.00082624 0.0603 50.63467 1.378596 5178.322 
 
 The odds ratio for the FA variable indicates that for every acre over the mean size 
of forest holding (531 acres, Table 5.3), the odds of a landowner using the provision 
increases by factor of 1.0008 per additional forested acre held (Table 5.28). The range 
odds for the FA variable (Table 5.29) indicates that the odds of landowner using the ARE 
provision improve by a factor of  fifty as forested acreage is varied between 0 and 4,750 
acres (Table 5.4 ).  
Exclusion of Cost-Share Payments 
 The awareness model for the provision that enables landowners to exclude 
qualifying cost-share payments from their gross income (ECSP) revealed the independent 
variables for membership to a landowner organization (BTO), size of forest holding (FA), 
and percent of land forested (PF) are significant at the α=0.05 level (Table 5.30). 
Additionally, the AUC coefficient indicates that the model did an acceptable job at fitting 
the observations.  
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Table 5.30. Logistic Regression for Awareness of the Exclusion of 
Qualifying Cost-Share Payments Provision. 
Independent 
Variable Odds Ratio 
Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
Constant -1.55876 <.0001* 
BTO 0.47957 <.0001* 2.6094 1.7134 4.0289 
FA 0.0004 0.0393* 1.0003 1 1.0007 
PRO -0.1121722 0.3571 0.7990 0.4953 1.2899 
LOE 0.03279099 0.7638 1.0677 0.6969 1.642 
PF 1.16869547 0.0074* 3.2177 1.3952 7.7568 
* Significant at the 5% level 
AUC=0.66993 
 The BTO coefficient suggests that respondents involved in a landowner 
organization were 1.71to 4.02 times as likely to be aware of the ECSP provision 
compared to respondents not holding membership. The FA coefficient indicates that a 
landowner’s odds of being aware of the provision increases by a factor of 1.0003 (Table 
5.30) for every additional acre held over the average (496 acres, Table 5.3). The range 
odds ratio for the ECSP provision reveals that a landowner’s odds for awareness increase 
by a factor 6.33 (Table 5.31) as forested acreage is varied between the minimum and 
maximum (0 and 4,750 acres, respectively, Table 5.4 ) of the sample. Examination of the 
PF coefficient reveals that respondents with forested holdings comprising 82 percent or 
more of total land held, increased their odds of being aware of the ECSP provision by a 
factor of 3.21 for every additional percent of forestland owned (Table 5.30) 
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Table 5.31.Range Odds Ratios for the size of forest holding variable (FA) for 
the awareness and use of the ECSP provision. 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Range Odds 
Ratio 
 Range Odds 
Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
FA (Awareness) 0.0003886 0.0393 6.332989 1.1675 40.84181 
 
 
 The model for use of the ECSP provision revealed that none of the independent 
variables examined in the analysis were significant at the α=0.05 level (Table 5.32). 
Additionally, the AUC coefficient reveals that the model did not do an acceptable job at 
fitting the observations. 
Table 5.32. Logistic Regression for Use of the Exclusion of Qualifying 
Cost-Share Payments Provision, Given Awareness. 
Independent 
Variable 
    
Odds Ratio 
 Odds Ratio                         
95% CI 
Coefficient 
Prob> 
Chisq Lower Upper 
Constant 0.36283319 0.5207 
BTO 0.07156209 0.7165 1.1538731 0.5219 2.4692 
FA -0.0002383 0.31 0.999762 0.9993 1.0002 
PRO 0.271712 0.171 1.7218926 0.7808 3.7364 
LOE 0.04294075 0.8182 1.0896772 0.5151 2.2445 
PF 0.54665669 0.447 1.727468 0.4103 7.0498 
AUC=0.59028 
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Table 5.33. Summary of Awareness Models for the Seven Tax Incentives. 
Independent 
Variable 
Prob> Chisq 
LTCG ADME CLIC DS179 RTC ARE ECSP 
Constant 0.0286 0.9156 0.0057* <.0001* 0.0056* 0.0008* <.0001* 
BTO <.0001* <.0001* <.0001* 0.0001* <.0001* <.0001* <.0001* 
FA 0.001* <.0001* 0.0002* 0.0006* 0.0026* 0.017* 0.0393* 
PRO 0.0092* 0.0376* 0.8308 0.1981 0.8811 0.0402* 0.3571 
LOE 0.0439* 0.0314* 0.0007* 0.037* 0.0586 0.0003* 0.7638 
PF 0.8998 0.0781 0.0815 0.004* 0.0918 0.0342* 0.0074* 
*Significant at the α=0.05 level. 
 
 A summary of the significant (α=0.05)  variables of the awareness  models 
revealed that the variables representing landowners membership in a landowner 
organization (BTO) and size of forest holding (FA) were consistent at predicting 
respondents’ awareness for all seven of the tax incentives examined in this study (Table 
5.33). Based on our initial screening tests, this also implies that landowners with a 
professionally prepared management plan would be aware of these incentives. Prudence 
would advise one from asserting the dependence of one of these demographics on the 
other. Rather, we can surmise that landowners who are actively involved in a landowner 
organization or possess a professionally prepared forest management plan tend to be 
more abreast about issues germane to holding forestland than other groups of owners.  
  The historically significant variable, size of forest holding (FA) was also a good 
predictor of landowners’ awareness of the tax incentives. Past research has found that 
size of forest holding is a key characteristic that is highly correlated to forest management 
on family forests. Even the current family forest literature continues to show size of 
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forest holding to be strongly correlated with many variables related to forest 
management, especially forest owners’ technical knowledge and attitudes towards timber 
harvesting. This supports the fact that the BTO variable has a substantial influence on 
landowners’ awareness of the provisions. Size of forest holding has also been considered 
to be a good proxy for landowners’ level of education, another one of the variables that 
was a significant (α=0.05) predictor of landowner awareness in this analysis.  
 The variable capturing landowners who held their forest land for investment 
purposes had little influence on the awareness for the casualty loss, depreciation and 
deductions, reforestation tax credit, and exclusion of qualifying cost-share payments 
provisions. Theory would suggest that an individual who is in the business of maximizing 
profits would explore all possible avenues to reduce costs; however, this appears to not 
be the case. One explanation for this inconsistency is that profit maximizers only expend 
their energy exploring cost minimizing avenues when needed. The lack of influence PRO 
has on the awareness of the casualty loss provision would support this claim. It truly is a 
case specific provision. The same reasoning would apply to the exclusion of qualified 
cost-share payments incentive. Landowners not engaged in cost-share programs have 
little incentive to explore avenues which minimizes their tax liabilities from participation. 
Likewise can be said for the provision that allows for the deduction and depreciation of 
applicable equipment or property improvements, those engaged in land ownership for 
investment reasons may find that holding equipment or adding qualified improvements to 
erode their overall returns. The fact that PRO positively influenced the awareness of ARE 
but not RTC is a little surprising. Since these two provisions are closely linked one would 
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surmise that knowledge of one would be highly correlated to the awareness of the other. 
Moreover, PRO has significant influence on the LTCG provision, which is also 
associated with timber harvesting activities.  This suggests that information regarding the 
seven year amortization and long-term capital gains treatment of timber provisions is 
more readily available.   
 
Table 5.34. Summary of the Use Models for the Seven Tax Incentives. 
Independent 
Variable 
Prob> Chisq 
LTCG ADME CLIC DS179 RTC ARE ECSP 
Constant 0.001 0.0004* 0.0503 0.014* 0.8952 0.4648 0.5207 
BTO 0.6856 0.5255 0.1521 0.1341 0.5111 0.1921 0.7165 
FA 0.0019* 0.1288 0.0017* 0.0285* 0.0136* 0.0603** 0.31 
PRO 0.8895 0.0722 0.7811 0.3364 0.0754 0.1765 0.171 
LOE 0.9146 0.8648 0.202 0.4147 0.396 0.8688 0.8182 
PF 0.25585 0.1958 0.2198 0.0322* 0.2791 0.2592 0.447 
*Significant at the α=0.05 level. 
**Significant per the effect likelihood ratio test. 
 
 Examining a summary of the use models in this analysis reveals that the size of 
forest holding (FA) variable was the only significant (α=0.05) one at predicting 
landowners’ use of the provisions (Table 5.34). To some extent this not surprising 
because the first stage selection model significantly reduced the sample size for the 
second stage, which was used to generate the use models (Table 5.1). This also confirms 
the findings of Dee (2001) and Greene et al. (2004), that very few of the socioeconomic 
predictors examined are useful at estimating landowner use of the provisions.  
 Our findings suggest that, with a few exceptions, specific landowner 
demographics can be attributed to a landowner’s awareness of the federal income tax 
provisions examined in this study. These predictors can possibly be used in the future to 
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target specific landowner groups in an effort to better educate them about the tax 
provisions. The use of the incentives however, does not seem to depend on any particular 
factor examined, except for the size of forest holding.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Family forest owners hold their land for a variety of reasons; many of which do 
not produce income. For the objectives that involve generation of income, the owners are 
subject to the federal income tax. This study examined how the size of forest holding and 
other landowner characteristics influences family forest owner knowledge and use of 
federal tax provisions germane to timber management under the 2001 Internal Revenue 
Code.  The seven tax provisions examined in this study were long-term capital gains 
treatment of timber income, annual deduction of management expenses, depreciation and 
the section 179 provision, deduction for casualty losses and other involuntary 
conversions, the reforestation tax credit, amortization of reforestation expenses, and the 
ability to exclude qualifying reforestation cost-share payments from gross income are 
offered to family forest landowners in an attempt to encourage sustainable forestry 
practices through monetary incentives. Respondents were South Carolina family forest 
landowners who indicated awareness and use of these 2001 tax provisions; some of these 
provisions have since changed, but the influence of various type of tax  incentives is just 
as relevant today, even for changed provisions. When compared with the general 
population of family forest owners (Butler, 2008), these respondents appear to be more 
representative of family forest owners with financially-oriented objectives.  So some 
caution should be used in interpreting these results relative to a more general population 
of family forest owners.  
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     A two-step sample selection model was employed to analyze their use behavior 
conditional on their awareness of these tax provisions. The survey revealed that 
awareness and use of the seven tax provisions varied widely among respondents. The 
two-stage sample selection model produced several interesting results. From the first 
stage of selection and binary logistic model, landowner awareness of all seven tax 
provisions was positively related to size of forest holding and membership in a forest 
landowner organization. This implies that family forest landowners that both had larger 
holdings and belonged to some sort of forest landowner organization were most likely to 
be aware of the seven tax provisions. Having a college education and holding land for 
investment purposes exhibited varying degrees of influence on landowner awareness of 
individual provisions. Landowners with these characteristics have also been more apt to 
receive cost-share funding (Daniels et al. 2010); technical assistance (Kilgore and Blinn 
2004), and use a professionally prepared forest management plan (Butler 2008).  
  Landowners who have at least a college education were more aware of five of the 
seven tax provisions: the long-term capital gains treatment of timber (LTCG), annual 
deduction of management expenses (ADME), casualty loss and involuntary conversions 
(CLIC), the section 179 deduction and depreciation (DS179), and the amortization of 
reforestation expenses (ARE) than those with less formal education. This finding coupled 
with the fact that membership in a landowner organization also positively influences 
awareness provides valuable insights on the importance of disseminating information to 
family forest owners. These results show this is especially true for the RTC and ECSP 
provisions. While the ARE provision was closely tied to the RTC provision at the time of 
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the initial survey, landowner awareness for the RTC was influenced by landowner 
organization membership but not level of education. This is just one example that 
demonstrates how landowner organizations serve as a conduit for distributing the 
information produced by forest service and state extension service publications, among 
others. This finding is further supported by the influence membership has on the CLIC 
and ECSP provisions. Both of these provisions could be considered case-specific in 
nature, and do not apply to most family forest owners. However, it further demonstrates 
the previous statement regarding landowner organizations. 
 In the outcome stage, landowner use of the provisions was modeled conditional 
on their awareness of the provisions. Surprisingly, size of forest holding was the only 
variable that influenced landowner use of the provisions in this study. Although this 
historically significant variable has been shown to influence many of the forest 
management activities family forest owners engage in, it is rather disturbing in the sense 
that, presently, parcelization is considered to be one of the major threats to sustainable 
forest management. Driven by urban development and other pressures that decrease 
forest tract sizes, parcelization tends to result in a loss of economies of scale which often 
makes forestry practices economically infeasible. This may also lead to forest 
fragmentation, an ecological issue. Tax provisions can be leveraged to mitigate 
economies of scale losses, which may in turn, reduce overall forest fragmentation.  
However, as noted by Greene et al. (2004), many family forest owners do not utilize the 
provisions because they believe that, “It doesn’t apply to their situation,” or “The benefit 
is too small to bother with.” The former of these responses could be potentially valid due 
  
105 
 
to the specificity of some of the provisions (e.g., ECSP and CLIC), or the fact that the 
landowner has not engaged in forest management activities that warrant the use thereof. 
For example, respondents that have not harvested timber have no need to utilize the long-
term capital gains or amortization of reforestation expenses (the reforestation tax credit 
was repealed by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004) provisions, but may utilize the 
annual deduction of management expenses while preparing for a timber harvest in the 
future.  
 The latter of the Greene et al. (2004) statements is problematic because regardless 
of the effectiveness education has on landowner awareness; further efforts must be made 
to show the benefits of these provisions. For example, respondents that did not utilize the 
long-term capital gains provision, but harvested timber could have realized tremendous 
tax savings. Moreover, landowners that treat timber income as a long-term capital gain at 
the time of this writing would save even more than those at the time of the initial survey 
in 2001.In 2001, the long-term capital gains tax rate was capped at 28 percent, while 
ordinary income tax rates were capped at 39.6 percent. At the time of this writing, the 
long-term capital gains tax rate is capped at 20 percent, while ordinary income tax rates 
are still capped at 39.6 percent. This equates to even larger tax savings than that offered 
under the 2001 Internal Revenue Code.  
 Taxpayers that utilize the reforestation tax provisions at the time of this writing 
would also realize larger benefits versus those offered in 2001. In 2001, the reforestation 
tax credit provided a ten percent tax credit to landowners that spent up to $10,000 for tree 
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planting costs such as site preparation, seeds, seedlings, and labor that could be 
subtracted from the amount of taxes otherwise owed to the federal government. 
Moreover, those that utilized the credit could amortize $9,500 of the $10,000 over an 84 
month period by utilizing the amortization of reforestation expenses provision. During 
this same time period, landowners that spent up to $10,000 but did not utilize the ten 
percent tax credit could amortize the full amount over an 84 month period. Since the 
initial study, the reforestation tax credit was repealed by the American Jobs Creation Act 
of 2004 and landowners are now allowed to deduct up to $10,000 per qualified timber 
property per year and amortize any amount in excess of $10,000 over 84 months.  
 Models developed in this study examined which socioeconomic factors influence 
landowner awareness and landowner use of seven federal income tax provisions. The 
findings confirm that educational efforts, ownership objectives influence landowner 
awareness of the provisions. However, none of these are good at influencing landowner 
use of the provisions. With urban development and other social pressures decreasing 
average parcel size additional efforts must be made to educate landowners on the benefits 
of the tax provisions offered through the internal revenue code.  Tax policy has profound 
impacts on the profitability of forest management; it also has the potential to be huge 
player in the conservation of many forested tracts across the United States. Modifications 
to some the provisions (e.g. long-term capital gains and reforestation tax provisions) 
since the initial study in 2001has further increased their benefits, which in turn, could 
increase the amount of forested acres sustainably managed. Since size of forest holding 
was the most significant variable at predicting use in this study, further research efforts 
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examining the awareness and use of federal tax provisions by family forest owners must 
be exerted to understand the exact acreage classes in which landowners are more likely to 
utilize the provisions than not. This one piece of data would enable forestry researchers to 
develop tools to reach out to those who are not currently using them. If we as society 
value the many benefits forests produce, it will be imperative to not only disseminate 
information on tax provisions, but also educate family forest owners on the benefits of 
them.  
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APPENDIX A 
LANDOWNER SURVEY 
Federal Income Tax Provisions Survey of Nonindustrial Private Forest Landowners 
There is a series of questions about each of the Federal income tax provisions described 
on the front page . Please fill out each series. There also is a form to fill out at the end of 
the questionnaire if you would like to receive a copy of the results. Please remember your 
participation is important to the success of  this study , and your answers are strictly 
confidential. 
Timber income can qualify as a long-term capital gain 
1 Did you know about this tax provision ? 
__ Yes→ Please continue with question 2 
__ No → Please go to question 8, on the next page 
2. Have you used this provision in the past? 
__ Yes→ Please continue with question 3 
__ No→ Please go to question 7 
 
3. When was the last time you used this provision? 
__ On my last tax return 
__ 2 to 5 years ago 
__ More than 5 years ago 
4. About how many times in all would you say you have used this provision?  
    About _____ times in the _____ years I have owned forestland 
5. How did you find out about this provision?  
__ From a tax professional 
__ From a forestry professional 
__ From attending a tax workshop  
__ Other: ____________________ 
6. What is it that you like most about this provision? 
__________________________________________________________ 
Please go to question 8, on the next page 
7. Why haven’t you used this provision? (Choose the one best answer) 
__It’s too complicated to understand 
__The benefit isn’t large enough to bother with 
__It doesn’t apply to my situation, because:____________________ 
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__I don’t want to use it, because:_____________________________ 
__Other:________________________________________________ 
Annual forest management costs can be deducted 
8. Did you know about this tax provision ? 
__ Yes→ Please continue with question 2 
__ No → Please go to question 8, on the next page 
9. Have you used this provision in the past? 
__ Yes→ Please continue with question 3 
__ No→ Please go to question 7 
 
10. When was the last time you used this provision? 
__ On my last tax return 
__ 2 to 5 years ago 
__ More than 5 years ago 
11. About how many times in all would you say you have used this provision?  
    About _____ times in the _____ years I have owned forestland 
12. How did you find out about this provision?  
__ From a tax professional 
__ From a forestry professional 
__ From attending a tax workshop  
__ Other: ____________________ 
13. What is it that you like most about this provision? 
__________________________________________________________ 
Please go to question 15, on the next page 
14. Why haven’t you used this provision? (Choose the one best answer) 
__It’s too complicated to understand 
__The benefit isn’t large enough to bother with 
__It doesn’t apply to my situation, because:____________________ 
__I don’t want to use it, because:_____________________________ 
__Other:________________________________________________ 
Please continue with question 15 
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10 percent tax credit up to $10,000 per year of reforestation expenses 
 
15. Did you know about this tax provision ? 
__ Yes→ Please continue with question 2 
__ No → Please go to question 8, on the next page 
16. Have you used this provision in the past? 
__ Yes→ Please continue with question 3 
__ No→ Please go to question 7 
 
17. When was the last time you used this provision? 
__ On my last tax return 
__ 2 to 5 years ago 
__ More than 5 years ago 
18. About how many times in all would you say you have used this provision?  
    About _____ times in the _____ years I have owned forestland 
19. How did you find out about this provision?  
__ From a tax professional 
__ From a forestry professional 
__ From attending a tax workshop  
__ Other: ____________________ 
20. What is it that you like most about this provision? 
__________________________________________________________ 
Please go to question 22, on the next page 
21. Why haven’t you used this provision? (Choose the one best answer) 
__It’s too complicated to understand 
__The benefit isn’t large enough to bother with 
__It doesn’t apply to my situation, because:____________________ 
__I don’t want to use it, because:_____________________________ 
__Other:________________________________________________ 
Please continue with question 22 
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Up to $10,000 per year of reforestation expenses can be amortized over 8 years 
 
22. Did you know about this tax provision ? 
__ Yes→ Please continue with question 2 
__ No → Please go to question 8, on the next page 
23. Have you used this provision in the past? 
__ Yes→ Please continue with question 3 
__ No→ Please go to question 7 
 
24. When was the last time you used this provision? 
__ On my last tax return 
__ 2 to 5 years ago 
__ More than 5 years ago 
25. About how many times in all would you say you have used this provision?  
    About _____ times in the _____ years I have owned forestland 
26. How did you find out about this provision?  
__ From a tax professional 
__ From a forestry professional 
__ From attending a tax workshop  
__ Other: ____________________ 
27. What is it that you like most about this provision? 
__________________________________________________________ 
Please go to question 29, on the next page 
28. Why haven’t you used this provision? (Choose the one best answer) 
__It’s too complicated to understand 
__The benefit isn’t large enough to bother with 
__It doesn’t apply to my situation, because:____________________ 
__I don’t want to use it, because:_____________________________ 
__Other:________________________________________________ 
Please continue with question 29 
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Payments from government cost-share programs can be excluded from gross 
income 
 
29. Did you know about this tax provision ? 
__ Yes→ Please continue with question 2 
__ No → Please go to question 8, on the next page 
30. Have you used this provision in the past? 
__ Yes→ Please continue with question 3 
__ No→ Please go to question 7 
 
31. When was the last time you used this provision? 
__ On my last tax return 
__ 2 to 5 years ago 
__ More than 5 years ago 
32. About how many times in all would you say you have used this provision?  
    About _____ times in the _____ years I have owned forestland 
33. How did you find out about this provision?  
__ From a tax professional 
__ From a forestry professional 
__ From attending a tax workshop  
__ Other: ____________________ 
34. What is it that you like most about this provision? 
__________________________________________________________ 
Please go to question 36, on the next page 
35. Why haven’t you used this provision? (Choose the one best answer) 
__It’s too complicated to understand 
__The benefit isn’t large enough to bother with 
__It doesn’t apply to my situation, because:____________________ 
__I don’t want to use it, because:_____________________________ 
__Other:________________________________________________ 
Please continue with question 36 
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You can take depreciation and Section 179 deductions 
 
36. Did you know about this tax provision ? 
__ Yes→ Please continue with question 2 
__ No → Please go to question 8, on the next page 
37. Have you used this provision in the past? 
__ Yes→ Please continue with question 3 
__ No→ Please go to question 7 
 
38. When was the last time you used this provision? 
__ On my last tax return 
__ 2 to 5 years ago 
__ More than 5 years ago 
39. About how many times in all would you say you have used this provision?  
    About _____ times in the _____ years I have owned forestland 
40. How did you find out about this provision?  
__ From a tax professional 
__ From a forestry professional 
__ From attending a tax workshop  
__ Other: ____________________ 
41. What is it that you like most about this provision? 
__________________________________________________________ 
Please go to question 43, on the next page 
42. Why haven’t you used this provision? (Choose the one best answer) 
__It’s too complicated to understand 
__The benefit isn’t large enough to bother with 
__It doesn’t apply to my situation, because:____________________ 
__I don’t want to use it, because:_____________________________ 
__Other:________________________________________________ 
Please continue with question 43 
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You can take a loss deduction for timber that is destroyed or stolen 
 
43. Did you know about this tax provision ? 
__ Yes→ Please continue with question 2 
__ No → Please go to question 8, on the next page 
44. Have you used this provision in the past? 
__ Yes→ Please continue with question 3 
__ No→ Please go to question 7 
 
45. When was the last time you used this provision? 
__ On my last tax return 
__ 2 to 5 years ago 
__ More than 5 years ago 
46. About how many times in all would you say you have used this provision?  
    About _____ times in the _____ years I have owned forestland 
47. How did you find out about this provision?  
__ From a tax professional 
__ From forestry professional 
__ From attending a tax workshop  
__ Other: ____________________ 
48. What is it that you like most about this provision? 
__________________________________________________________ 
Please go to question 50, on the next page 
49. Why haven’t you used this provision? (Choose the one best answer) 
__It’s too complicated to understand 
__The benefit isn’t large enough to bother with 
__It doesn’t apply to my situation, because:____________________ 
__I don’t want to use it, because:_____________________________ 
__Other:________________________________________________ 
Please continue with question 50 
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An important part of this study is to test whether landowners with different characteristics 
respond to the questions differently. Please answer this short series of questions about 
characteristics of your forestland and yourself. 
 
50. How many acres of land do you own, altogether? 
      _______________________________acres 
 
51. How many acres of forestland do you own? 
      _______________________________acres 
 
52. What would you say is the single most important reason you own forestland? 
     ___ Part of my residence                                   ___Recreation 
      ___Esthetic enjoyment                                     ___Timber production 
      ___Part of my farm                                          ___ Land investment 
      ___To provide products I use for my farm or home 
 
53. Do you belong to a forestland owner organization? 
  __Yes 
  __No 
 
54. Do you have a written forest management plan? 
__ Yes 
__ No 
 
55. What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?  
___Elementary school                                           ___College degree 
___High school or equivalent                               ___ Some graduate work 
___Some college                                                   ___ Graduate degree                  
  
56. What is your occupation? 
__ Blue collar or clerical                                        ___ Homemaker 
__White collar or professional                               ___Retired 
__Farmer                                                                ___Other: 
                                                                               _______________ 
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57. What is your age? 
___ Under 30 years old. 
___ 30 to 49 years old 
___ 50 to 65 years old 
___ 66 years or older 
     
58. What is your present household income level? 
___$0 to $30,000 per year 
___ $30,001 to $85,000 per year 
___Greater than $85,000 per year 
  
   If you would like to receive a copy of the study results , please fill out the form on the 
next page. 
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In an effort to track the returns of this survey we are asking for you to provide your name 
in the space below. I, Robert J. Dee pledge to enter the survey information into a 
spreadsheet and then destroy the survey form. Your name will never be used in any way 
other than to keep track of those who have returned the survey. Thank you for taking the 
time to fill out this survey form. 
 
 
Name:________________________________________ 
 
 
If you would like to receive a copy of the results from this study, please fill out the 
following form. (This form is on a separate sheet so we can separate it from your 
questionnaire. Your name and address will not be used with your responses.) 
 
 
Name:___________________________________________________________ 
 
Address:________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Optional 
 
Telephone:_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Email:__________ 
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APPENDIX B 
LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS 
 
 
Nominal Logistic Fit for LTCG-Awareness 
Converged in Gradient, 6 iterations 
 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 29.43142 5 58.86284 <.0001* 
Full 218.95269    
Reduced 248.38411    
 
 
   
RSquare (U) 0.1185 
AICc 450.089 
BIC 474.758 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 465 
  
  
 
Measure Training Definition 
Entropy RSquare 0.1185 1-Loglike(model)/Loglike(0) 
Generalized RSquare 0.1811 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n)) 
Mean -Log p 0.4709 ∑ -Log(ρ[j])/n 
RMSE 0.3921 √ ∑(y[j]-ρ[j])²/n 
Mean Abs Dev 0.3068 ∑ |y[j]-ρ[j]|/n 
Misclassification Rate 0.2258 ∑ (ρ[j]≠ρMax)/n 
N 465 N 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 437 210.11167 420.2233 
Saturated 442 8.84101 Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 5 218.95269 0.7096 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept  0.77475951 0.3539471 4.79 0.0286* 0.09437706 1.488339 
FA1  0.00151499 0.0004605 10.82 0.0010* 0.00069153 0.00249564 
 PF1  0.05849624 0.4647309 0.02 0.8998  -0.8657407 0.96229507 
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Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
BTO1[1]  0.63284708 0.120413 27.62 <.0001* 0.39868217 0.87157206 
PRO-
I[1] 
  -0.4134588 0.1587863 6.78 0.0092*  -0.7372902  -0.1123784 
LOE[1]  0.24870462 0.1234215 4.06 0.0439* 0.00511951 0.48991399 
 
For log odds of 1/0 
 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R 
ChiSquare 
Prob>ChiSq   
FA1 1 1 16.5781527 <.0001*  
 PF1 1 1 0.01582041 0.8999  
BTO1 1 1 28.3307269 <.0001*  
PRO-I 1 1 7.4075867 0.0065*  
LOE 1 1 4.00312209 0.0454*  
 
Odds Ratios 
For LTCG2 odds of 1 versus 0 
 
Tests and confidence intervals on odds ratios are likelihood ratio based. 
 
Unit Odds Ratios 
Per unit change in regressor 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 1.001516 1.000692 1.002499 0.9984862 
 PF1 1.060241 0.42074 2.617697 0.9431818 
 
Range Odds Ratios 
Per change in regressor over entire range 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 1334.367 26.70245 140688.6 0.0007494 
 PF1 1.060241 0.42074 2.617697 0.9431818 
 
Odds Ratios for BTO1 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.2820434 <.0001* 0.1749694 0.4505148 
1 0 3.5455531 <.0001* 2.2196829 5.7152847 
 
Odds Ratios for PRO-I 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
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Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 2.2862605 0.0065* 1.2520182 4.3692019 
1 0 0.4373955 0.0065* 0.2288748 0.7987104 
 
Odds Ratios for LOE 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.6081041 0.0454* 0.3753757 0.9898132 
1 0 1.6444554 0.0454* 1.0102916 2.663998 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
 
 
Using LTCG2='1' to be the positive level 
 
AUC 
0.74163 
 
 
Confusion Matrix 
Actual 
Predicted 
 
Training 1 0 
1 347 13 
0 92 13 
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Where(:LTCG2 == 1) 
 
Nominal Logistic Fit for LTCG-Use 
Converged in Gradient, 6 iterations 
 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 8.61008 5 17.22016 0.0041* 
Full 146.99125    
Reduced 155.60134    
 
 
   
RSquare (U) 0.0553 
AICc 306.22 
BIC 329.299 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 360 
  
  
 
Measure Training Definition 
Entropy RSquare 0.0553 1-Loglike(model)/Loglike(0) 
Generalized RSquare 0.0807 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n)) 
Mean -Log p 0.4083 ∑ -Log(ρ[j])/n 
RMSE 0.3532 √ ∑(y[j]-ρ[j])²/n 
Mean Abs Dev 0.2510 ∑ |y[j]-ρ[j]|/n 
Misclassification Rate 0.1556 ∑ (ρ[j]≠ρMax)/n 
N 360 N 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 339 141.96932 283.9386 
Saturated 344 5.02193 Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 5 146.99125 0.9866 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept  1.59210519 0.481938 10.91 0.0010* 0.70079111 2.605021 
FA1  0.00203391 0.0006544 9.66 0.0019* 0.00089826 0.00346295 
 PF1   -0.7174421 0.6348829 1.28 0.2585  -2.0148422 0.48745021 
BTO1[1]  0.06660747 0.1645366 0.16 0.6856  -0.2655452 0.38280715 
PRO-I[1]   -0.025331 0.1823005 0.02 0.8895  -0.3959988 0.32283855 
LOE[1]   -0.0178191 0.1661263 0.01 0.9146  -0.3547296 0.29998686 
 
For log odds of 1/0 
 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq   
FA1 1 1 16.8584672 <.0001*  
 PF1 1 1 1.32965507 0.2489  
BTO1 1 1 0.16217297 0.6872  
PRO-I 1 1 0.01939214 0.8892  
LOE 1 1 0.0115415 0.9144  
  
123 
 
 
Odds Ratios 
For LTCG3 odds of 1 versus 0 
 
Tests and confidence intervals on odds ratios are likelihood ratio based. 
 
Unit Odds Ratios 
Per unit change in regressor 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 1.002036 1.000899 1.003469 0.9979682 
 PF1 0.487999 0.133341 1.628159 2.0491849 
 
Range Odds Ratios 
Per change in regressor over entire range 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 15694.5 71.28999 13922571 6.3717e-5 
 PF1 0.487999 0.133341 1.628159 2.0491849 
 
Odds Ratios for BTO1 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.8752769 0.6872 0.4650482 1.700786 
1 0 1.1424955 0.6872 0.5879635 2.1503149 
 
Odds Ratios for PRO-I 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 1.0519672 0.8892 0.5243074 2.2078024 
1 0 0.9506 0.8892 0.4529391 1.907278 
 
Odds Ratios for LOE 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 1.0362809 0.9144 0.5488261 2.0328914 
1 0 0.9649894 0.9144 0.4919102 1.8220709 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
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Using LTCG3='1' to be the positive level 
 
AUC 
0.69423 
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Nominal Logistic Fit for ADME-Awareness 
Converged in Gradient, 6 iterations 
 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 42.89286 5 85.78572 <.0001* 
Full 206.71725    
Reduced 249.61011    
 
 
   
RSquare (U) 0.1718 
AICc 425.618 
BIC 450.287 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 465 
  
  
 
Measure Training Definition 
Entropy RSquare 0.1718 1-Loglike(model)/Loglike(0) 
Generalized RSquare 0.2559 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n)) 
Mean -Log p 0.4446 ∑ -Log(ρ[j])/n 
RMSE 0.3810 √ ∑(y[j]-ρ[j])²/n 
Mean Abs Dev 0.2889 ∑ |y[j]-ρ[j]|/n 
Misclassification Rate 0.2065 ∑ (ρ[j]≠ρMax)/n 
N 465 N 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 437 193.71735 387.4347 
Saturated 442 12.99990 Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 5 206.71725 0.9574 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept   -0.0366914 0.3463282 0.01 0.9156  -0.7165913 0.64683267 
FA1  0.00220747 0.0005615 15.46 <.0001* 0.00119803 0.003402 
BTO1[1]  0.74798925 0.1241815 36.28 <.0001* 0.5074019 0.9951575 
PRO-I[1]   -0.3245013 0.1560772 4.32 0.0376*  -0.6404006  -0.0267174 
LOE[1]  0.27255457 0.1266857 4.63 0.0314* 0.02289006 0.52054904 
 PF1  0.82351931 0.4673944 3.10 0.0781  -0.0929734 1.74470546 
 
For log odds of 1/0 
 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq   
FA1 1 1 25.1814069 <.0001*  
BTO1 1 1 38.0400238 <.0001*  
PRO-I 1 1 4.58192068 0.0323*  
LOE 1 1 4.57165335 0.0325*  
 PF1 1 1 3.1036078 0.0781  
 
Odds Ratios 
For ADME1 odds of 1 versus 0 
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Tests and confidence intervals on odds ratios are likelihood ratio based. 
 
Unit Odds Ratios 
Per unit change in regressor 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 1.00221 1.001199 1.003408 0.997795 
 PF1 2.278505 0.911218 5.724215 0.4388844 
 
Range Odds Ratios 
Per change in regressor over entire range 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 35792.94 296.0865 10422847 2.7938e-5 
 PF1 2.278505 0.911218 5.724215 0.4388844 
 
Odds Ratios for BTO1 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.2240293 <.0001* 0.1366524 0.3624735 
1 0 4.4637021 <.0001* 2.7588221 7.3178384 
 
Odds Ratios for PRO-I 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 1.9136313 0.0323* 1.0548883 3.5995227 
1 0 0.5225667 0.0323* 0.2778146 0.9479677 
 
Odds Ratios for LOE 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.5797785 0.0325* 0.3530668 0.955252 
1 0 1.7247966 0.0325* 1.0468442 2.8323255 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
 
 
Using ADME1='1' to be the positive level 
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AUC 
0.78050 
 
 
Confusion Matrix 
Actual 
Predicted 
 
Training 1 0 
1 342 17 
0 79 27 
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Where(:ADME1 == 1) 
 
Nominal Logistic Fit for ADME-USE 
Converged in Gradient, 5 iterations 
 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 3.68768 5 7.375355 0.1942 
Full 150.04531    
Reduced 153.73299    
 
 
   
RSquare (U) 0.0240 
AICc 312.329 
BIC 335.391 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 359 
  
  
 
Measure Training Definition 
Entropy RSquare 0.0240 1-Loglike(model)/Loglike(0) 
Generalized RSquare 0.0353 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n)) 
Mean -Log p 0.4180 ∑ -Log(ρ[j])/n 
RMSE 0.3558 √ ∑(y[j]-ρ[j])²/n 
Mean Abs Dev 0.2537 ∑ |y[j]-ρ[j]|/n 
Misclassification Rate 0.1532 ∑ (ρ[j]≠ρMax)/n 
N 359 n 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 342 145.88643 291.7729 
Saturated 347 4.15888 Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 5 150.04531 0.9771 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept  2.00392646 0.5620838 12.71 0.0004* 0.97336223 3.19184067 
FA1  0.00055585 0.0003659 2.31 0.1288  -6.4842e-5 0.0013712 
BTO1[1]  0.10331169 0.1627292 0.40 0.5255  -0.2257523 0.41551105 
PRO-I[1]  0.30213687 0.168068 3.23 0.0722  -0.0345271 0.6275614 
LOE[1]  0.02858469 0.16785 0.03 0.8648  -0.3128991 0.34909113 
 PF1   -0.900528 0.6960765 1.67 0.1958  -2.3387605 0.4035075 
 
For log odds of 1/0 
 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq   
FA1 1 1 2.9750353 0.0846  
BTO1 1 1 0.39594525 0.5292  
PRO-I 1 1 3.1103473 0.0778  
LOE 1 1 0.02884164 0.8651  
 PF1 1 1 1.78352654 0.1817  
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Odds Ratios 
For ADME3 odds of 1 versus 0 
 
Tests and confidence intervals on odds ratios are likelihood ratio based. 
 
Unit Odds Ratios 
Per unit change in regressor 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 1.000556 0.999935 1.001372 0.9994443 
 PF1 0.406355 0.096447 1.497066 2.460902 
 
Range Odds Ratios 
Per change in regressor over entire range 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 14.01753 0.734916 673.9736 0.0713393 
 PF1 0.406355 0.096447 1.497066 2.460902 
 
Odds Ratios for BTO1 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.8133259 0.5292 0.4356038 1.5706737 
1 0 1.2295194 0.5292 0.6366695 2.2956639 
 
Odds Ratios for PRO-I 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.5464712 0.0778 0.2850408 1.0714943 
1 0 1.8299227 0.0778 0.9332761 3.5082691 
 
Odds Ratios for LOE 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.9444341 0.8651 0.4974888 1.8697379 
1 0 1.0588351 0.8651 0.5348343 2.0100956 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
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Using ADME3='1' to be the positive level 
 
AUC 
0.60978 
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Nominal Logistic Fit for CLIC-Awareness 
Converged in Gradient, 5 iterations 
 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 38.98871 5 77.97741 <.0001* 
Full 276.23378    
Reduced 315.22248    
 
 
   
RSquare (U) 0.1237 
AICc 564.651 
BIC 589.32 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 465 
  
  
 
Measure Training Definition 
Entropy RSquare 0.1237 1-Loglike(model)/Loglike(0) 
Generalized RSquare 0.2080 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n)) 
Mean -Log p 0.5941 ∑ -Log(ρ[j])/n 
RMSE 0.4536 √ ∑(y[j]-ρ[j])²/n 
Mean Abs Dev 0.4103 ∑ |y[j]-ρ[j]|/n 
Misclassification Rate 0.3204 ∑ (ρ[j]≠ρMax)/n 
N 465 n 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 437 262.89408 525.7882 
Saturated 442 13.33970 Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 5 276.23378 0.0022* 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept   -0.9104962 0.3296243 7.63 0.0057*  -1.5708793  -0.2743802 
FA1  0.00117466 0.000317 13.73 0.0002* 0.00059703 0.00183731 
BTO1[1]  0.56955638 0.107107 28.28 <.0001* 0.36128995 0.78168038 
PRO-I[1]   -0.0269916 0.126301 0.05 0.8308  -0.2768808 0.21926217 
LOE[1]  0.37329991 0.1107246 11.37 0.0007* 0.15705136 0.59171311 
 PF1  0.73274659 0.4206588 3.03 0.0815  -0.0859036 1.5676405 
 
For log odds of 1/0 
 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq   
FA1 1 1 19.7123185 <.0001*  
BTO1 1 1 29.1949619 <.0001*  
PRO-I 1 1 0.04574231 0.8306  
LOE 1 1 11.4652099 0.0007*  
 PF1 1 1 3.07457024 0.0795  
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Odds Ratios 
For CLIC1 odds of 1 versus 0 
 
Tests and confidence intervals on odds ratios are likelihood ratio based. 
 
Unit Odds Ratios 
Per unit change in regressor 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 1.001175 1.000597 1.001839 0.998826 
 PF1 2.080788 0.917683 4.79532 0.4805872 
 
Range Odds Ratios 
Per change in regressor over entire range 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 264.9756 17.04578 6168.487 0.0037739 
 PF1 2.080788 0.917683 4.79532 0.4805872 
 
Odds Ratios for BTO1 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.3201029 <.0001* 0.209431 0.4854981 
1 0 3.1239954 <.0001* 2.0597403 4.7748414 
 
Odds Ratios for PRO-I 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 1.0554669 0.8306 0.6449875 1.739785 
1 0 0.947448 0.8306 0.5747837 1.5504176 
 
Odds Ratios for LOE 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.4739754 0.0007* 0.3062277 0.730444 
1 0 2.1098141 0.0007* 1.3690304 3.2655435 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
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Using CLIC1='1' to be the positive level 
 
AUC 
0.72788 
 
 
Lift Curve 
 
 
 CLIC1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
Confusion Matrix 
Actual 
Predicted 
 
Training 1 0 
1 217 56 
0 93 99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Li
ft
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Where(:CLIC1 == 1) 
 
Nominal Logistic Fit for CLIC-Use 
Converged in Gradient, 4 iterations 
 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 7.45301 5 14.90602 0.0108* 
Full 137.57319    
Reduced 145.02620    
 
 
   
RSquare (U) 0.0514 
AICc 287.462 
BIC 308.803 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 273 
  
  
 
Measure Training Definition 
Entropy RSquare 0.0514 1-Loglike(model)/Loglike(0) 
Generalized RSquare 0.0812 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n)) 
Mean -Log p 0.5039 ∑ -Log(ρ[j])/n 
RMSE 0.4040 √ ∑(y[j]-ρ[j])²/n 
Mean Abs Dev 0.3261 ∑ |y[j]-ρ[j]|/n 
Misclassification Rate 0.2161 ∑ (ρ[j]≠ρMax)/n 
N 273 n 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 261 132.89106 265.7821 
Saturated 266 4.68213 Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 5 137.57319 0.4063 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept   -1.0433941 0.5329776 3.83 0.0503  -2.1430775  -0.0357926 
FA1  0.00069119 0.0002203 9.85 0.0017* 0.00027721 0.00114886 
BTO1[1]   -0.2434374 0.1699668 2.05 0.1521  -0.5726394 0.09690833 
PRO-I[1]  0.0521308 0.1876387 0.08 0.7811  -0.3054639 0.43469693 
LOE[1]  0.25134902 0.1969888 1.63 0.2020  -0.1177599 0.66140162 
 PF1   -0.8162901 0.6651946 1.51 0.2198  -2.1033157 0.52526769 
 
For log odds of 1/0 
 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq   
FA1 1 1 10.8982543 0.0010*  
BTO1 1 1 1.99312863 0.1580  
PRO-I 1 1 0.07790971 0.7802  
LOE 1 1 1.73486033 0.1878  
 PF1 1 1 1.4586876 0.2271  
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Odds Ratios 
For CLIC3 odds of 1 versus 0 
 
Tests and confidence intervals on odds ratios are likelihood ratio based. 
 
Unit Odds Ratios 
Per unit change in regressor 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 1.000691 1.000277 1.00115 0.999309 
 PF1 0.442069 0.122051 1.690911 2.2620921 
 
Range Odds Ratios 
Per change in regressor over entire range 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 26.66007 3.731225 234.4177 0.0375093 
 PF1 0.442069 0.122051 1.690911 2.2620921 
 
Odds Ratios for BTO1 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 1.6272229 0.1580 0.8238089 3.1433177 
1 0 0.6145439 0.1580 0.3181352 1.2138737 
 
Odds Ratios for PRO-I 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.9009896 0.7802 0.4192056 1.8421398 
1 0 1.1098908 0.7802 0.542847 2.3854645 
 
Odds Ratios for LOE 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.6048964 0.1878 0.2663875 1.2655664 
1 0 1.6531756 0.1878 0.7901601 3.7539298 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
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Using CLIC3='1' to be the positive level 
 
AUC 
0.64398 
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Nominal Logistic Fit for DS179- Awareness 
Converged in Gradient, 4 iterations 
 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 28.21244 5 56.42488 <.0001* 
Full 294.09993    
Reduced 322.31236    
 
 
   
RSquare (U) 0.0875 
AICc 600.383 
BIC 625.052 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 465 
  
  
 
Measure Training Definition 
Entropy RSquare 0.0875 1-Loglike(model)/Loglike(0) 
Generalized RSquare 0.1524 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n)) 
Mean -Log p 0.6325 ∑ -Log(ρ[j])/n 
RMSE 0.4695 √ ∑(y[j]-ρ[j])²/n 
Mean Abs Dev 0.4422 ∑ |y[j]-ρ[j]|/n 
Misclassification Rate 0.3548 ∑ (ρ[j]≠ρMax)/n 
N 465 n 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 437 283.53282 567.0656 
Saturated 442 10.56711 Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 5 294.09993 <.0001* 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept   -1.4238384 0.3401665 17.52 <.0001*  -2.1133593  -0.7758048 
FA1  0.00088732 0.0002592 11.72 0.0006* 0.00041693 0.00143002 
BTO1[1]  0.40721944 0.1052362 14.97 0.0001* 0.20252168 0.61558434 
PRO-I[1]   -0.1577441 0.1225609 1.66 0.1981  -0.400103 0.08134771 
LOE[1]  0.22655742 0.108626 4.35 0.0370* 0.01443101 0.44086924 
 PF1  1.23292409 0.4278471 8.30 0.0040* 0.41048172 2.09221065 
 
For log odds of 1/0 
 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq   
FA1 1 1 16.0310191 <.0001*  
BTO1 1 1 15.359361 <.0001*  
PRO-I 1 1 1.66839346 0.1965  
LOE 1 1 4.38317332 0.0363*  
 PF1 1 1 8.7681136 0.0031*  
 
Odds Ratios 
For DS1791 odds of 1 versus 0 
  
138 
 
 
Tests and confidence intervals on odds ratios are likelihood ratio based. 
 
Unit Odds Ratios 
Per unit change in regressor 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 1.000888 1.000417 1.001431 0.9991131 
 PF1 3.431248 1.507544 8.102808 0.2914391 
 
Range Odds Ratios 
Per change in regressor over entire range 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 67.67757 7.245857 891.2084 0.0147759 
 PF1 3.431248 1.507544 8.102808 0.2914391 
 
Odds Ratios for BTO1 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.4428878 <.0001* 0.2919512 0.6669479 
1 0 2.2579084 <.0001* 1.4993675 3.4252302 
 
Odds Ratios for PRO-I 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 1.3709284 0.1965 0.84985 2.2259995 
1 0 0.7294327 0.1965 0.4492364 1.1766782 
 
Odds Ratios for LOE 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.6356451 0.0363* 0.4140624 0.9715505 
1 0 1.5732048 0.0363* 1.0292826 2.4150947 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
 
 
Using DS1791='1' to be the positive level 
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AUC 
0.69851 
 
 
Confusion Matrix 
Actual 
Predicted 
 
Training 1 0 
1 156 77 
0 88 144 
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Where(:DS1791 == 1) 
 
Nominal Logistic Fit for DS179-Use 
Converged in Gradient, 4 iterations 
 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 6.11543 5 12.23087 0.0318* 
Full 143.75739    
Reduced 149.87283    
 
 
   
RSquare (U) 0.0408 
AICc 299.886 
BIC 320.221 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 233 
  
  
 
Measure Training Definition 
Entropy RSquare 0.0408 1-Loglike(model)/Loglike(0) 
Generalized RSquare 0.0707 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n)) 
Mean -Log p 0.6170 ∑ -Log(ρ[j])/n 
RMSE 0.4620 √ ∑(y[j]-ρ[j])²/n 
Mean Abs Dev 0.4277 ∑ |y[j]-ρ[j]|/n 
Misclassification Rate 0.3391 ∑ (ρ[j]≠ρMax)/n 
N 233 n 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 222 140.98480 281.9696 
Saturated 227 2.77259 Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 5 143.75739 0.0040* 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept  1.52423061 0.6205375 6.03 0.0140* 0.35192535 2.80098112 
FA1  0.00066883 0.0003053 4.80 0.0285* 0.00012953 0.00133021 
BTO1[1]  0.24267027 0.1619781 2.24 0.1341  -0.0770018 0.56033888 
PRO-I[1]  0.16883458 0.1756165 0.92 0.3364  -0.178116 0.513464 
LOE[1]   -0.1391226 0.1705603 0.67 0.4147  -0.482762 0.18902294 
 PF1   -1.6131188 0.75301 4.59 0.0322*  -3.1449848  -0.1779287 
 
For log odds of 1/0 
 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq   
FA1 1 1 6.2278988 0.0126*  
BTO1 1 1 2.22419638 0.1359  
PRO-I 1 1 0.91922393 0.3377  
LOE 1 1 0.67719385 0.4106  
 PF1 1 1 4.88017093 0.0272*  
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Odds Ratios 
For DS1793 odds of 1 versus 0 
 
Tests and confidence intervals on odds ratios are likelihood ratio based. 
 
Unit Odds Ratios 
Per unit change in regressor 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 1.000669 1.00013 1.001331 0.9993314 
 PF1 0.199265 0.043068 0.837002 5.0184384 
 
Range Odds Ratios 
Per change in regressor over entire range 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 23.97332 1.850115 554.7281 0.041713 
 PF1 0.199265 0.043068 0.837002 5.0184384 
 
Odds Ratios for BTO1 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.6154876 0.1359 0.3260587 1.166495 
1 0 1.6247282 0.1359 0.857269 3.0669321 
 
Odds Ratios for PRO-I 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.7134313 0.3377 0.3581054 1.4279388 
1 0 1.4016767 0.3377 0.7003101 2.7924742 
 
Odds Ratios for LOE 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 1.3208101 0.4106 0.6851991 2.6261636 
1 0 0.7571111 0.4106 0.3807836 1.4594299 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
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Using DS1793='1' to be the positive level 
 
AUC 
0.65000 
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Nominal Logistic Fit for RTC-Awareness 
Converged in Gradient, 4 iterations 
 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 24.29971 5 48.59942 <.0001* 
Full 296.54013    
Reduced 320.83984    
 
 
   
RSquare (U) 0.0757 
AICc 605.264 
BIC 629.932 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 465 
  
  
 
Measure Training Definition 
Entropy RSquare 0.0757 1-Loglike(model)/Loglike(0) 
Generalized RSquare 0.1326 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n)) 
Mean -Log p 0.6377 ∑ -Log(ρ[j])/n 
RMSE 0.4705 √ ∑(y[j]-ρ[j])²/n 
Mean Abs Dev 0.4452 ∑ |y[j]-ρ[j]|/n 
Misclassification Rate 0.3462 ∑ (ρ[j]≠ρMax)/n 
N 465 n 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 437 277.13201 554.264 
Saturated 442 19.40812 Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 5 296.54013 0.0001* 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept   -0.8848956 0.3194384 7.67 0.0056*  -1.5254231  -0.2689282 
FA1  0.00075809 0.0002514 9.09 0.0026* 0.00030301 0.00128675 
BTO1[1]  0.45984418 0.1035557 19.72 <.0001* 0.25823414 0.66464938 
PRO-I[1]  0.01802254 0.1204458 0.02 0.8811  -0.219221 0.25387315 
LOE[1]  0.20311418 0.1074049 3.58 0.0586  -0.0071572 0.4144456 
 PF1  0.68602253 0.4068423 2.84 0.0918  -0.1046132 1.49480614 
 
For log odds of 1/0 
 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq   
FA1 1 1 11.9779864 0.0005*  
BTO1 1 1 20.1972526 <.0001*  
PRO-I 1 1 0.02237908 0.8811  
LOE 1 1 3.5844474 0.0583  
 PF1 1 1 2.88752715 0.0893  
 
Odds Ratios 
For RTC1 odds of 1 versus 0 
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Tests and confidence intervals on odds ratios are likelihood ratio based. 
 
Unit Odds Ratios 
Per unit change in regressor 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 1.000758 1.000303 1.001288 0.9992422 
 PF1 1.985801 0.900673 4.458472 0.503575 
 
Range Odds Ratios 
Per change in regressor over entire range 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 36.63247 4.217653 451.2735 0.0272982 
 PF1 1.985801 0.900673 4.458472 0.503575 
 
Odds Ratios for BTO1 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.3986433 <.0001* 0.2646628 0.5966239 
1 0 2.5085085 <.0001* 1.6760977 3.7783929 
 
Odds Ratios for PRO-I 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.9645968 0.8811 0.6018504 1.5502899 
1 0 1.0367026 0.8811 0.6450407 1.6615424 
 
Odds Ratios for LOE 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.666158 0.0583 0.436533 1.0144173 
1 0 1.5011453 0.0583 0.9857876 2.2907773 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
 
 
Using RTC1='1' to be the positive level 
 
AUC 
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AUC 
0.69289 
 
 
Confusion Matrix 
Actual 
Predicted 
 
Training 1 0 
1 192 59 
0 102 112 
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Where(:RTC1 == 1) 
 
Nominal Logistic Fit for RTC3 
Converged in Gradient, 5 iterations 
 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 10.44672 5 20.89343 0.0008* 
Full 122.78736    
Reduced 133.23408    
 
 
   
RSquare (U) 0.0784 
AICc 257.919 
BIC 278.727 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 251 
  
  
 
Measure Training Definition 
Entropy RSquare 0.0784 1-Loglike(model)/Loglike(0) 
Generalized RSquare 0.1221 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n)) 
Mean -Log p 0.4892 ∑ -Log(ρ[j])/n 
RMSE 0.3986 √ ∑(y[j]-ρ[j])²/n 
Mean Abs Dev 0.3180 ∑ |y[j]-ρ[j]|/n 
Misclassification Rate 0.2430 ∑ (ρ[j]≠ρMax)/n 
N 251 n 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 240 119.49153 238.9831 
Saturated 245 3.29584 Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 5 122.78736 0.5064 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept   -0.0646083 0.4904352 0.02 0.8952 
FA1  0.00122496 0.0004962 6.09 0.0136* 
BTO1[1]  0.11893613 0.1810051 0.43 0.5111 
PRO-I[1]  0.32626282 0.1835054 3.16 0.0754 
LOE[1]  0.14919911 0.1757711 0.72 0.3960 
 PF1  0.68706758 0.6347514 1.17 0.2791 
 
For log odds of 1/0 
 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq   
FA1 1 1 8.85231887 0.0029*  
BTO1 1 1 0.42492167 0.5145  
PRO-I 1 1 3.06296785 0.0801  
LOE 1 1 0.70821286 0.4000  
 PF1 1 1 1.15453202 0.2826  
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Odds Ratios 
For RTC3 odds of 1 versus 0 
 
Tests and confidence intervals on odds ratios are likelihood ratio based. 
 
Unit Odds Ratios 
Per unit change in regressor 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 1.001226 1.000364 1.002319 0.9987758 
 PF1 1.987878 0.561452 6.867745 0.5030491 
 
Range Odds Ratios 
Per change in regressor over entire range 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 336.4915 5.634545 60047.85 0.0029718 
 PF1 1.987878 0.561452 6.867745 0.5030491 
 
Odds Ratios for BTO1 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.7883034 0.5145 0.3925054 1.6347083 
1 0 1.2685471 0.5145 0.6117299 2.5477353 
 
Odds Ratios for PRO-I 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.5207289 0.0801 0.255317 1.083259 
1 0 1.9203849 0.0801 0.9231403 3.9166996 
 
Odds Ratios for LOE 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.7420058 0.4000 0.3759744 1.5016415 
1 0 1.3476984 0.4000 0.6659379 2.6597559 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
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Using RTC3='1' to be the positive level 
 
AUC 
0.68979 
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Nominal Logistic Fit for ARE- Awareness 
Converged in Gradient, 4 iterations 
 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 29.85034 5 59.70068 <.0001* 
Full 290.08377    
Reduced 319.93411    
 
 
   
RSquare (U) 0.0933 
AICc 592.351 
BIC 617.02 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 465 
  
  
 
Measure Training Definition 
Entropy RSquare 0.0933 1-Loglike(model)/Loglike(0) 
Generalized RSquare 0.1612 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n)) 
Mean -Log p 0.6238 ∑ -Log(ρ[j])/n 
RMSE 0.4651 √ ∑(y[j]-ρ[j])²/n 
Mean Abs Dev 0.4336 ∑ |y[j]-ρ[j]|/n 
Misclassification Rate 0.3484 ∑ (ρ[j]≠ρMax)/n 
N 465 n 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 437 274.83453 549.6691 
Saturated 442 15.24924 Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 5 290.08377 0.0002* 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept   -1.1024633 0.3289855 11.23 0.0008*  -1.7638199  -0.4699942 
FA1  0.00055817 0.0002339 5.70 0.0170* 0.00013451 0.00105214 
BTO1[1]  0.42125648 0.104566 16.23 <.0001* 0.2173496 0.6277406 
PRO-I[1]  0.24954542 0.1216326 4.21 0.0402* 0.01153675 0.48930323 
LOE[1]  0.39525658 0.1092692 13.08 0.0003* 0.1823001 0.61124773 
 PF1  0.87616979 0.4137439 4.48 0.0342* 0.07279282 1.69944063 
 
For log odds of 1/0 
 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq   
FA1 1 1 7.00551809 0.0081*  
BTO1 1 1 16.4874336 <.0001*  
PRO-I 1 1 4.22268508 0.0399*  
LOE 1 1 13.3026369 0.0003*  
 PF1 1 1 4.57425069 0.0325*  
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Odds Ratios 
For ARE1 odds of 1 versus 0 
 
Tests and confidence intervals on odds ratios are likelihood ratio based. 
 
Unit Odds Ratios 
Per unit change in regressor 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 1.000558 1.000135 1.001053 0.999442 
 PF1 2.401683 1.075508 5.470886 0.4163747 
 
Range Odds Ratios 
Per change in regressor over entire range 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 14.17268 1.894463 148.0655 0.0705583 
 PF1 2.401683 1.075508 5.470886 0.4163747 
 
Odds Ratios for BTO1 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.430627 <.0001* 0.2849387 0.6474594 
1 0 2.3221952 <.0001* 1.5444984 3.5095268 
 
Odds Ratios for PRO-I 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.6070823 0.0399* 0.3758345 0.9771907 
1 0 1.647223 0.0399* 1.0233417 2.6607458 
 
Odds Ratios for LOE 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.453612 0.0003* 0.2944944 0.6944742 
1 0 2.2045274 0.0003* 1.4399382 3.3956509 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
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Using ARE1='1' to be the positive level 
 
AUC 
0.70355 
 
 
Confusion Matrix 
Actual 
Predicted 
 
Training 1 0 
1 200 56 
0 106 103 
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Where(:ARE1 == 1) 
 
Nominal Logistic Fit for ARE-Use 
Converged in Gradient, 5 iterations 
 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 6.25936 5 12.51872 0.0283* 
Full 124.29978    
Reduced 130.55914    
 
 
   
RSquare (U) 0.0479 
AICc 260.937 
BIC 281.871 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 256 
  
  
 
Measure Training Definition 
Entropy RSquare 0.0479 1-Loglike(model)/Loglike(0) 
Generalized RSquare 0.0746 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n)) 
Mean -Log p 0.4855 ∑ -Log(ρ[j])/n 
RMSE 0.3943 √ ∑(y[j]-ρ[j])²/n 
Mean Abs Dev 0.3118 ∑ |y[j]-ρ[j]|/n 
Misclassification Rate 0.2109 ∑ (ρ[j]≠ρMax)/n 
N 256 n 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 244 122.39024 244.7805 
Saturated 249 1.90954 Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 5 124.29978 0.4739 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Intercept  0.39830179 0.5449533 0.53 0.4648 
FA1  0.00082624 0.0004398 3.53 0.0603 
BTO1[1]   -0.2593395 0.1988192 1.70 0.1921 
PRO-I[1]  0.26307268 0.1946518 1.83 0.1765 
LOE[1]   -0.0320578 0.1940759 0.03 0.8688 
 PF1  0.77484828 0.6866897 1.27 0.2592 
 
For log odds of 1/0 
 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq   
FA1 1 1 4.67718609 0.0306*  
BTO1 1 1 1.81317266 0.1781  
PRO-I 1 1 1.76110256 0.1845  
LOE 1 1 0.02746468 0.8684  
 PF1 1 1 1.24696995 0.2641  
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Receiver Operating Characteristic 
 
 
Using ARE3='1' to be the positive level 
 
AUC 
0.64997 
 
 
Odds Ratios 
For ARE3 odds of 1 versus 0 
 
Tests and confidence intervals on odds ratios are likelihood ratio based. 
 
Unit Odds Ratios 
Per unit change in regressor 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 1.000827 1.000068 1.001802 0.9991741 
 PF1 2.170263 0.5488 8.270145 0.4607737 
 
Range Odds Ratios 
Per change in regressor over entire range 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 50.63467 1.378596 5178.322 0.0197493 
 PF1 2.170263 0.5488 8.270145 0.4607737 
 
Odds Ratios for BTO1 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 1.6798073 0.1781 0.796909 3.8393663 
1 0 0.5953064 0.1781 0.2604596 1.2548484 
 
Odds Ratios for PRO-I 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.5908782 0.1845 0.2791211 1.2959601 
1 0 1.6923961 0.1845 0.7716287 3.5826747 
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Odds Ratios for LOE 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 1.0662156 0.8684 0.5105259 2.367011 
1 0 0.9378966 0.8684 0.4224737 1.9587645 
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Nominal Logistic Fit for ECSP-Awareness 
Converged in Gradient, 4 iterations 
 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 18.93674 5 37.87348 <.0001* 
Full 295.92933    
Reduced 314.86607    
 
 
   
RSquare (U) 0.0601 
AICc 604.042 
BIC 628.711 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 465 
  
  
 
Measure Training Definition 
Entropy RSquare 0.0601 1-Loglike(model)/Loglike(0) 
Generalized RSquare 0.1054 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n)) 
Mean -Log p 0.6364 ∑ -Log(ρ[j])/n 
RMSE 0.4716 √ ∑(y[j]-ρ[j])²/n 
Mean Abs Dev 0.4456 ∑ |y[j]-ρ[j]|/n 
Misclassification Rate 0.3527 ∑ (ρ[j]≠ρMax)/n 
N 465 n 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 437 278.43075 556.8615 
Saturated 442 17.49858 Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 5 295.92933 <.0001* 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept   -1.5587642 0.3498434 19.85 <.0001*  -2.2713681  -0.8955643 
FA1  0.00038858 0.0001885 4.25 0.0393* 3.26025e-5 0.00078099 
BTO1[1]  0.47957483 0.1088672 19.41 <.0001* 0.26923832 0.69674277 
PRO-I[1]   -0.1121722 0.1218164 0.85 0.3571  -0.3513265 0.1272701 
LOE[1]  0.03279099 0.1091453 0.09 0.7638  -0.1805729 0.24795579 
 PF1  1.16869547 0.4363989 7.17 0.0074* 0.33306656 2.04857018 
 
For log odds of 1/0 
 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq   
FA1 1 1 4.59458871 0.0321*  
BTO1 1 1 20.5484333 <.0001*  
PRO-I 1 1 0.8466199 0.3575  
LOE 1 1 0.09036979 0.7637  
 PF1 1 1 7.63315124 0.0057*  
 
Odds Ratios 
For ECSP1 odds of 1 versus 0 
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Tests and confidence intervals on odds ratios are likelihood ratio based. 
 
Unit Odds Ratios 
Per unit change in regressor 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 1.000389 1.000033 1.000781 0.9996115 
 PF1 3.217792 1.39524 7.756802 0.3107721 
 
Range Odds Ratios 
Per change in regressor over entire range 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 6.332959 1.167496 40.84181 0.1579041 
 PF1 3.217792 1.39524 7.756802 0.3107721 
 
Odds Ratios for BTO1 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.3832186 <.0001* 0.2482087 0.5836367 
1 0 2.6094766 <.0001* 1.7133948 4.0288684 
 
Odds Ratios for PRO-I 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 1.2515019 0.3575 0.7752729 2.0191021 
1 0 0.7990399 0.3575 0.4952697 1.2898684 
 
Odds Ratios for LOE 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.9365223 0.7637 0.6090155 1.4349726 
1 0 1.0677803 0.7637 0.6968774 1.6419944 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
 
 
Using ECSP1='1' to be the positive level 
 
AUC 
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AUC 
0.66993 
 
 
Confusion Matrix 
Actual 
Predicted 
 
Training 1 0 
1 87 104 
0 60 214 
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Where(:ECSP1 == 1) 
 
Nominal Logistic Fit for ECSP3 ECSP1=1 
Converged in Gradient, 4 iterations 
 
 
Whole Model Test 
Model  -LogLikelihood DF ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq 
Difference 2.17049 5 4.340982 0.5014 
Full 113.38194    
Reduced 115.55243    
 
 
   
RSquare (U) 0.0188 
AICc 239.22 
BIC 258.278 
Observations (or Sum Wgts) 191 
  
  
 
Measure Training Definition 
Entropy RSquare 0.0188 1-Loglike(model)/Loglike(0) 
Generalized RSquare 0.0320 (1-(L(0)/L(model))^(2/n))/(1-L(0)^(2/n)) 
Mean -Log p 0.5936 ∑ -Log(ρ[j])/n 
RMSE 0.4499 √ ∑(y[j]-ρ[j])²/n 
Mean Abs Dev 0.4047 ∑ |y[j]-ρ[j]|/n 
Misclassification Rate 0.2984 ∑ (ρ[j]≠ρMax)/n 
N 191 n 
 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF  -LogLikelihood ChiSquare 
Lack Of Fit 183 111.99565 223.9913 
Saturated 188 1.38629 Prob>ChiSq 
Fitted 5 113.38194 0.0209* 
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimate Std Error ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept  0.36283319 0.5648903 0.41 0.5207  -0.7343907 1.50673408
FA1   -0.0002383 0.0002347 1.03 0.3100  -0.0007095 0.00024102
BTO1[1]  0.07156209 0.1970585 0.13 0.7165  -0.325133 0.45194457
PRO-I[1]  0.271712 0.1984967 1.87 0.1710  -0.1237018 0.6590658
LOE[1]  0.04294075 0.1867677 0.05 0.8182  -0.331724 0.40423083
 PF1  0.54665669 0.7188715 0.58 0.4470  -0.890795 1.95300374
 
For log odds of 1/0 
 
 
Effect Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Source Nparm DF L-R ChiSquare Prob>ChiSq   
FA1 1 1 1.00490153 0.3161  
BTO1 1 1 0.1308158 0.7176  
PRO-I 1 1 1.83693067 0.1753  
LOE 1 1 0.05263113 0.8185  
 PF1 1 1 0.57172265 0.4496  
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Odds Ratios 
For ECSP3 odds of 1 versus 0 
 
Tests and confidence intervals on odds ratios are likelihood ratio based. 
 
Unit Odds Ratios 
Per unit change in regressor 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 0.999762 0.999291 1.000241 1.0002383 
 PF1 1.727468 0.410329 7.049832 0.578882 
 
Range Odds Ratios 
Per change in regressor over entire range 
 
Term Odds Ratio Lower 95% Upper 95% Reciprocal 
FA1 0.322394 0.034385 3.141883 3.1017947 
 PF1 1.727468 0.410329 7.049832 0.578882 
 
Odds Ratios for BTO1 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.8666464 0.7176 0.4049915 1.9160505 
1 0 1.1538731 0.7176 0.5219069 2.4691875 
 
Odds Ratios for PRO-I 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.5807563 0.1753 0.2676349 1.2806959 
1 0 1.7218926 0.1753 0.7808255 3.7364337 
 
Odds Ratios for LOE 
Level1 /Level2 Odds Ratio Prob>Chisq Lower 95% Upper 95% 
0 1 0.917703 0.8185 0.4455429 1.9414749 
1 0 1.0896772 0.8185 0.5150723 2.2444526 
 
Receiver Operating Characteristic 
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Using ECSP3='1' to be the positive level 
 
AUC 
0.59028 
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Appendix C 
SURVEY DATA 
 
 
 Treatment of Qualifying Income as a Long-term Capital Gain  
     If No, Why Not:  
 Aware?  
 Used 
It?    Complicated  
 Too 
Small   N/A  
 Don't Want 
To    Other  
IDNo LTCG2 LTCG3 LTCG5 LTCG6 LTCG7 LTCG8 LTCG9 
1001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1002 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1004 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1005 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1006 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1007 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1009 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1010 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1011 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1012 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1013 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1017 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1018 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1019 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1021 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1022 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1023 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1024 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1027 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1028 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1029 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1030 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1031 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1032 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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1033 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1034 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1035 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1036 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1037 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1038 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1039 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1040 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1041 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1042 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1043 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1044 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1046 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1047 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1048 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1049 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1050 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1051 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1052 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1053 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1055 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1056 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1057 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1058 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1059 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1060 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1061 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1062 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1063 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1064 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1065 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1066 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1067 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1068 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1069 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1070 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1071 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1072 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1073 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1074 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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1075 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1076 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1077 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1078 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1079 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1080 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1081 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1083 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1084 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1086 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1087 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1088 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1089 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1090 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1091 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1092 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1093 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1094 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1095 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1096 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1097 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1098 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1099 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1100 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1101 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1102 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1103 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1104 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1105 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1106 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1107 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1108 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1109 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1111 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1112 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1113 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1114 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1116 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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1117 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1118 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1120 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1122 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1123 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1125 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1126 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1127 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1129 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1130 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1131 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1132 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1133 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1134 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1135 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1136 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1137 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1138 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1139 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1140 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1141 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1143 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1144 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1145 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
1146 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1147 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1148 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1149 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1150 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1151 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1152 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1153 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1154 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1156 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1157 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1158 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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1159 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1161 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1164 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1165 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1166 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1169 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1170 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1171 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1172 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1173 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1174 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1175 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1176 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1177 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1178 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1179 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1180 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1181 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1182 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1183 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1184 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1185 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1186 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1187 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1188 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1189 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1190 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1191 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1192 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1193 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1195 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1196 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1197 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1198 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1199 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1200 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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1201 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1202 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1203 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1204 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1205 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1206 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1207 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1208 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1209 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1210 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1211 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1213 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1214 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1215 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1216 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1217 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1218 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1219 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1220 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1221 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1222 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1223 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1224 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1225 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1226 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1227 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1228 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1229 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1230 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1231 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1232 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1233 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1234 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1235 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1236 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1237 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1238 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1239 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1240 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1241 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1242 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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1243 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1244 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1245 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1246 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1247 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1248 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1249 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1250 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1251 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1252 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1253 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2012 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2014 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2015 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2016 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2017 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2018 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2019 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2021 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2022 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2023 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2024 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2025 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2026 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2027 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2028 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2029 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2031 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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2032 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2033 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2034 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2035 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2036 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2037 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2038 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2039 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2040 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2041 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2042 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2043 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2044 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2046 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2047 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2048 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2049 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2050 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2051 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2052 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2053 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2055 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2056 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2057 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2058 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2059 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2060 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2061 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2062 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2063 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2064 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2065 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2066 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2067 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2068 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2069 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2070 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2071 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
2072 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2073 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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2074 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2075 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2076 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2077 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2078 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2079 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2081 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2082 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2083 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2084 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2085 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2086 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2088 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2089 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2090 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2091 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2092 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2093 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2094 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2095 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2096 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2097 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2098 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2099 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2101 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2102 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2103 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2104 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2106 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2107 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2108 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2109 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2110 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2111 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2113 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2114 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2115 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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2116 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2117 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2119 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2120 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2122 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2123 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2124 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2125 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2126 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2127 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2129 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2131 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2132 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2133 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2134 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2135 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2136 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2137 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2138 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2139 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2140 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2141 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2143 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2144 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2145 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2146 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2147 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2148 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2149 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2150 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2151 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2152 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2153 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2154 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2156 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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2158 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2159 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2160 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2161 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2162 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2164 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2165 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2166 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2169 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2171 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2172 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2173 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2174 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2175 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2176 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2177 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2178 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2179 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2180 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2181 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2182 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2183 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2184 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2185 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2186 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2187 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2188 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2189 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2190 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2191 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2192 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2193 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2195 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2196 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2197 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2198 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2199 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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2200 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2201 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2202 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2203 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2204 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2205 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2206 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2207 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2208 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2209 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2210 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2211 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2213 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2214 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2215 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2216 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 Annual Deduction of Management Expenses  
   If No, Why Not:  
 
Aware?  
 Used 
It?  
 
Complicated  
 Too 
Small   N/A   Don't Want To   Other  
IDNo ADME1 ADME3 ADME5 ADME6 ADME7 ADME8 ADME9 
1001 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1002 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1003 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1004 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1005 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1006 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1009 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1010 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1011 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1013 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1015 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1017 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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1018 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1019 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1021 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1022 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1023 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1024 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1027 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1028 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1029 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1030 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1031 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1032 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1033 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1034 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1035 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1036 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1037 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1038 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1039 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1040 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1041 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1042 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1043 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1044 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1046 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1047 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1048 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1049 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1050 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1051 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1052 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1053 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1055 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1056 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1057 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1058 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1059 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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1060 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1061 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1062 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1063 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1064 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1065 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1066 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1067 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1068 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1069 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1070 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1071 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1072 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1073 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1074 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1075 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1076 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1077 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1078 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1079 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1081 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1083 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1084 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1086 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1087 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1088 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1089 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1090 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1091 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1092 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1093 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1094 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1095 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1096 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1097 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1098 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1099 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1100 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1101 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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1102 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1103 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1104 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1105 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
1106 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1107 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1108 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1109 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1111 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1112 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1113 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1114 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1116 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1117 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1118 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1120 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1122 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1123 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1125 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1126 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1127 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1129 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1130 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1131 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1132 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1133 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1134 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1135 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1136 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1137 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1138 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1139 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1140 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1141 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1143 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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1144 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1145 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1146 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1147 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1148 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1149 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1150 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1151 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1152 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1153 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1154 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1155 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1156 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1157 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1158 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1160 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1161 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1164 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1165 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1166 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1168 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1169 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1170 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1171 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1172 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1173 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1174 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1175 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1176 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1177 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1178 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1179 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1180 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1181 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1182 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1183 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1184 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1185 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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1186 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1187 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1188 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1189 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1190 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1191 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1192 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1193 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1195 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1196 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1197 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1198 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1199 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1200 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1201 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1202 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1203 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1204 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1205 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1206 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1207 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1208 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1209 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1210 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1211 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1212 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1213 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1214 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1215 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1216 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1217 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1218 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1219 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1220 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1221 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1222 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1223 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1224 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1225 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1226 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1227 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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1228 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1229 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1230 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1231 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1232 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1233 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1234 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1235 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1236 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1237 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1238 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1239 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1240 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1241 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1242 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1243 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1244 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1245 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1246 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1247 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1248 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1249 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1250 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1251 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1252 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1253 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2012 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2014 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2015 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
179 
 
2017 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2019 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2021 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2022 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2023 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2024 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2025 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2026 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2027 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2028 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2029 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2031 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2032 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2033 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2034 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2035 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2036 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2037 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2038 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2039 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2040 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2041 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2042 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2043 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2044 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2045 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2046 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2047 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2048 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2049 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2050 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2051 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2052 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2053 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2055 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2056 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2057 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2058 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
  
180 
 
2059 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2060 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2061 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2062 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2063 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2064 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2065 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2066 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2067 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2068 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2069 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2070 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2071 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2072 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2073 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2074 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2075 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2076 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2077 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2078 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2079 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2081 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2083 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2084 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2085 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2086 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2087 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2088 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2089 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2090 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2091 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2092 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2093 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2094 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2095 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2096 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2097 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2098 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2099 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
181 
 
2101 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2102 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2103 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2104 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2105 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2106 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2107 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2108 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2109 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2110 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2113 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2114 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2115 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2116 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2118 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2119 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2122 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2123 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2124 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2125 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2126 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2127 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2129 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2131 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2132 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2133 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2134 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2135 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2136 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2137 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2138 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2139 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2140 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2141 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
182 
 
2143 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2144 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2145 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2146 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2148 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2150 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2151 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2152 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2153 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2154 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2156 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2157 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2158 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2159 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2160 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2161 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2162 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2164 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2165 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2166 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2169 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2171 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2172 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2173 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2174 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2175 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2176 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2177 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2179 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2180 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2181 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2182 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2183 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2184 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
183 
 
2185 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2186 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2187 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2188 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2189 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2190 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2191 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2192 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2193 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2195 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2196 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2197 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2198 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2199 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2200 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2201 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2202 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2203 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2204 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2205 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2206 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2207 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2208 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2209 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2210 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2211 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2213 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2214 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2215 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2216 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Depreciation and the Section 179 Deduction for Income-Producing Property  
     If No, Why Not:  
 
Aware?  
 Used 
It?  
 
Complicated  
 Too 
Small   N/A  
 Don't Want 
To   Other  
IDNo DS1791 DS1793 DS1795 DS1796 DS1797 DS1798 DS1799 
1001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1004 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1010 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1013 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
185 
 
1017 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1018 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1019 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1021 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1022 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1023 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1024 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1027 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1028 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1029 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1030 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1031 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1032 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1033 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1034 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1035 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1036 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1037 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1038 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1039 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1040 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1041 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1042 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1043 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1044 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1046 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 
1047 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1048 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1049 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1050 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1051 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1052 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1053 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1055 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1056 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1057 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1058 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
186 
 
1059 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1060 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1061 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1062 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1063 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1064 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1065 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1066 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1067 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1068 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1069 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1070 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1071 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1072 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1073 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1074 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1075 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1076 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1077 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1078 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1079 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1081 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1083 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1084 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1086 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1088 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1089 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1090 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1091 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1092 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1093 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1094 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1095 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1096 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1097 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1098 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1099 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
187 
 
1101 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1102 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1103 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1104 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1106 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1107 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1108 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1109 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1111 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1113 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1114 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1116 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1117 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1118 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1120 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1122 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1123 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1126 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1127 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1129 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1130 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1131 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1132 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1133 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1134 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1135 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1136 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1137 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1138 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1139 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1140 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1141 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
188 
 
1143 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1144 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1146 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1148 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1150 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1151 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1152 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1153 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1154 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1156 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1158 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1161 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1164 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1165 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1166 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1169 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1170 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1171 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1172 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1173 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1174 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1175 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1176 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1177 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1178 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1179 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1180 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1181 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1182 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1183 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1184 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
189 
 
1185 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1186 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1187 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1188 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1189 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1190 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1191 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1192 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1193 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1195 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1196 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1198 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1199 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1200 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1201 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1202 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1203 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1204 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1205 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1206 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1207 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1208 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1209 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1210 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1211 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1213 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1214 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1215 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1216 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1217 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1218 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1219 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1220 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1221 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1222 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1223 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1224 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1225 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1226 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
  
190 
 
1227 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1228 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1229 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1230 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1231 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1232 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1233 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1234 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1235 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1237 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1238 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1239 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1240 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1241 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1242 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1243 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1244 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1245 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1246 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1247 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1248 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1249 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1250 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1251 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1252 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1253 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2011 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2012 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2014 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
191 
 
2016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2017 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2019 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2021 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2022 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2023 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2024 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2025 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2027 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2028 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2029 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2031 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2032 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2033 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2034 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2035 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2036 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2037 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2038 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2039 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2040 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2041 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2042 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2043 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2044 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2045 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2046 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2047 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2048 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2049 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2050 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2051 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2052 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2053 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2055 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2056 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2057 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
192 
 
2058 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2059 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2060 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2061 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2062 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2063 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2064 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2065 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2066 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
2067 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2068 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2069 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2070 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2071 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2072 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2073 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2074 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2075 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2076 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2077 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2078 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2079 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2081 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2083 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2084 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2086 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2088 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2089 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2090 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2091 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2092 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2093 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2094 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2095 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2096 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2097 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2098 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2099 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
193 
 
2100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2102 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2103 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2104 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2106 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2107 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2108 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2109 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2113 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2114 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2115 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2116 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2119 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2122 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
2123 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2124 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2126 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2127 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2129 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2131 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2132 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2133 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2134 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2135 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2136 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2137 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2138 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2139 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2140 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2141 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
194 
 
2142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2144 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2145 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2146 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2148 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2150 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2151 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2152 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2153 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2154 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2156 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2157 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2158 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2160 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2161 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2164 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2165 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2166 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2169 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2171 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2172 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2173 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2174 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2175 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2176 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2177 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2179 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2180 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2181 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2182 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2183 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
195 
 
2184 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2185 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2186 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2187 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2188 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2189 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2190 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2191 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2192 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2193 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2195 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2196 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2197 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2198 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2199 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2201 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2202 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2203 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2204 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2205 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2206 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2207 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2208 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2209 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2210 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2211 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2213 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2214 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2215 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2216 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
  
196 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Deductions for Casualty Losses or Other Involuntary Conversions  
   If No, Why Not?  
 
Aware?  
 Used 
It?   Complicated   Too Small   N/A   Don't Want To  
 
Other  
IDNo CLIC1 CLIC3 CLIC5 CLIC6 CLIC7 CLIC8 CLIC9 
1001 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1004 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1005 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1006 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1007 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1011 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1013 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
197 
 
1015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1016 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1017 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1018 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1019 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1021 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1022 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1023 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1024 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1027 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1028 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1029 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1031 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1032 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1033 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1034 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1035 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1036 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1037 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1038 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1039 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1040 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1041 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1042 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1043 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1044 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1046 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1047 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1048 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1049 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1050 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1051 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1052 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1053 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1055 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1056 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
  
198 
 
1057 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1058 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1059 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1060 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1061 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1062 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1063 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1064 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1065 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1066 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1067 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1068 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1069 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1070 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1071 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1072 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1073 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1074 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1075 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1076 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1077 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1078 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1079 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1081 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1083 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1084 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1086 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1087 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1088 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1089 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1090 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1091 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1092 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1093 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1094 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1095 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1096 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1097 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1098 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
  
199 
 
1099 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1101 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1102 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1103 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1104 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1105 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1106 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1107 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1108 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1109 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1111 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1112 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1113 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1114 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1116 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1120 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1122 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1123 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1126 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1127 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1129 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1130 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1131 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1132 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1133 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1134 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1135 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1136 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1138 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1139 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1140 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
  
200 
 
1141 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1142 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1143 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1144 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1145 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1146 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1148 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1150 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1151 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1152 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1153 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1154 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1156 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1157 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1158 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1161 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1164 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1165 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1166 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1169 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1171 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1172 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1173 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1174 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1175 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1176 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1177 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1178 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1179 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1180 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1181 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1182 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
  
201 
 
1183 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1184 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1185 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1186 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1187 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1188 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1189 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1190 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1191 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1192 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1193 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1194 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1195 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1196 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1198 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1199 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1200 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1201 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1202 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1203 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1204 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1205 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1206 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1207 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1208 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1209 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1210 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1211 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1212 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1213 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1214 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1215 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1216 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1217 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1218 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1219 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1220 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1221 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1222 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1223 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1224 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
202 
 
1225 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1226 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1227 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1228 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1229 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1230 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1231 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1232 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1233 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1234 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1235 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1236 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1237 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1238 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1239 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1240 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1241 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1242 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1243 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1244 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1245 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1246 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1247 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1248 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1249 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1250 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1251 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1252 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1253 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2002 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2006 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2012 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2013 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
  
203 
 
2014 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2015 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2017 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2019 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2020 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2021 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2022 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2023 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2024 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2025 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2027 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2028 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2029 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2031 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2032 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2033 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2034 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2035 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2036 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2037 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2038 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2039 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2040 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2041 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2042 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2043 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2044 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2045 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2046 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2047 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2048 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2049 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2050 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2051 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2052 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2053 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2055 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
  
204 
 
2056 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2057 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2058 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2059 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2060 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2061 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2062 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2063 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2064 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2065 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2066 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2067 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2068 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2069 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2070 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2071 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2072 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2073 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2074 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2075 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2076 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2077 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2078 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2079 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2081 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2082 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2083 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2084 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2086 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2088 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2089 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2090 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2091 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2092 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2093 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2094 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2095 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2096 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2097 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
205 
 
2098 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2099 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2101 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2102 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2103 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2104 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2106 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2107 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2108 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2109 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2113 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2114 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2115 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2116 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2119 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2122 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2123 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2124 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2125 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2126 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2127 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2128 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2129 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2130 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2131 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2132 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2133 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2134 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2135 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2136 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2137 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2138 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2139 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
  
206 
 
2140 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2141 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2144 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2145 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2146 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2148 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2149 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2150 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2151 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2152 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
2153 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2154 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2156 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2157 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2158 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2159 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2161 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2162 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2164 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2165 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2166 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2169 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2171 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2172 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2173 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2174 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2175 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2176 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2177 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2179 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2180 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2181 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
207 
 
2182 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2183 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2184 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2185 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2186 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2187 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2188 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2189 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2190 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2191 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2192 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2193 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2194 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2196 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2197 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2198 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2199 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2200 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2201 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2202 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2203 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2204 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2205 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2206 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2207 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2208 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2209 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2210 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2211 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2213 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2214 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2215 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2216 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 
 
 
 
  
208 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Reforestation Tax Credit  
     If No, Why Not?  
 Aware?   Used It?   Complicated   Too Small   N/A   Don't Want To  
 
Other  
IDNo RTC1 RTC3 RTC5 RTC6 RTC7 RTC8 RTC9 
1001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1002 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1004 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1009 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1010 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1011 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
209 
 
1013 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1017 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1018 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1019 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1021 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1022 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1023 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1024 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1027 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1028 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1029 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1030 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1031 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1032 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1033 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1034 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1035 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1036 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1037 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1038 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1039 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1040 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1041 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1042 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1043 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1044 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1046 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1047 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1048 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1049 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1050 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1051 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1052 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1053 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
210 
 
1055 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1056 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1057 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1058 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1059 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1060 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1061 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1062 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1063 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1064 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1065 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1066 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1067 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1068 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1069 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1070 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1071 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1072 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1073 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1074 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1075 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1076 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1077 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1078 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1079 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1081 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1083 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1084 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1086 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1087 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1088 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1089 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1090 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1091 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1092 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1093 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1094 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1095 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1096 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
211 
 
1097 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1098 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1099 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1100 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1101 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1102 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1103 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1104 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1106 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1107 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1108 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1109 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1111 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1112 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1113 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1114 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1116 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1120 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1122 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1123 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1126 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1127 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1129 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1130 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1131 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1132 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1133 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1134 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1135 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1136 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1137 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1138 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
212 
 
1139 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1140 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1141 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1143 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1144 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1145 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1146 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1148 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1149 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1150 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1151 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1152 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1153 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1154 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1156 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1157 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1158 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1161 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1164 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1165 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1166 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1168 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1169 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1170 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1171 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1172 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1173 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1174 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1175 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1176 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1177 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1178 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1179 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1180 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
  
213 
 
1181 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1182 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1183 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1184 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1185 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1186 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1187 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1188 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1189 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1190 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1191 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1192 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1193 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1195 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1196 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1197 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1198 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1199 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1200 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1201 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1202 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1203 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1204 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1205 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1206 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1207 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1208 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1209 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1210 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1211 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1212 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1213 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1214 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1215 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1216 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1217 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1218 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1219 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1220 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1221 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1222 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
214 
 
1223 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1224 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1225 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1226 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1227 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1228 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1229 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1230 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1231 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1232 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1233 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1234 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1235 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1236 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1237 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1238 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1239 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1240 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1241 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1242 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1243 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1244 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1245 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1246 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1247 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1248 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1249 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1250 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1251 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1252 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1253 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
215 
 
2012 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2014 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2015 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2017 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2019 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2021 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2022 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2023 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2024 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2025 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2026 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2027 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2028 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2029 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2031 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2032 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2033 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2034 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2035 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2036 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2037 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2038 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2039 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2040 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2041 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2042 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2043 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2044 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2046 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2047 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2048 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2049 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2050 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2051 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2052 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2053 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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2054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2055 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2056 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2057 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2058 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2059 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2060 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2061 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2062 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2063 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2064 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2065 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2066 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2067 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2068 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2069 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2070 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2071 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
2072 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2073 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2074 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2075 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2076 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2077 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2078 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2079 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2081 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2083 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2084 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2086 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2088 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2089 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2090 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2091 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2092 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2093 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2094 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2095 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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2096 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2097 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2098 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2099 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2102 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2103 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2104 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2107 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2108 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2109 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2113 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2114 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2115 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2116 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2119 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2122 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2123 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2124 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2126 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2127 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2129 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2131 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2132 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2133 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2134 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2135 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2136 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2137 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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2138 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2139 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2141 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2143 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2144 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2145 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2146 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2148 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2150 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2151 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2152 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2153 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2154 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2156 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2158 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2160 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2161 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2164 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2165 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2166 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2169 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2171 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2172 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2173 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2174 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2175 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2176 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2177 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2179 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
219 
 
2180 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2181 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2182 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2183 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2184 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2185 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2186 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2187 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2188 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2189 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2190 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2191 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2192 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2193 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2196 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2198 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2199 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2200 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2201 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2202 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2203 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2204 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2205 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2206 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2207 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2208 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2209 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2210 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2211 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2213 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2214 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2215 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2216 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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 Amortization of Reforestation Expenses  
   If No, Why Not?  
 
Aware?  
 Used 
It?   Complicated   Too Small   N/A   Don't Want To  
 
Other  
IDNo ARE1 ARE3 ARE5 ARE6 ARE7 ARE8 ARE9 
1001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1002 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1009 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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1011 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1013 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1017 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1018 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1019 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1021 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1022 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1023 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1024 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1027 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1028 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1029 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1031 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1032 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1033 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1034 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1035 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1036 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1037 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1038 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1039 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1040 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1041 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1042 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1043 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1044 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1046 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1047 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1048 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1049 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1050 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1051 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1052 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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1053 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1055 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1056 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1057 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1058 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1059 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1060 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1061 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1062 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1063 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1064 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1065 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1066 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1067 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1068 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1069 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1070 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1071 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1072 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1073 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1074 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1075 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1076 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1077 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1078 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1079 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1081 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1083 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1084 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1086 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1087 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1088 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1089 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1090 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1091 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1092 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1093 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1094 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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1095 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1096 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1097 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1098 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1099 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1100 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1101 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1102 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1103 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1104 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1105 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1106 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1107 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1108 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1109 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1111 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1112 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1113 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1114 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1116 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1120 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1122 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1123 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1126 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1127 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1129 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1131 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1132 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1133 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1134 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1135 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1136 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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1137 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1138 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1139 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1141 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1144 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1145 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1146 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1148 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1149 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1150 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1151 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1152 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1153 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1154 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1156 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1157 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1158 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1159 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1161 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1164 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1165 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1166 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1169 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1170 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1171 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1172 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1173 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1174 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1175 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1176 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1177 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1178 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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1179 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1180 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1181 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1182 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1183 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1184 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1185 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1186 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1187 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1188 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1189 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1190 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1191 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1192 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1193 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1195 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1196 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1197 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1198 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1199 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1200 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1201 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1202 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1203 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1204 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1205 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1206 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1207 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1208 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1209 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1210 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1211 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1213 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1214 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1215 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1216 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1217 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1218 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1219 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1220 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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1221 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1222 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1223 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1224 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1225 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1226 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1227 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1228 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1229 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1230 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1231 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1232 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1233 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1234 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1235 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1236 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1237 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1238 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1239 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1240 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1241 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1242 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1243 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1244 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1245 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1246 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1247 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1248 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1249 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1250 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1251 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1252 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1253 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2009 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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2010 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2012 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2014 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2015 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2017 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2019 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2021 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2022 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2023 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2024 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2025 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2026 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2027 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2028 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2029 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2031 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2032 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2033 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2034 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2035 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2036 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2037 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2038 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2039 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2040 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2041 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2042 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2043 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2044 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2046 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2047 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2048 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2049 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2050 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2051 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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2052 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2053 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2055 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2056 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2057 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2058 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2059 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2060 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2061 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2062 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2063 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2064 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2065 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2066 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2067 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2068 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2069 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2070 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2071 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2072 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2073 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2074 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2075 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2076 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2077 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2078 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2079 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2081 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2082 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2083 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2084 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2086 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2088 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2089 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2090 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2091 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2092 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2093 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
  
229 
 
2094 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2095 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2096 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2097 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2098 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2099 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2102 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2103 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2104 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2107 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2108 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2109 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2113 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2114 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2115 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2116 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2120 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2122 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2123 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2124 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2126 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2127 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2129 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2131 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2132 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2133 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2134 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2135 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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2136 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2137 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2138 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2139 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2140 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2141 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2144 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2145 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2146 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2148 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2150 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2151 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2152 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2153 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2154 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2156 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2157 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2158 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2160 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2161 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2164 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2165 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2166 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2169 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2171 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2172 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2173 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2174 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2175 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2176 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2177 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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2178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2179 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2180 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2181 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2182 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2183 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2184 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2185 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2186 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2187 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2188 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2189 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2190 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2191 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2192 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2193 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2196 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2197 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2198 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2199 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2201 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2202 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2203 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2204 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2205 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2206 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2207 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2208 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2209 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2210 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2211 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2213 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2214 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2215 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2216 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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 Exclude Qualifying Government Cost-Share Payments from Gross Income  
     If No, Why Not?  
 
Aware?  
 Used 
It?  
 
Complicated  
 Too 
Small   N/A   Don't Want To  
 
Other  
IDNo ECSP1 ECSP3 ECSP5 ECSP6 ECSP7 ECSP8 ECSP9 
1001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1003 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1007 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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1010 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1013 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1015 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1016 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1017 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1019 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1021 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1022 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1023 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1024 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1026 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1027 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1028 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1029 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1030 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1031 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1032 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1033 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1034 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1035 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1036 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1037 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1038 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1039 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1040 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1041 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1042 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1043 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1044 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1046 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1047 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1048 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1049 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1050 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1051 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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1052 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1053 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1055 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1056 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1057 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1058 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1059 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1060 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1061 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1062 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1063 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1064 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1065 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1066 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1067 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1068 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1069 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1070 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1071 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1072 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1073 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1074 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1075 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1076 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1077 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1078 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1079 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1081 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1083 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1084 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1086 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1087 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1088 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1089 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1090 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1091 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1092 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1093 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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1094 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1095 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1096 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1097 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1098 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1099 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1100 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1101 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1102 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1103 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1104 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1105 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1107 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1108 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1109 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1111 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1113 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1114 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1116 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1117 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1120 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1121 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1122 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1123 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1125 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1126 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1127 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1128 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1129 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1131 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1132 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1133 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1134 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1135 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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1136 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1137 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1138 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1139 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1140 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1141 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1143 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1144 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1145 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1146 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1148 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1150 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1151 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1152 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1153 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1154 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1156 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1158 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1159 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1161 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1164 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1165 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1166 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1169 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1171 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1172 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1173 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1174 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1175 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1176 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1177 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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1178 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1179 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1180 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1181 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1182 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1183 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1184 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1185 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1186 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1187 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1188 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1189 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1190 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1191 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1192 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1193 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1195 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1196 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1197 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1198 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1199 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1200 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1201 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1202 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1203 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1204 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1205 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1206 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1207 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1208 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1209 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1210 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1211 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1213 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1214 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1215 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1216 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1217 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1218 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1219 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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1220 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1221 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1222 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1223 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1224 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1225 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1226 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1227 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1228 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1229 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1230 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1231 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1232 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1233 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1234 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1235 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1237 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1238 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1239 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1240 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1241 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1242 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1243 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1244 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1245 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1246 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1247 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1248 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1249 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1250 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1251 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1252 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1253 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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2009 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2010 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2012 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2014 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2015 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2016 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2017 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2018 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2019 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2020 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2021 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2022 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2023 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2024 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2026 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2027 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2028 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2029 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2030 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2031 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2032 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2033 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2034 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2035 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2036 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2037 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2038 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2039 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2040 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2041 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2042 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2043 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2044 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2046 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2047 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2048 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2049 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2050 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
240 
 
2051 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2052 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2053 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2054 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2055 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2056 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2057 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2058 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2059 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2060 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2061 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2062 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2063 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2064 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2065 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2066 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2067 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2068 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2069 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2070 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2071 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2072 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2073 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2074 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2075 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2076 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2077 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2078 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2079 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2081 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2083 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2084 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2085 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2086 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2087 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2088 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2089 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2090 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2091 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2092 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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2093 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2094 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2095 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2096 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2097 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2098 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2099 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2102 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2103 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2104 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2107 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2108 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2109 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2113 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2114 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2116 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2117 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2118 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2119 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2120 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2122 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2123 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2124 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2126 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2127 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2128 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2129 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2130 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2131 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2132 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2133 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2134 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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2135 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2136 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2137 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2138 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2139 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2141 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2144 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2146 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2148 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2149 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2150 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2151 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2152 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2153 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2154 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2155 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2156 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2158 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2159 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2160 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2161 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2164 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2165 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2166 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2169 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2171 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2172 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2173 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2174 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2175 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2176 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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2177 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2178 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2179 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2180 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2181 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2182 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2183 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2184 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2185 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2186 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2187 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2188 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2189 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2190 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2191 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2192 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2193 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2195 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2196 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2197 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2198 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2199 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2201 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2202 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2203 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2204 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2205 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2206 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2207 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2208 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2209 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2210 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2211 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2212 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2213 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2214 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2215 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2216 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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 Acres   N/R   <49 A  
 50-99 
A  
 100-199 
A  
 200-
499A  
 500-
999A  
 
>1000A  
IDNo TA1 TA2 TA3 TA5 TA7 TA9 TA11 TA12 
1001 503 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1002 143 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1003 210 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1004 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1005 156 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1006 103 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1007 225 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1008 11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1009 144 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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1010 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1011 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1012 1200 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1013 320 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1014 20 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1015 825 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1016 4500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1017 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1018 1069 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1019 1600 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1020 135 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1021 310 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1022 5800 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1023 160 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1024 50 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1025 155 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1026 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1027 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1028 700 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1029 20000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1030 260 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1031 185 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1032 800 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1033 76 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1034 202 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1035 364 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1036 55 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1037 33000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1038 464 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1039 262 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1040 480 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1041 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1042 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1043 2400 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1044 195 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1045 254 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1046 650 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1047 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1048 279 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1049 900 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1050 168 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1051 175 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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1052 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1053 228 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1054 452 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1055 2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1056 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1057 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1058 61 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1059 1500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1060 1600 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1061 2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1062 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1063 650 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1064 260 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1065 220 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1066 1359 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1067 540 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1068 800 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1069 140 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1070 800 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1071 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1072 65 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1073 696 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1074 550 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1075 842 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1076 91 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1077 800 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1078 2505 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1079 1500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1080 225 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1081 217 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1082 225 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1083 162 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1084 765 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1085 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1086 378 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1087 660 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1088 675 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1089 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1090 115 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1091 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1092 713 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1093 1150 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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1094 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1095 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1096 75 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1097 225 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1098 850 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1099 140 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1100 700 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1101 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1102 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1103 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1104 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1105 154 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1106 88 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1107 130 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1108 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1109 1975 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1110 354 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1111 121 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1112 595 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1113 550 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1114 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1115 113 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1116 586 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1117 900 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1118 395 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1119 37 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1120 425 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1121 204 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1122 260 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1123 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1124 58 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1125 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1126 180 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1127 885 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1128 32 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1129 97 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1130 750 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1131 154 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1132 219 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1133 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1134 312 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1135 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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1136 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1137 4000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1138 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1139 118 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1140 240 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1141 72 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1142 42 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1143 458 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1144 520 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1145 146 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1146 1600 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1147 34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1148 900 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1149 170 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1150 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1151 1200 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1152 84 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1153 780 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1154 75 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1155 571 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1156 490 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1157 225 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1158 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1159 147 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1160 65 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1161 1430 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1162 660 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1163 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1164 1296 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1165 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1166 361 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1167 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1168 234 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1169 325 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1170 316 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1171 625 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1172 87 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1173 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1174 212 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1175 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1176 55 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1177 118 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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1178 320 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1179 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1180 40 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1181 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1182 800 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1183 29 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1184 1076 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1185 214 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1186 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1187 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1188 344 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1189 800 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1190 370 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1191 1438 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1192 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1193 360 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1194 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1195 125 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1196 285 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1197 139 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1198 866 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1199 70 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1200 130 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1201 730 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1202 252 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1203 169 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1204 975 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1205 3000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1206 120 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1207 1700 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1208 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1209 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1210 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1211 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1212 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1213 515 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1214 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1215 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1216 270 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1217 60 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1218 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1219 140 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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1220 446 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1221 286 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1222 120 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1223 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1224 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1225 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1226 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1227 1122 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1228 1100 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1229 1050 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1230 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1231 216 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1232 68 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1233 222 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1234 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1235 850 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1236 160 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1237 228 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1238 3500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1239 650 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1240 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1241 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1242 144 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1243 486 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1244 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1245 6800 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1246 1200 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1247 145 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1248 125 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1249 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1250 625 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1251 1100 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1252 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1253 890 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2001 2100 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2002 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2003 28 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 113 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2005 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2006 66 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2007 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2008 480 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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2009 3000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2010 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2011 132 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2012 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2013 107 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2014 285 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2015 700 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2016 53 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2017 2200 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2018 180 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2019 42 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2020 119 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2021 357 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2022 1200 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2023 114 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2024 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2025 262 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2026 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2027 1450 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2028 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2029 550 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2030 119 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2031 187 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2032 571 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2033 2140 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2034 75 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2035 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2036 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2037 655 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2038 174 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2039 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2040 212 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2041 700 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2042 33500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2043 1600 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2044 800 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2045 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2046 140 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2047 179 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2048 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2049 900 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2050 235 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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2051 120 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2052 281 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2053 358 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2054 175 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2055 326 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2056 185 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2057 195 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2058 110 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2059 650 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2060 125 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2061 144 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2062 550 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2063 780 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2064 441 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2065 750 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2066 750 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2067 352 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2068 330 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2069 230 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2070 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2071 114 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2072 70 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2073 222 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2074 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2075 125 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2076 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2077 380 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2078 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2079 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2080 202 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2081 454 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2082 302 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2083 230 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2084 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2085 26 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2086 256 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2087 133 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2088 1150 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2089 162 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2090 107 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2091 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2092 287 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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2093 253 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2094 90 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2095 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2096 175 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2097 112 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2098 550 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2099 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2100 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2101 775 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2102 66 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2103 490 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2104 175 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2105 123 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2106 700 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2107 566 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2108 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2109 16250 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2110 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2111 151 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2112 135 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2113 302 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2114 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2115 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2116 275 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2117 115 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2118 415 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2119 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2120 321 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2121 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2122 70 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2123 426 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2124 19 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2125 285 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2126 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2127 280 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2128 297 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2129 225 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2130 25 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2131 122 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2132 1851 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2133 925 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2134 51 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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2135 114 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2136 279 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2137 128 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2138 60 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2139 383 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2140 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2141 50 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2142 85 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2143 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2144 125 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2145 394 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2146 720 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2147 20 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2148 1800 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2149 33 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2150 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2151 70 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2152 700 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2153 534 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2154 2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2155 52 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2156 163 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2157 175 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2158 470 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2159 48 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2160 575 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2161 1100 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2162 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2163 185 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2164 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2165 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2166 480 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2167 30 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2168 140 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2169 151 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2170 370 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2171 736 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2172 103 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2173 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2174 605 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2175 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2176 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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2177 137 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2178 151 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2179 163 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2180 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2181 1526 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2182 307 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2183 700 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2184 170 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2185 177 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2186 365 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2187 602 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2188 3000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2189 4400 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2190 900 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2191 340 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2192 65 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2193 1200 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2194 700 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2195 190 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2196 1527 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2197 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2198 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2199 65 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2200 2300 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2201 1300 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2202 580 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2203 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2204 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2205 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2206 60 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2207 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2208 1019 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2209 122 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2210 240 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2211 640 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2212 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2213 55 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2214 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2215 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2216 925 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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Forested 
Acres   N/R   <49 A  
 50-99 
A  
 100-199 
A  
 200-
499A  
 500-
999A   >1000A  
IDNo FA1 FA2 FA3 FA5 FA7 FA9 FA11 FA12 
1001 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1002 75 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1003 125 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1004 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1005 145 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1006 103 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1007 140 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1008 11 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1009 143 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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1010 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1011 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1012 800 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1013 320 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1014 16 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1015 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1016 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1017 75 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1018 1069 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1019 1500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1020 75 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1021 294 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1022 4750 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1023 160 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1024 50 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1025 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1026 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1027 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1028 700 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1029 18500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1030 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1031 185 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1032 700 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1033 48 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1034 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1035 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1036 55 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1037 11000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1038 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1039 252 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1040 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1041 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1042 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1043 2250 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1044 180 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1045 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1046 550 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1047 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1048 275 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1049 700 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1050 140 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1051 175 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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1052 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1053 228 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1054 452 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1055 1560 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1056 195 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1057 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1058 51 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1059 800 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1060 800 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1061 1200 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1062 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1063 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1064 180 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1065 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1066 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1067 540 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1068 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1069 80 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1070 750 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1071 360 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1072 65 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1073 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1074 550 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1075 800 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1076 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1077 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1078 1430 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1079 1400 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1080 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1081 185 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1082 175 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1083 80 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1084 345 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1085 42 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1086 375 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1087 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1088 650 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1089 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1090 14 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1091 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1092 575 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1093 1150 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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1094 80 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1095 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1096 68 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1097 145 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1098 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1099 130 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1100 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1101 190 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1102 90 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1103 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1104 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1105 140 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1106 70 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1107 30 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1108 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1109 1925 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1110 354 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1111 120 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1112 595 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1113 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1114 425 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1115 95 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1116 475 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1117 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1118 253 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1119 35 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1120 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1121 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1122 170 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1123 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1124 45 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1125 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1126 140 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1127 850 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1128 15 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1129 97 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1130 320 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1131 140 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1132 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1133 225 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1134 140 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1135 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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1136 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1137 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1138 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1139 110 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1140 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1141 72 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1142 30 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1143 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1144 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1145 70 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1146 1400 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1147 34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1148 900 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1149 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1150 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1151 1200 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1152 82 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1153 619 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1154 35 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1155 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1156 490 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1157 185 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1158 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1159 81 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1160 60 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1161 1300 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1162 655 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1163 140 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1164 1210 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1165 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1166 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1167 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1168 234 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1169 295 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1170 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1171 575 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1172 80 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1173 890 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1174 206 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1175 95 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1176 55 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1177 118 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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1178 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1179 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1180 28 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1181 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1182 650 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1183 29 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1184 1076 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1185 212 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1186 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1187 80 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1188 310 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1189 215 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1190 370 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1191 1150 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1192 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1193 310 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1194 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1195 125 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1196 220 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1197 139 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1198 750 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1199 60 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1200 130 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1201 580 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1202 252 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1203 169 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1204 972 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1205 2900 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1206 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1207 1100 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1208 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1209 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1210 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1211 204 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1212 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1213 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1214 220 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1215 590 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1216 270 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1217 55 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1218 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1219 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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1220 340 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1221 230 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1222 105 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1223 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1224 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1225 35 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1226 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1227 730 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1228 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1229 1049 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1230 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1231 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1232 68 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1233 140 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1234 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1235 650 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1236 60 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1237 225 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1238 3000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1239 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1240 950 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1241 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1242 130 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1243 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1244 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1245 4500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1246 1100 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1247 55 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1248 118 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1249 375 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1250 575 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1251 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1252 900 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1253 850 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2001 1700 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2002 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2003 28 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2004 90 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2005 345 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2006 63 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2007 90 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2008 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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2009 2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2010 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2011 75 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2012 225 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2013 107 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2014 285 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2015 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2016 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2017 2200 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2018 160 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2019 42 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2020 90 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2021 255 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2022 1200 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2023 90 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2024 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2025 170 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2026 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2027 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2028 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2029 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2030 95 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2031 165 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2032 571 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2033 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2034 75 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2035 140 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2036 390 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2037 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2038 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2039 520 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2040 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2041 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2042 32750 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2043 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2044 800 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2045 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2046 70 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2047 139 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2048 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2049 900 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2050 235 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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2051 110 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2052 255 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2053 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2054 110 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2055 320 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2056 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2057 180 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2058 110 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2059 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2060 25 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2061 139 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2062 425 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2063 700 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2064 372 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2065 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2066 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2067 345 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2068 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2069 175 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2070 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2071 102 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2072 50 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2073 126 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2074 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2075 85 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2076 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2077 360 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2078 460 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2079 600 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2080 202 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2081 340 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2082 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2083 220 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2084 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2085 24 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2086 256 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2087 120 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2088 650 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2089 80 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2090 30 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2091 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2092 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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2093 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2094 70 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2095 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2096 85 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2097 112 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2098 545 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2099 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2100 269 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2101 775 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2102 66 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2103 485 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2104 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2105 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2106 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2107 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2108 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2109 16200 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2110 180 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2111 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2112 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2113 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2114 95 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2115 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2116 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2117 45 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2118 315 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2119 95 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2120 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2121 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2122 35 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2123 375 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2124 15 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2125 250 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2126 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2127 195 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2128 275 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2129 130 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2130 25 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2131 50 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2132 1851 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2133 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2134 51 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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2135 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2136 279 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2137 128 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2138 55 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2139 380 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2140 275 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2141 50 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2142 85 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2143 100 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2144 46 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2145 390 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2146 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2147 16 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2148 1800 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2149 7 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2150 398 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2151 70 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2152 650 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2153 534 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2154 2500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2155 50 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2156 125 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2157 96 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2158 410 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2159 45 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2160 455 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2161 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2162 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2163 185 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2164 950 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2165 1350 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2166 390 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2167 30 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2168 75 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2169 101 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2170 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2171 616 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2172 80 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2173 200 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2174 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2175 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2176 225 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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2177 125 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2178 150 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2179 153 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2180 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2181 875 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2182 90 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2183 650 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2184 160 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2185 137 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2186 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2187 602 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2188 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2189 4200 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2190 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2191 340 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2192 55 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2193 1050 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2194 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2195 190 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2196 1515 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2197 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2198 450 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2199 60 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2200 1700 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2201 1215 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2202 540 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2203 165 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2204 440 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2205 350 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2206 57 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2207 400 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2208 950 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2209 122 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2210 240 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2211 330 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2212 300 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2213 50 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2214 80 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2215 500 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2216 850 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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 %Forested   N/R   <1/3   1/3-2/3   >2/3  
IDNo  PF1  PF2 PF3 PF5 PF6 
1001 0.199 0 1 0 0 
1002 0.524 0 0 1 0 
1003 0.595 0 0 1 0 
1004 1 0 0 0 1 
1005 0.929 0 0 0 1 
1006 1 0 0 0 1 
1007 0.622 0 0 1 0 
1008 1 0 0 0 1 
1009 0.993 0 0 0 1 
1010 0 1 0 0 0 
1011 0.6 0 0 1 0 
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1012 0.667 0 0 1 0 
1013 1 0 0 0 1 
1014 0.8 0 0 0 1 
1015 0.485 0 0 1 0 
1016 0 1 0 0 0 
1017 0.5 0 0 1 0 
1018 1 0 0 0 1 
1019 0.938 0 0 0 1 
1020 0.556 0 0 1 0 
1021 0.948 0 0 0 1 
1022 0.819 0 0 0 1 
1023 1 0 0 0 1 
1024 1 0 0 0 1 
1025 0 1 0 0 0 
1026 0.9 0 0 0 1 
1027 1 0 0 0 1 
1028 1 0 0 0 1 
1029 0.925 0 0 0 1 
1030 0.385 0 0 1 0 
1031 1 0 0 0 1 
1032 0.875 0 0 0 1 
1033 0.632 0 0 1 0 
1034 0.99 0 0 0 1 
1035 0.962 0 0 0 1 
1036 1 0 0 0 1 
1037 0.333 0 0 1 0 
1038 0.97 0 0 0 1 
1039 0.962 0 0 0 1 
1040 0.521 0 0 1 0 
1041 1 0 0 0 1 
1042 0.5 0 0 1 0 
1043 0.938 0 0 0 1 
1044 0.923 0 0 0 1 
1045 0.591 0 0 1 0 
1046 0.846 0 0 0 1 
1047 0 1 0 0 0 
1048 0.986 0 0 0 1 
1049 0.778 0 0 0 1 
1050 0.833 0 0 0 1 
1051 1 0 0 0 1 
1052 0 1 0 0 0 
1053 1 0 0 0 1 
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1054 1 0 0 0 1 
1055 0.624 0 0 1 0 
1056 0.975 0 0 0 1 
1057 0.833 0 0 0 1 
1058 0.836 0 0 0 1 
1059 0.533 0 0 1 0 
1060 0.5 0 0 1 0 
1061 0.48 0 0 1 0 
1062 0 1 0 0 0 
1063 0.769 0 0 0 1 
1064 0.692 0 0 0 1 
1065 0.909 0 0 0 1 
1066 0.736 0 0 0 1 
1067 1 0 0 0 1 
1068 0.438 0 0 1 0 
1069 0.571 0 0 1 0 
1070 0.938 0 0 0 1 
1071 0.9 0 0 0 1 
1072 1 0 0 0 1 
1073 0.575 0 0 1 0 
1074 1 0 0 0 1 
1075 0.95 0 0 0 1 
1076 0 1 0 0 0 
1077 0.625 0 0 1 0 
1078 0.571 0 0 1 0 
1079 0.933 0 0 0 1 
1080 0 1 0 0 0 
1081 0.853 0 0 0 1 
1082 0.778 0 0 0 1 
1083 0.494 0 0 1 0 
1084 0.451 0 0 1 0 
1085 0 1 0 0 0 
1086 0.992 0 0 0 1 
1087 0.909 0 0 0 1 
1088 0.963 0 0 0 1 
1089 0.571 0 0 1 0 
1090 0.122 0 1 0 0 
1091 0 1 0 0 0 
1092 0.806 0 0 0 1 
1093 1 0 0 0 1 
1094 0.8 0 0 0 1 
1095 1 0 0 0 1 
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1096 0.907 0 0 0 1 
1097 0.644 0 0 1 0 
1098 0.412 0 0 1 0 
1099 0.929 0 0 0 1 
1100 0 1 0 0 0 
1101 0.76 0 0 0 1 
1102 0.9 0 0 0 1 
1103 0.667 0 0 1 0 
1104 0.8 0 0 0 1 
1105 0.909 0 0 0 1 
1106 0.795 0 0 0 1 
1107 0.231 0 1 0 0 
1108 0 1 0 0 0 
1109 0.975 0 0 0 1 
1110 1 0 0 0 1 
1111 0.992 0 0 0 1 
1112 1 0 0 0 1 
1113 0.636 0 0 1 0 
1114 0.85 0 0 0 1 
1115 0.841 0 0 0 1 
1116 0.811 0 0 0 1 
1117 0.556 0 0 1 0 
1118 0.641 0 0 1 0 
1119 0.946 0 0 0 1 
1120 0.824 0 0 0 1 
1121 0.735 0 0 0 1 
1122 0.654 0 0 1 0 
1123 1 0 0 0 1 
1124 0.776 0 0 0 1 
1125 1 0 0 0 1 
1126 0.778 0 0 0 1 
1127 0.96 0 0 0 1 
1128 0.469 0 0 1 0 
1129 1 0 0 0 1 
1130 0.427 0 0 1 0 
1131 0.909 0 0 0 1 
1132 0.913 0 0 0 1 
1133 0.9 0 0 0 1 
1134 0.449 0 0 1 0 
1135 1 0 0 0 1 
1136 0.8 0 0 0 1 
1137 0.5 0 0 1 0 
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1138 0.75 0 0 0 1 
1139 0.932 0 0 0 1 
1140 0.833 0 0 0 1 
1141 1 0 0 0 1 
1142 0.714 0 0 0 1 
1143 0.983 0 0 0 1 
1144 0.577 0 0 1 0 
1145 0.479 0 0 1 0 
1146 0.875 0 0 0 1 
1147 1 0 0 0 1 
1148 1 0 0 0 1 
1149 0.588 0 0 1 0 
1150 0.875 0 0 0 1 
1151 1 0 0 0 1 
1152 0.976 0 0 0 1 
1153 0.794 0 0 0 1 
1154 0.467 0 0 1 0 
1155 0.876 0 0 0 1 
1156 1 0 0 0 1 
1157 0.822 0 0 0 1 
1158 0.667 0 0 1 0 
1159 0.551 0 0 1 0 
1160 0.923 0 0 0 1 
1161 0.909 0 0 0 1 
1162 0.992 0 0 0 1 
1163 0.467 0 0 1 0 
1164 0.934 0 0 0 1 
1165 0.5 0 0 1 0 
1166 0.277 0 1 0 0 
1167 0.667 0 0 1 0 
1168 1 0 0 0 1 
1169 0.908 0 0 0 1 
1170 0.949 0 0 0 1 
1171 0.92 0 0 0 1 
1172 0.92 0 0 0 1 
1173 0 1 0 0 0 
1174 0.972 0 0 0 1 
1175 0.95 0 0 0 1 
1176 1 0 0 0 1 
1177 1 0 0 0 1 
1178 0.938 0 0 0 1 
1179 0.5 0 0 1 0 
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1180 0.7 0 0 0 1 
1181 1 0 0 0 1 
1182 0.813 0 0 0 1 
1183 1 0 0 0 1 
1184 1 0 0 0 1 
1185 0.991 0 0 0 1 
1186 0.75 0 0 0 1 
1187 0.533 0 0 1 0 
1188 0.901 0 0 0 1 
1189 0.269 0 1 0 0 
1190 1 0 0 0 1 
1191 0.8 0 0 0 1 
1192 1 0 0 0 1 
1193 0.861 0 0 0 1 
1194 1 0 0 0 1 
1195 1 0 0 0 1 
1196 0.772 0 0 0 1 
1197 1 0 0 0 1 
1198 0.866 0 0 0 1 
1199 0.857 0 0 0 1 
1200 1 0 0 0 1 
1201 0.795 0 0 0 1 
1202 1 0 0 0 1 
1203 1 0 0 0 1 
1204 0.997 0 0 0 1 
1205 0.967 0 0 0 1 
1206 0.833 0 0 0 1 
1207 0.647 0 0 1 0 
1208 1 0 0 0 1 
1209 0.5 0 0 1 0 
1210 0.8 0 0 0 1 
1211 0.583 0 0 1 0 
1212 0.4 0 0 1 0 
1213 0.485 0 0 1 0 
1214 0.55 0 0 1 0 
1215 0.983 0 0 0 1 
1216 1 0 0 0 1 
1217 0.917 0 0 0 1 
1218 1 0 0 0 1 
1219 0.714 0 0 0 1 
1220 0.762 0 0 0 1 
1221 0.804 0 0 0 1 
  
274 
 
1222 0.875 0 0 0 1 
1223 0 1 0 0 0 
1224 0.444 0 0 1 0 
1225 0.35 0 0 1 0 
1226 1 0 0 0 1 
1227 0.651 0 0 1 0 
1228 0.909 0 0 0 1 
1229 0.999 0 0 0 1 
1230 0.8 0 0 0 1 
1231 0.694 0 0 0 1 
1232 1 0 0 0 1 
1233 0.631 0 0 1 0 
1234 1 0 0 0 1 
1235 0.765 0 0 0 1 
1236 0.375 0 0 1 0 
1237 0.987 0 0 0 1 
1238 0.857 0 0 0 1 
1239 0.692 0 0 0 1 
1240 0.95 0 0 0 1 
1241 1 0 0 0 1 
1242 0.903 0 0 0 1 
1243 0.926 0 0 0 1 
1244 0.4 0 0 1 0 
1245 0.662 0 0 1 0 
1246 0.917 0 0 0 1 
1247 0.379 0 0 1 0 
1248 0.944 0 0 0 1 
1249 0.938 0 0 0 1 
1250 0.92 0 0 0 1 
1251 0.545 0 0 1 0 
1252 0.9 0 0 0 1 
1253 0.955 0 0 0 1 
2001 0.81 0 0 0 1 
2002 0.875 0 0 0 1 
2003 1 0 0 0 1 
2004 0.796 0 0 0 1 
2005 0.986 0 0 0 1 
2006 0.955 0 0 0 1 
2007 0.9 0 0 0 1 
2008 0.938 0 0 0 1 
2009 0.833 0 0 0 1 
2010 0.667 0 0 1 0 
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2011 0.568 0 0 1 0 
2012 0.9 0 0 0 1 
2013 1 0 0 0 1 
2014 1 0 0 0 1 
2015 0.714 0 0 0 1 
2016 0 1 0 0 0 
2017 1 0 0 0 1 
2018 0.889 0 0 0 1 
2019 1 0 0 0 1 
2020 0.756 0 0 0 1 
2021 0.714 0 0 0 1 
2022 1 0 0 0 1 
2023 0.789 0 0 0 1 
2024 1 0 0 0 1 
2025 0.649 0 0 1 0 
2026 0.857 0 0 0 1 
2027 0.414 0 0 1 0 
2028 0.857 0 0 0 1 
2029 0.727 0 0 0 1 
2030 0.798 0 0 0 1 
2031 0.882 0 0 0 1 
2032 1 0 0 0 1 
2033 0.467 0 0 1 0 
2034 1 0 0 0 1 
2035 0 1 0 0 0 
2036 0.867 0 0 0 1 
2037 0.687 0 0 0 1 
2038 0.575 0 0 1 0 
2039 0.867 0 0 0 1 
2040 0.472 0 0 1 0 
2041 0.286 0 1 0 0 
2042 0.978 0 0 0 1 
2043 0.625 0 0 1 0 
2044 1 0 0 0 1 
2045 0.75 0 0 0 1 
2046 0.5 0 0 1 0 
2047 0.777 0 0 0 1 
2048 0.667 0 0 1 0 
2049 1 0 0 0 1 
2050 1 0 0 0 1 
2051 0.917 0 0 0 1 
2052 0.907 0 0 0 1 
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2053 0 1 0 0 0 
2054 0.629 0 0 1 0 
2055 0.982 0 0 0 1 
2056 0.811 0 0 0 1 
2057 0.923 0 0 0 1 
2058 1 0 0 0 1 
2059 0.615 0 0 1 0 
2060 0.2 0 1 0 0 
2061 0.965 0 0 0 1 
2062 0.773 0 0 0 1 
2063 0.897 0 0 0 1 
2064 0.844 0 0 0 1 
2065 0.533 0 0 1 0 
2066 0.6 0 0 1 0 
2067 0.98 0 0 0 1 
2068 0.909 0 0 0 1 
2069 0.761 0 0 0 1 
2070 0 1 0 0 0 
2071 0.895 0 0 0 1 
2072 0.714 0 0 0 1 
2073 0.568 0 0 1 0 
2074 1 0 0 0 1 
2075 0.68 0 0 0 1 
2076 0.5 0 0 1 0 
2077 0.947 0 0 0 1 
2078 0.767 0 0 0 1 
2079 1 0 0 0 1 
2080 1 0 0 0 1 
2081 0.749 0 0 0 1 
2082 0.662 0 0 1 0 
2083 0.957 0 0 0 1 
2084 1 0 0 0 1 
2085 0.923 0 0 0 1 
2086 1 0 0 0 1 
2087 0.902 0 0 0 1 
2088 0.565 0 0 1 0 
2089 0.494 0 0 1 0 
2090 0.28 0 1 0 0 
2091 1 0 0 0 1 
2092 0.871 0 0 0 1 
2093 0.791 0 0 0 1 
2094 0.778 0 0 0 1 
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2095 1 0 0 0 1 
2096 0.486 0 0 1 0 
2097 1 0 0 0 1 
2098 0.991 0 0 0 1 
2099 1 0 0 0 1 
2100 0.897 0 0 0 1 
2101 1 0 0 0 1 
2102 1 0 0 0 1 
2103 0.99 0 0 0 1 
2104 0.571 0 0 1 0 
2105 0.813 0 0 0 1 
2106 0.571 0 0 1 0 
2107 0 1 0 0 0 
2108 1 0 0 0 1 
2109 0.997 0 0 0 1 
2110 0.9 0 0 0 1 
2111 0 1 0 0 0 
2112 0.741 0 0 0 1 
2113 0.993 0 0 0 1 
2114 0.633 0 0 1 0 
2115 0.556 0 0 1 0 
2116 0.727 0 0 0 1 
2117 0.391 0 0 1 0 
2118 0.759 0 0 0 1 
2119 0.95 0 0 0 1 
2120 0.935 0 0 0 1 
2121 1 0 0 0 1 
2122 0.5 0 0 1 0 
2123 0.88 0 0 0 1 
2124 0.789 0 0 0 1 
2125 0.877 0 0 0 1 
2126 0.667 0 0 1 0 
2127 0.696 0 0 0 1 
2128 0.926 0 0 0 1 
2129 0.578 0 0 1 0 
2130 1 0 0 0 1 
2131 0.41 0 0 1 0 
2132 1 0 0 0 1 
2133 0.541 0 0 1 0 
2134 1 0 0 0 1 
2135 0.877 0 0 0 1 
2136 1 0 0 0 1 
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2137 1 0 0 0 1 
2138 0.917 0 0 0 1 
2139 0.992 0 0 0 1 
2140 0.611 0 0 1 0 
2141 1 0 0 0 1 
2142 1 0 0 0 1 
2143 0.25 0 1 0 0 
2144 0.368 0 0 1 0 
2145 0.99 0 0 0 1 
2146 0.278 0 1 0 0 
2147 0.8 0 0 0 1 
2148 1 0 0 0 1 
2149 0.212 0 1 0 0 
2150 0.995 0 0 0 1 
2151 1 0 0 0 1 
2152 0.929 0 0 0 1 
2153 1 0 0 0 1 
2154 1 0 0 0 1 
2155 0.962 0 0 0 1 
2156 0.767 0 0 0 1 
2157 0.549 0 0 1 0 
2158 0.872 0 0 0 1 
2159 0.938 0 0 0 1 
2160 0.791 0 0 0 1 
2161 0.909 0 0 0 1 
2162 0.75 0 0 0 1 
2163 1 0 0 0 1 
2164 0.95 0 0 0 1 
2165 0.675 0 0 0 1 
2166 0.813 0 0 0 1 
2167 1 0 0 0 1 
2168 0.536 0 0 1 0 
2169 0.669 0 0 0 1 
2170 0.541 0 0 1 0 
2171 0.837 0 0 0 1 
2172 0.777 0 0 0 1 
2173 0.667 0 0 1 0 
2174 0.579 0 0 1 0 
2175 0.8 0 0 0 1 
2176 0.9 0 0 0 1 
2177 0.912 0 0 0 1 
2178 0.993 0 0 0 1 
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2179 0.939 0 0 0 1 
2180 0.889 0 0 0 1 
2181 0.573 0 0 1 0 
2182 0.293 0 1 0 0 
2183 0.929 0 0 0 1 
2184 0.941 0 0 0 1 
2185 0.774 0 0 0 1 
2186 0.959 0 0 0 1 
2187 1 0 0 0 1 
2188 0.667 0 0 1 0 
2189 0.955 0 0 0 1 
2190 0.556 0 0 1 0 
2191 1 0 0 0 1 
2192 0.846 0 0 0 1 
2193 0.875 0 0 0 1 
2194 0.571 0 0 1 0 
2195 1 0 0 0 1 
2196 0.992 0 0 0 1 
2197 0.5 0 0 1 0 
2198 0.9 0 0 0 1 
2199 0.923 0 0 0 1 
2200 0.739 0 0 0 1 
2201 0.935 0 0 0 1 
2202 0.931 0 0 0 1 
2203 0.825 0 0 0 1 
2204 0.978 0 0 0 1 
2205 0.875 0 0 0 1 
2206 0.95 0 0 0 1 
2207 0.667 0 0 1 0 
2208 0.932 0 0 0 1 
2209 1 0 0 0 1 
2210 1 0 0 0 1 
2211 0.516 0 0 1 0 
2212 1 0 0 0 1 
2213 0.909 0 0 0 1 
2214 0.533 0 0 1 0 
2215 1 0 0 0 1 
2216 0.919 0 0 0 1 
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 Primary Reason for Ownership  
 
Residence  
 
Esthetics   PFrm  
 
Products   Recreation   Timber   Investment  
IDNo PRO1 PRO2 PRO3 PRO4 PRO5 PRO6 PRO7 
1001 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1002 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1003 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1004 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1005 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1006 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1007 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1008 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1009 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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1010 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1011 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1012 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1013 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1014 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1015 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1016 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1017 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1018 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1019 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1020 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1021 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1022 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1023 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1024 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1025 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1026 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1027 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1028 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1029 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1030 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1031 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1032 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1033 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1034 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1035 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1036 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1037 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1038 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1039 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1040 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1041 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1042 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1043 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1044 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1045 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1046 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1047 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1048 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1049 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1050 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1051 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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1052 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1053 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1054 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1055 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1056 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1057 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1058 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1059 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1060 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1061 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1062 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1063 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1064 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1065 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1066 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
1067 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1068 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1069 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1070 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1071 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1072 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1073 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1074 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1075 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1076 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1077 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1078 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1079 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1080 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1081 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1082 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1083 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1084 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1085 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1086 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1087 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1088 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1089 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1090 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1091 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1092 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1093 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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1094 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1095 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1096 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1097 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1098 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1099 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1100 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1101 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1102 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1103 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1104 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
1105 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1106 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1107 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1108 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1109 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1110 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1111 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1112 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1113 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1114 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1115 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1116 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
1117 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1118 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1119 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1120 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1121 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
1122 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1123 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1124 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1125 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1126 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1127 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1128 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1129 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1130 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1131 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1132 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1133 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1134 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
1135 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
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1136 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1137 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1138 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1139 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1140 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1141 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1142 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1143 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1144 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1145 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
1146 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1147 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1148 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1149 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1150 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1151 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1152 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1153 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1154 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1155 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1156 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1157 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1158 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
1159 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1160 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1161 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1162 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1163 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1164 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1165 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1166 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1167 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1168 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1169 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1170 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1171 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1172 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1173 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1174 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1175 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1176 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1177 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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1178 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1179 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1180 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1181 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1182 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1183 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1184 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1185 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1186 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1187 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1188 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1189 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1190 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1191 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1192 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
1193 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1194 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
1195 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1196 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1197 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1198 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1199 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1200 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1201 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1202 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1203 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1204 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1205 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1206 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
1207 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1208 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1209 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1210 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1211 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1212 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1213 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1214 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1215 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1216 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1217 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1218 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1219 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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1220 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1221 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1222 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1223 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1224 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1225 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1226 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1227 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1228 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1229 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1230 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1231 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
1232 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1233 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1234 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1235 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1236 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1237 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1238 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1239 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1240 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1241 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1242 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1243 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1244 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1245 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1246 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1247 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1248 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
1249 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1250 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1251 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1252 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1253 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2002 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2003 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2004 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2005 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2007 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2008 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
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2009 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2010 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2011 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2012 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2013 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2014 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
2015 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
2016 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2017 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
2018 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2019 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
2020 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2021 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2022 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2023 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2024 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2025 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2026 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
2027 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2028 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2029 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
2030 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2031 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2032 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
2033 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2034 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2035 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2036 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2037 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2038 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2039 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2040 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2041 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2042 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
2043 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
2044 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2045 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2046 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2047 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
2048 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2049 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2050 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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2051 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2052 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2053 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2054 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2055 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2056 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2057 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2058 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2059 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2060 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2061 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
2062 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2063 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2064 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2065 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2066 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2067 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2068 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2069 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2070 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2071 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2072 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2073 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2074 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2075 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2076 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
2077 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2078 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2079 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2080 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2081 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
2082 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2083 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2084 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2085 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2086 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2087 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2088 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2089 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2090 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2091 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
2092 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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2093 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2094 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2095 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2096 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2097 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2098 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
2099 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2100 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2101 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2102 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2103 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2104 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2105 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2106 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2107 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2108 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2109 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2110 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2111 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
2112 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2113 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2114 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2115 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2116 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2117 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2118 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2119 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
2120 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2121 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2122 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2123 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2124 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2125 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2126 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2127 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2128 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
2129 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2130 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2131 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2132 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2133 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2134 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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2135 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2136 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2137 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2138 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
2139 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2140 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2141 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2142 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2143 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2144 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2145 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2146 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2147 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2148 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2149 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2150 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2151 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
2152 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2153 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2154 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2155 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2156 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2157 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2158 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2159 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2160 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2161 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2162 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2163 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2164 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2165 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2166 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2167 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2168 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2169 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2170 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2171 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2172 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2173 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2174 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2175 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2176 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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2177 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2178 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2179 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2180 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2181 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2182 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2183 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 
2184 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
2185 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
2186 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2187 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2188 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2189 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 
2190 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
2191 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2192 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2193 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2194 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2195 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
2196 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2197 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2198 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2199 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2200 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2201 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2202 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
2203 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2204 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2205 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2206 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2207 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2208 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2209 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
2210 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2211 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2212 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2213 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2214 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2215 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2216 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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   Level of Education  
 
Organization  
 Mgmt 
Plan   ES   HS   SC   C   SG   G  
IDNo BTO1 MP1 LOE1 LOE2 LOE3 LOE4 LOE5 LOE6 
1001 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1002 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1003 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1004 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1005 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1006 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1007 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1008 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1009 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1010 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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1011 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1012 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1013 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1014 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1015 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1016 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1017 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1018 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1019 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1020 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1021 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1022 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1023 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1024 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1025 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1026 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1027 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1028 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1029 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1030 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1031 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1032 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1033 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1034 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1035 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1036 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1037 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1038 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1039 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1040 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1041 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1042 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1043 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1044 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1045 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1046 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1047 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1048 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1049 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1050 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1051 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1052 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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1053 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1054 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1055 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1056 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1057 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1058 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1059 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1060 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1061 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1062 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1063 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1064 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1065 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1066 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1067 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1068 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1069 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1070 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1071 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1072 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1073 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1074 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1075 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1076 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1077 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1078 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1079 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1080 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1081 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1082 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1083 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1084 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1085 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1086 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1087 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1088 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1089 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1090 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1091 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1092 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1093 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1094 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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1095 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1096 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1097 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1098 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1099 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1100 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1101 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1102 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1103 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1104 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1105 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1106 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1107 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1108 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1109 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1110 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1111 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1112 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1113 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1114 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1115 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1116 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1117 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1118 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1119 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1120 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1122 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1123 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1124 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1125 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1126 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1127 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1128 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1129 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1130 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1131 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1132 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1133 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1134 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1135 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1136 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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1137 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1138 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1139 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1140 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1141 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1142 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1143 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1144 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1145 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1146 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1147 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1148 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1149 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1150 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1151 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1152 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1153 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1154 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1155 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1156 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1157 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1158 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1159 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1160 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1161 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1162 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1163 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1164 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1165 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1166 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1167 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1168 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1169 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1170 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1171 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1172 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1173 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1174 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1175 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1176 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1177 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1178 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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1179 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1180 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1181 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1182 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1183 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1184 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1185 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1186 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1187 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1188 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1189 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1190 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1191 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1192 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1193 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1195 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1196 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1197 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1198 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1199 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1200 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1201 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1202 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1203 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1204 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1205 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1206 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1207 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1208 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1209 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1210 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1211 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1212 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1213 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1214 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1215 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1216 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1217 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1218 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1219 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1220 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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1221 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1222 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1223 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1224 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1225 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1226 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1227 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1228 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1229 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1230 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1231 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1232 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1233 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1234 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1235 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1237 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1238 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1239 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1240 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1241 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1242 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1243 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1244 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1245 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1246 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1247 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1248 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1249 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1250 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1251 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1252 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1253 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2001 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2002 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2003 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2004 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2006 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2008 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2009 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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2010 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2011 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2012 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2013 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2014 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2015 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2016 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2017 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2018 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2019 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2020 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2021 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2022 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2023 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2024 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2026 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2027 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2028 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2029 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2030 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2031 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2032 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2033 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2034 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2035 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2036 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2037 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2038 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2039 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2040 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2041 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2042 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2043 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2044 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2045 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2046 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2047 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2048 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2049 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2050 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2051 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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2052 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2053 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2054 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2055 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2056 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2057 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2058 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2059 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2060 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2061 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2062 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2063 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2064 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2065 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2066 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2067 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2068 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2069 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2070 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2071 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2072 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2073 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2074 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2075 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2076 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2077 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2078 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2079 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2080 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2081 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2082 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2083 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2084 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2085 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2086 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2087 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2088 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2089 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2090 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2091 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2092 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2093 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
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2094 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2095 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2096 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2097 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2098 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2099 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2100 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2101 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2102 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2103 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2104 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2105 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2106 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2107 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2108 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2109 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2110 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2111 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2112 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2113 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2114 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2115 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2116 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2117 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2118 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2119 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2120 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2121 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2122 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2123 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2124 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2125 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2126 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2127 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2128 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2129 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2130 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2131 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2132 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2133 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2134 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2135 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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2136 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2137 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2138 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2139 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2140 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2141 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2142 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2144 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2145 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2146 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2147 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2148 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2149 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2150 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2151 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2152 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2153 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2154 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2155 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2156 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2157 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2158 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2159 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2160 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2161 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2162 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2164 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2165 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2166 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2167 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2169 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2170 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2171 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2172 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2173 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2174 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2175 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2176 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2177 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
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2178 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2179 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2180 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2181 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2182 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2183 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2184 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2185 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2186 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2187 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2188 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2189 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2190 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2191 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2192 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2193 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2194 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2196 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2197 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2198 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2199 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2200 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2201 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2202 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2203 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2204 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2205 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2206 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2207 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2208 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2209 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2210 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2211 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2212 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2213 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2214 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2215 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2216 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
 
  
304 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 Occupation  
 B-Collar   W-Collar   PFrmer  
 
Homemaker   Retired   Other  
IDNo OCC1 OCC2 OCC3 OCC4 OCC5 OCC6 
1001 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1002 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1003 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1004 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1005 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1006 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1007 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1008 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1009 0 0 0 0 1 0 
  
305 
 
1010 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1011 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1012 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1013 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1014 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1015 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1016 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1017 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1018 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1019 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1020 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1021 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1022 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1023 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1024 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1025 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1026 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1027 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1028 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1029 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1030 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1031 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1032 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1033 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1034 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1035 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1036 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1037 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1038 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1039 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1040 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1041 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1042 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1043 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1044 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1045 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1046 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1047 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1048 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1049 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1050 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1051 0 0 0 0 1 0 
  
306 
 
1052 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1053 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1054 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1055 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1056 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1057 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1058 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1059 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1060 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1061 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1062 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1063 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1064 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1065 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1066 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1067 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1068 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1069 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1070 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1071 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1072 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1073 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1074 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1075 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1076 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1077 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1078 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1079 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1080 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1081 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1082 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1083 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1084 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1085 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1086 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1087 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1088 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1089 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1090 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1091 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1092 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1093 0 1 0 0 0 0 
  
307 
 
1094 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1095 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1096 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1097 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1098 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1099 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1100 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1101 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1102 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1103 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1104 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1105 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1106 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1107 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1108 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1109 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1110 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1111 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1112 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1113 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1114 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1115 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1116 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1117 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1118 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1119 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1120 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1121 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1122 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1123 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1124 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1125 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1126 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1127 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1128 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1129 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1130 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1131 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1132 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1133 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1134 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1135 0 1 0 0 0 0 
  
308 
 
1136 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1137 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1138 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1139 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1140 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1141 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1142 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1143 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1144 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1145 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1146 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1147 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1148 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1149 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1150 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1151 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1152 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1153 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1154 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1155 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1156 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1157 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1158 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1159 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1160 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1161 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1162 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1163 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1164 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1165 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1166 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1167 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1168 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1169 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1170 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1171 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1172 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1173 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1174 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1175 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1176 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1177 0 1 0 0 0 0 
  
309 
 
1178 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1179 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1180 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1181 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1182 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1183 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1184 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1185 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1186 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1187 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1188 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1189 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1190 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1191 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1192 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1193 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1194 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1195 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1196 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1197 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1198 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1199 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1200 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1201 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1202 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1203 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1204 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1205 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1206 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1207 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1208 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1209 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1210 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1211 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1212 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1213 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1214 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1215 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1216 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1217 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1218 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1219 0 0 0 0 1 0 
  
310 
 
1220 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1221 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1222 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1223 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1224 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1225 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1226 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1227 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1228 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1229 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1230 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1231 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1232 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1233 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1234 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1235 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1236 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1237 1 0 0 0 0 0 
1238 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1239 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1240 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1241 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1242 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1243 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1244 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1245 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1246 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1247 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1248 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1249 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1250 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1251 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1252 0 0 0 0 1 0 
1253 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2001 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2002 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2003 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2004 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2007 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2008 0 0 0 0 1 0 
  
311 
 
2009 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2010 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2011 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2012 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2013 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2014 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2015 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2016 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2017 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2018 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2019 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2020 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2021 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2022 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2023 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2024 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2025 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2026 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2027 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2028 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2029 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2030 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2031 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2032 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2033 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2034 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2035 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2036 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2037 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2038 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2039 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2040 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2041 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2042 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2043 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2044 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2045 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2046 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2047 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2048 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2049 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2050 0 0 0 0 1 0 
  
312 
 
2051 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2052 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2053 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2054 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2055 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2056 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2057 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2058 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2059 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2060 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2061 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2062 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2063 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2064 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2065 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2066 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2067 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2068 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2069 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2070 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2071 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2072 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2073 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2074 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2075 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2076 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2077 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2078 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2079 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2080 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2081 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2082 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2083 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2084 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2085 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2086 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2087 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2088 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2089 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2090 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2091 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2092 0 0 0 0 1 0 
  
313 
 
2093 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2094 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2095 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2096 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2097 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2098 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2099 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2100 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2101 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2102 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2103 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2104 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2105 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2106 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2107 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2108 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2109 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2110 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2111 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2112 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2113 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2114 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2115 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2116 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2117 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2118 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2119 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2120 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2121 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2122 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2123 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2124 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2125 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2126 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2127 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2128 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2129 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2130 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2131 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2132 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2133 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2134 0 1 0 0 0 0 
  
314 
 
2135 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2136 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2137 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2138 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2139 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2140 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2141 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2142 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2143 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2144 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2145 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2146 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2147 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2148 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2149 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2150 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2151 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2152 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2153 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2154 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2155 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2156 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2157 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2158 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2159 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2160 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2161 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2162 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2163 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2164 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2165 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2166 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2167 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2168 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2169 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2170 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2171 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2172 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2173 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2174 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2175 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2176 0 0 0 0 1 0 
  
315 
 
2177 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2178 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2179 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2180 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2181 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2182 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2183 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2184 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2185 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2186 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2187 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2188 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2189 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2190 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2191 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2192 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2193 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2194 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2195 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2196 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2197 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2198 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2199 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2200 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2201 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2202 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2203 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2204 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2205 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2206 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2207 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2208 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2209 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2210 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2211 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2212 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2213 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2214 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2215 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2216 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
 
  
316 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
 Age Level   Household Income Level  
 < 30   30-49   50-65   > 65   < $30K  
 $30K-
85K   > $85K  
IDNo AGE1 AGE2 AGE3 AGE4 HIL1 HIL2 HIL3 
1001 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1002 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1003 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1004 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1005 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1006 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1007 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1008 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1009 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
  
317 
 
1010 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1011 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1012 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1013 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1014 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
1015 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1016 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1017 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1018 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1019 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1020 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1021 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
1022 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1023 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1024 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1025 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1026 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1027 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1028 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1029 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1030 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1031 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1032 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1033 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1034 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1035 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1036 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1037 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1038 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
1039 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1040 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1041 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1042 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
1043 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1044 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1045 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1046 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1047 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1048 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1049 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1050 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1051 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
  
318 
 
1052 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1053 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1054 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1055 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1056 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1057 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1058 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1059 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1060 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1061 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1062 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1063 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1064 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1065 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1066 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1067 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1068 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1069 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1070 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1071 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1072 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1073 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1074 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1075 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1076 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1077 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1078 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1079 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1080 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1081 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1082 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1083 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1084 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1085 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1086 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1087 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1088 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1089 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1090 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1091 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1092 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1093 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
  
319 
 
1094 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1095 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1096 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1097 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1098 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1099 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1100 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1101 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1102 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1103 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1104 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1105 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1106 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1107 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1108 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1109 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1110 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
1111 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1112 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1113 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1114 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1115 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1116 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1117 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1118 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1119 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1120 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1121 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1122 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1123 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1124 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1125 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1126 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1127 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1128 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1129 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1130 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1131 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1132 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1133 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1134 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1135 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
  
320 
 
1136 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1137 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1138 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1139 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1140 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1141 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1142 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1143 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1144 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1145 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1146 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1147 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1148 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1149 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1150 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1151 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1152 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1153 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1154 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1155 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1156 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1157 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1158 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1159 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1160 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1161 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1162 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1163 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1164 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1165 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1166 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1167 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1168 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1169 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1170 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1171 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1172 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1173 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1174 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1175 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1176 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1177 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
  
321 
 
1178 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1179 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1180 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1181 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1182 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1183 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1184 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1185 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1186 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1187 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1188 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1189 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1190 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1191 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1192 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1193 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1194 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1195 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
1196 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1197 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1198 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1199 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1200 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1201 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1202 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1203 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1204 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1205 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1206 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1207 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1208 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1209 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1210 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1211 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
1212 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1213 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1214 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1215 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1216 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1217 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1218 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1219 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
  
322 
 
1220 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1221 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1222 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1223 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1224 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1225 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1226 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1227 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1228 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1229 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1230 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1231 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1232 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1233 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1234 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1235 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1236 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1237 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1238 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1239 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
1240 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1241 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1242 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1243 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1244 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1245 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1246 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1247 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
1248 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1249 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
1250 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
1251 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
1252 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
1253 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2001 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2002 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2003 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2005 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2006 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2007 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2008 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
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2009 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2010 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2011 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2012 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2013 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2014 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2015 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2016 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2017 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2018 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2019 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2020 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2021 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2022 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2023 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2024 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
2025 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2026 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2027 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2028 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2029 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2030 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2031 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2032 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2033 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2034 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2035 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2036 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2037 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2038 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2039 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2040 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2041 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2042 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2043 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2044 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2045 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2046 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2047 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2048 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2049 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2050 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
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2051 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2052 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2053 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2054 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
2055 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2056 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2057 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2058 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2059 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2060 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
2061 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2062 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2063 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2064 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2065 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2066 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2067 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2068 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2069 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2070 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2071 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2072 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2073 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2074 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2075 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2076 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2077 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2078 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2079 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2080 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
2081 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2082 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2083 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2084 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2085 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2086 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2087 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2088 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2089 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2090 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2091 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2092 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
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2093 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2094 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2095 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2096 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2097 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2098 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2099 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2100 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2101 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2102 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2103 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2104 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2105 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2106 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2107 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2108 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2109 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2110 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2111 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2112 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2113 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2114 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2115 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2116 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2117 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2118 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2119 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2120 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
2121 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2122 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2123 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
2124 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2125 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2126 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2127 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2128 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
2129 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2130 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2131 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2132 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2133 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2134 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
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2135 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2136 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2137 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2138 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2139 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2140 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2141 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2142 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2143 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2144 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2145 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2146 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2147 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2148 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2149 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
2150 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2151 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2152 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2153 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2154 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2155 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2156 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
2157 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
2158 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2159 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2160 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2161 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2162 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2163 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2164 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2165 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2166 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2167 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2168 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2169 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2170 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2171 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2172 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2173 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2174 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2175 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2176 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
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2177 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2178 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2179 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
2180 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2181 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2182 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2183 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2184 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2185 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2186 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2187 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2188 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2189 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2190 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2191 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2192 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
2193 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2194 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2195 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2196 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
2197 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2198 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2199 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2200 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
2201 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2202 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
2203 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2204 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
2205 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2206 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2207 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2208 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
2209 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
2210 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2211 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2212 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2213 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2214 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
2215 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
2216 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
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